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ABSTRACT
The thesis investigates the paradoxical developments and implications of the emerging 
Romani (Gypsy) civil rights movement in post-socialist Europe. Focusing on 
contemporary Hungary as a case study for the region, the research covers discursive and 
political frameworks on human rights, and critically analyses their multifaceted 
dimensions, including the role of human rights NGOs and INGOs and the moral 
entrepreneurs who run them. The research uses qualitative methods to investigate the 
activities of non-state actors and social agents which influence both Romani communities 
as well as state policy in Hungary vis-a-vis Roma.
In Hungarian society, the complex discursive shifts on Romani people, from the ‘Gypsy 
problem’ to ‘Roma rights’ are key components of an emerging narrative of liberal human 
rights entrepreneurs engaged in creating a visible space for recognition of the rights of 
Roma. The research investigates how the public face of the ‘movement’ builds itself 
around claims of violence and oppression of Roma. It also reflects upon key strategies 
and technologies employed by the movement’s participants within Hungarian civil 
society.
The co-existence of neoliberal human rights regimes of governance with emancipatory 
discourses indicates, paradoxically, the continuing (reproduction of racialised and other 
hierarchies within the movement itself which reinforce asymmetries of power within 
Hungarian society. Another primary finding is that in practice the movement has 
privileged the pursuit of civil liberties over socio-economic justice for Roma, and has, as 
a result, served to dislocate local Romani communities from decision-making structures.
The thesis argues that ‘counterdiscourses’ to neoliberal human rights approaches are 
effectively marginalized, as particular ‘Roma rights’ frameworks have become impositions 
from outside the Romani communities, generating arenas of strategic instrumentalisation 
by elite participants. Subaltern Romani communities signal their awareness of these 
asymmetries of power, and show their resistance through a strategic display of ironic 
humour and attempts at epistemic disobedience.
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Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself 
and his family, including food, clothing, housing, and medical care and necessaiy social services, 
and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age 
or other lack of livelihood in circumstances byond his control.
Article 25, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948)
Human rights violations are not accidents; they are not random in distribution or effect. Rights 
violations are, rather, ymptoms of deeper pathologies ofpower and are linked intimately to the 
social conditions that so often determine who will suffer abuse and who will be shielded from 
harm.
Paul Farmer, Pathologies of Power (2003)
A.s the global market economy pulverised traditional societies and moralities and drew every 
comer of the planet into a single economic machine, human rights emerged as a secular creed that 
the new global middle class needed in order to justify their domination of the new cosmopolitan 
order.
Kenneth Anderson, formerly of Human Rights Watch (Farmer 2003: 213)
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PREFACE
A.U of my work has been in sum an inventoy of my attachments; all of my work has been, it 
should be understood, a constant revolt against my attachments; all of my work, for certain, has 
been an attempt at.. .reconciliation between the different parts of myself.
--Albert Memmi (1996)
In the spring of 1996, approximately two years prior to embarking upon a doctoral 
programme, I was employed by a newly launched international human rights organization 
in Budapest, Hungary — the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC).1 The primary aim of 
this international non-governmental organization (NGO) - emphasizing its contributions 
to the ‘public interest’ - is to work on behalf of Romani (Gypsy) individuals whose 
human rights have been violated. In other words, the documentation of human rights 
abuses faced by Roma in Europe, and legal intervention on their behalf constitutes the 
primary mission of the work of this NGO. During my first year of work with the ERRC, 
I conducted intensive human rights field missions in the Czech and Slovak Republics 
which culminated in the publication of Time of the Skinheads: Denial and Exclusion of Roma in 
Slovakia, one in a series of human rights reports about Roma in Europe (ERRC 1997). In 
the spring of 1997,1 moved to the ERRC’s expanding legal department, and became the 
co-ordinator of its human rights education programmes, where I continued to work full- 
time until January of 1998.2
1 In 2006, the ERRC marked a decade o f  its existence with the celebration o f  an anniversary event at the 
UK  Embassy in Budapest. The event was hosted by UK ambassador John Nichols and Budapest Mayor 
Gabor Demszky, both o f whom expressed their resounding support for the work o f  the organization; see 
http://www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=2585
2 Though officially registered at LSE by this time, my boss Jim Goldston, then head o f  the legal division o f  
the ERRC, urged me to stay in Budapest until the end o f  the year to complete on-going projects. Goldston 
is executive director o f  Open Society Institute’s Justice Initiative, a global law reform initiative which has 
offices in Abuja, Budapest, and N ew  York City.
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My sociological interests revolving around human rights in Central and Eastern Europe 
have been informed and shaped by these work experiences — some of which I found to 
be surprisingly joyful, and others which I could not ethically sustain - within the world of 
professional human rights. Like David Kennedy (2004), I began to gain an awareness of 
the human rights arena as a site of enormous power and contestation. As I later discovered, this 
reality is rarely acknowledged by most international activists who generally support an 
unproblematic view of human rights advocacy as working against the forces of power,; and 
therefore above critical scrutiny. As a witness to the emerging ‘Roma rights’ movement 
in the post-socialist region (by 2005, the dynamic connections to elite human rights 
entrepreneurs and European bureaucrats had given this embryonic movement a pan- 
European fa9 ade, despite clearly distinct discursive trajectories)3,1 began to perceive, and 
thus question, some fundamental problems and paradoxes inherent in the lifeworld of 
professional human rights, and in particular, vis-a-vis Romani communities.
How was it that the movement for the rights of Roma in post-socialist Eastern Europe 
had become dominated by those who were in fact from outside Romani communities 
themselves - Western and Western-educated human rights entrepreneurs, the majority of 
whom are not Romanies - indeed, persons like myself? Why and how were American- 
style discourses on civil liberties and human rights, along with their attendant legal 
practices, becoming hegemonic within post-socialist east European societies in such a 
short span of time? If one of the implicit goals of human rights entrepreneurs in the 
region had been to construct an oppositional discourse on Romani peoples from that of 
‘deviant’ and ‘problematic objects’ to that of active subjects, indeed, citizens worthy of 
human rights protection, just how successful had they been in this venture? How was it
3 The term ‘human rights entrepreneur’ is an adaptation o f  Becker’s (1963) concept o f ‘moral entrepreneur’, 
applied to the arena o f  contemporary human rights, particularly in post-socialist Europe. I elaborate further 
on this concept in Chapter One. For an insightful exploration o f  the complexities o f  the discursive 
frameworks which have emerged on Romani peoples within Europe, see Simhandl (2006).
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that millions of euros were being spent on state and private projects that were putatively 
supporting the integration of historically dehumanized, ‘othered’, and marginalized 
communities in the region, and yet, over ten years on, the fruits of these social 
investments had at best achieved only mixed results in terms of their life chances? Had 
neoliberal policy trajectories in post-socialist Hungary strengthened structural 
impediments to Romani integration, and to what extent were human rights entrepreneurs 
in the region cognizant of the paradox of their embrace of neoliberalism? Within this 
social field, led primarily by Euro-American elites4, what was the position of Romani 
peoples themselves: a culturally complex conglomerate of communities whose socio­
economic circumstances had deteriorated from the late socialist times of the 1980s, to 
the present neoliberal political order?
These were the profoundly troubling questions that began to emerge at the front and 
centre of my mind as I tried to grapple with the paradoxical realities that confronted me 
when I visited some of the most socio-economically marginalized communities and 
villages in present day Europe, pockets of humanity which have been rendered zones of 
‘infra-humanity’ with very little understanding from the outside world (Gilroy 2000a; 
2000b).5 To my mind, the ‘time of the Gypsies’6 has yet to arrive, to a European 
civilization which in many respects still views Roma from the persistently pathologising 
medieval imagery of ‘wayward Gypsies’.
4 Although I use the term ‘elite’, I am aware o f  the relative nature o f  this term, especially with respect to the 
area o f  Romani activism; nonetheless, work with Roma (Gypsies) provides a path to a ‘quasi-elite’ status 
for marginal intellectuals and professionals, particularly for Western Europeans. I owe this insight to 
Professor Thomas Acton. There is further variation to this ‘quasi-elite’ status depending on class, ethnicity, 
and political affiliation.
5 Paul Gilroy (2000a; 2000b) uses this term in poignant reference to both the Black Atlantic diaspora and 
the ‘enemy’ detainees in Guantanamo bay (Cuba) held by the US government at its military base there. I 
develop this concept with reference to Roma further in Chapter two.
6 The evocative phrase Tim e o f the Gypsies’ was first used by film director Emir Kusturica in his 1989 film 
o f  the same name; the central characters were Romanies from Yugoslavia. It is also the title o f  a book by 
British anthropologist Michael Stewart (1997), who conducted his fieldwork in late socialist Hungary.
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In this thesis, I take on the task of deconstructing what is now popularly known as 
‘Roma rights’ with some trepidation. Having been a strong supporter and a participant 
within this movement in the past, it has been useful to take a step back and assess its 
aims, claims and strategies, as well as its discursive and policy impact on the Romani 
populations of Central and Eastern Europe. Making sense of contentious existential 
questions and traversing through the minefields of myths on Roma in mainstream 
academic work has proven to be a difficult journey. I am aware of the choices I have had 
to make to narrow my intellectual peregrinations, and to present research which is 
‘manageable’ enough to complete as a doctoral monograph. Thus, I have had to forego 
addressing many interesting questions and key dimensions of the research that would be 
critical to explore in future work.
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION
1.1 The problem of European anti-Gypsyism
A. people are hounded from place to place in Europe throughout the centuries, and treated like 
the heasts of the wilderness. Laws are devised so cruel that even the judges still mesmerised by 
the Carolina criminalis deem them too severe, and refrain from applying them. For every penal 
statute presupposes a criminal act, hutfor these venerable judges it was something new that the 
m ere existence o f a people constitu ted a crim inal act —  A. Welcker, “Die 
Ziguenerplage”/ “The Gypsy Nuisance”, 1902 (dted in Heuss 2000)
The Gypsy problem [sic] is a litmus test not of democracy but of a civil society... the two are 
certainly two sides of the same coin; one is unthinkable without the other. One means legislation 
to enable the people to vote and make them the source of power. The civil society is  
related to human behavior.
— Vaclav Havel, playwright and former President of the Czech Republic, (N Y T  
1993)
The Romani subaltern7 — still to be fully acknowledged in Europe — has been subjected 
to the disciplinary exigencies of ‘infra-humanity’, in this particular case manifested by 
their sheer invisibility as humans within European discursive and social fabrics, from 
history books to everyday workplaces.8 Where you will find Romani people — real or 
fictitious — will be in the minds of Europeans who have otherised them, proffering them a 
kind of ‘distorted’ visibility (Clark 2004; Hancock 1997; Heuss 2000). In today’s Europe
7 Though I use the terms Roma, Romanies, (Romani as an adjective) and Gypsies freely and 
interchangeably in this text, there are certain important distinctions, which are also contextually bound. 
Within Hungary for example, Gypsy groups are generally divided into three broad categories: Hungarian 
Roma or Romungre (the majority o f  whom speak Hungarian as a mother tongue today, although their 
ancestors were Romani speakers who underwent linguistic assimilation), Vlach Roma (Olah, many o f  
whom continue to speak Romani as a mother tongue), and Beash (many o f  whom speak an archaic form o f  
the Romanian language as a mother tongue). Within these groups, there are further divisions, primarily 
based on traditional occupations and dialect. Thus, the diversity within the peoples referred to as “Roma’ or 
‘Gypsy’ must never be underestimated. The term subaltern refers here to the marginalized position o f  
Roma. First used in 1930s Italy by Gramsci (2001) to refer to certain groups who were outside formal 
structures o f  politics, it became common usage within postcolonial studies in the 1980s, where it spawned 
an entire sub-discipline ‘subaltern studies’ (Guha and Spivak 1988). Recently, it has gained currency 
amongst critical social theorists (Fraser, N . 1992; de Sousa Santos 2002; W oodiwiss 2006).
8 Everyday workplaces are one site o f  ‘everyday racism’ for Roma. Essed (2001:177) has coined the term 
‘everyday racism’ to refer to the connection between structural and ideological forces o f  racism with 
“routine situations in everyday life”. I apply this concept with respect to Hungarian Roma in later sections 
o f  this thesis.
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(both ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ halves), within this falsely constructed and vigorously 
recycled imaginarium of the ‘Gypsy problem’, Romani persons occupy varying paradoxical 
positions ranging from ‘annoying’ beggars, welfare dependents, thieves, and prostitutes, 
to exotic dancers and wedding musicians. And-Gypsyism is ubiquitous in contemporary 
‘post-modem’, ‘post-colonial’ Europe, and certainly poses a grave challenge to our 
understanding of aspirational or emergent cosmopolitanism (Ansley 2005; Garavito- 
Rodriguez & de Sousa Santos 2005; Trehan and Kocze 2009).9
Within the erstwhile socialist east European states, under one-party rule, this essentialised 
' iconography of deviance and otherness was contained to some extent by the all-pervasive 
State which disavowed open displays of ethnicity, and celebrated, at least rhetorically, 
‘worker’s solidarity’ across ethnic lines. By minimizing various cultural markers such as 
language and clothing, as well as seasonal economic migration, the socialist State offered 
Roma the possibility to join the proletariat classes through socio-economic integration. 
You could be a good Bulgarian, a good Hungarian, a good Slovak, a good comrade — 
even if you were an ‘inferior Gypsy’. There was a place for you at the common table, 
despite your seat being a bit rickety, and your cloth napkin tattered. I take up the subject 
of discursive practices vis-a-vis Roma in socialist Hungary in greater depth in Chapter 
Four of this thesis.
The ‘civilizin g m ission* o f the H absburgs
Attempts at systematic assimilation of Romani communities (or ‘Gypsy’ communities as 
they were then known in society) in central Europe date back to the Habsburg Empire
9 My personal experiences within UK academia have confirmed for me the diffuse nature o f  European 
anti-Gypsyism. N ot too long ago, a white European academic who completed a doctorate from the 
University o f  London, and a person who (notably) specializes in gender studies told me that “Gypsies are 
dirty and disgusting”. This denigrating statement suggests the entrenched and pervasive nature o f  this form 
o f ‘acceptable’ prejudice within so-called progressive intellectual circles in contemporary Europe. Another 
colleague, a doctoral student from southeastern Europe, made an ironic ‘joke’ about the recent accession to 
the EU o f  two new Balkan countries, commenting dryly, “.. .well, o f  course I know about Gypsies in the 
Balkans - my research focuses on crime!” (Trehan 2006).
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during the era of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy. The Austro-Hungarian Empire 
in the late 18th century covered present-day Austria, Hungary, parts of Italy, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, southern Poland and the Ukraine, the Banat and Transylvania 
(Romania), Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and northern Serbia; in other words, huge swathes 
of territory on which Romani communities were resident. However, the civilizing mission 
of Empress Maria Theresa, and her son, Emperor Joseph II (referred to as an 
‘enlightened absolutist’ by some historians10), resulted in draconian measures towards 
their Romani subjects. The Habsburg’s experiments with assimilation of Roma were 
essentially a series of special regulatory decrees enacted over a thirty year period from 
1753 to 1783. Initially, these measures appeared inclusive in nature, for example, the 
provision of land for Romani settlement, permission for the conduct of artisan trades, 
and the opening up of guild membership. In addition, Romanies were to be called ‘new 
Hungarians’ or ‘new peasants’ (the use of the term ‘Gypsy’ being discouraged in official 
usage). Nonetheless, the decrees became progressively harsher and, by 1772, mandatory 
military service was enacted for all Romani males above the age of sixteen; Romanes, the 
mother tongue was prohibited, along with the wearing of traditional dress, marriage 
amongst Roma, or even keeping custody of children. Romani children were to be placed 
in foster homes with peasant families from the age of four, and the counties were to pay 
the farmers directly for their maintenance costs. In reality though, many children ran 
away and ultimately found their way back to their own families (Kallai and Torzsok 2000: 
9-11; Kemeny 2005: 15-17).
As seen from the previous example, a conscious effort was made by the Habsburgs of 
the time to eliminate ‘Gypsy’ identity from Austro-Hungarian lands; nonetheless, the
10 See for example, Hunyadi-Balazs (1997), Szabo (1994), and Scott (1990).
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Romani body itself was ‘salvaged’ and became a site of cultural colonisation.11 In some 
other areas of Europe, for example, in present-day Denmark, Portugal, Spain, and 
England, various pieces of legislation made it a crime merely to be Romani, and there were 
harsh punishments decreed (including expulsion on pain of death) in an attempt to 
dissuade Roma from even entering these lands (Fraser 1992; Heuss 2000). Thus, in 
relative terms, the Habsburgs were perhaps more ‘enlightened’ than their other European 
contemporaries, as they at least accepted the corporeal humanity of Roma, despite viewing 
Romani culture to be both deeply alien and inherendy flawed.12
This imperial, civilking mission suggests strong parallels with the foundations of the 
British colonial mindset in both the American colonies and New South Wales (Australia), 
where indigenous children were forcibly removed from their families and placed in foster 
care (usually within day and boarding schools) for the purpose of civilizing them, with an 
emphasis on making ‘good Christians’ of them, without regard for the negation of their 
core identity and culture (Bud 2004:1-4).13 Fortunately for some Romani families living 
under Habsburg rule, local authorities responsible for the implementation of these new 
regulations did not fully comply with them. Investing in Romani ‘integration’ was not 
necessarily a desirable objective, guild membership for Roma was rejected by members 
who feared added competition from Romani artisans, and the social conflict and financial 
costs associated with the forcible removal of Romani children from their families and
11 Over a hundred years later, Archduke Josef Karl Ludwig o f  the Austrian Habsburgs became an 
aficionado o f  Romani language and culture. Nicknamed the ‘Gypsy Archduke’, he collaborated with his 
contemporary, Romani intellectual Franz Sztojka Nagyidai, to bring out a dictionary o f  Romanes in the late 
1800s (NYT 1888). Chapter Two provides more details o f  early Orientalists such as Archduke Josef, who  
were known as ‘Gypsylorists’, based on their affiliation with the Gypsy Lore Society.
12 The humanity o f  Roma was denied in a far more egregious way by the Nazis, for whom Roma and Sinti 
were lebensunwertesleben, that is, ‘lives unworthy o f  life’. It has been conservatively estimated that well over 
500,000 Roma perished in the genocidal campaigns o f the Nazis and their allies in Europe from 1939-1945, 
though it is likely we shall never be able to account for all those who went missing. The fate o f  Romani 
survivors post-Holocaust and their descendants remains grim and under-researched (Friedman 1995; 
Hancock 1989,1997,2000).
13 Boarding schools for native American children in the US became more common by the late 1870s, 
ensuring their isolation from the ‘contaminating’ influences o f  their own peoples (Buti 2004: 4).
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placement in foster homes proved to be a significant deterrent. Romani assimilation 
therefore remained a ‘failed experiment’, mired at the level of legislative declaration: by 
the late 1780s, the ‘Gypsy question’ was no longer o f official interest to the Habsburgs, 
and disappeared from the official imperial agenda with the closure o f the Department of 
Gypsy Affairs in 1787 (Kemeny 2005: 15-17; Johnson 1998). Nonetheless, the policies of 
the time reflected the pervasive belief in Gypsy ‘deviance’ and ‘inferiority’ within Austro- 
Hungarian society, and this continues to have significant repercussions for Romani 
communities, as pernicious narratives of Gypsy otherness continue to reproduce themselves 
in contemporary Europe.14 These civilizing impulses targeting Romanies have been 
coupled with broader and diffuse relations of coloniality and (neo)coloniality with respect 
to the Central East European region, and are covered later in the thesis.
Figure 1 -  “Gypsy family with cimbalom and double bass’, image from postcard,
%
Maar, Hungary (1929), source: Ethnographic Museum, Budapest
14 In Hungary today, less than 15% of Roma speak a dialect o f the Romani language, and this can be 
attributed in part to the antipathy towards the Romani culture during the time o f the Habsburgs, who 
attempted assimilation. There are ethnolects which are mixtures o f  Hungarian and Romani languages that 
are widespread in the Romungre (Hungarian Romani) communities (Hancock 2007).
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1.2 The post-socialist setting in Hungary
There are approximately 700,000 Romani citizens in post-socialist Hungary today. This 
figure is based on data gathered from representative sample surveys conducted by 
Hungarian social scientists (cf. Kemeny and Janky 2005), and does not represent official 
statistics on the Romani population from national census data, which are considerably 
lower, partly as a result of the strong stigma - and internalized stigmatization - attached to 
Romani identity which results in a general caution in self-identifying as Romani (cf. Clark 
1998; Barany 2002: 159-160).15 Though residing in all o f Hungary’s counties, there are 
large Romani communities in the north and northeast o f the country (from the Matra 
Hills eastwards to Debrecen); in the Transdanubian region, including Baranya county; the 
Great Plains region, and Budapest and its environs (see map below).
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Figure 2 - Map of Hungary, source: Lonely Planet (2006)
15 For an explanation o f stigma and the processes o f  stigmatization, see Goffman (1963: 46). Romani 
ethnicity is a complex construction, and like other ethnicities, a fluid phenomenon. Moreover, persons 
having one Romani parent, and another non-Romani parent, may self-identify in complex ways, depending 
on various factors, including age (generational belonging) and community setting. For example, a female 
rap singer in Hungary, Fatima, o f  the band Fekete Vonat (Black Train*) has an Arab (Egyptian) father and a 
Romani mother. Very few studies have been done in this area, but suffice to say, contrary to popular 
mythology, Romani communities are not hermetically sealed, despite the fact that spatial segregation is 
pronounced, and indeed, is rising since the collapse o f actually existing socialism.
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Many of these sub-regions within Hungary have been economically depressed since the 
mid-1980s. Romani communities themselves are highly diverse, both linguistically and 
culturally, as well as a result of different historical experiences, including slavery for some 
communities (Hancock 1987; Achim 2004). The levels of assimilation or integration 
within Hungarian society also vary according to community background and state policy 
directed at them under successive regimes. Nonetheless, taken as a whole, Romanies 
comprise the most marginalized ethnic minority in Hungary: more than 50% are officially 
unemployed, and in some so-called ‘compact communities’ — a polite sociological 
euphemism for highly segregated settlements — the official rate of unemployment hovers 
around 99%. In contrast, under actually existing socialism, Romanies had relative income 
security, and by the 1980s, Hungary could boast employment rates for Romani men 
comparable to other Hungarian citizens.
Male and Female Employment Rates as a Percentage of Roma of Working Age
1971 1978 1987 1993 2003
% N % N % N % N % N
Men 85.2 na. 77.3 1421 74.4 1966 28.8 2456 28.0 1616
Women 30.3 na. 47.0 1454 49.3 1922 16.3 2386 15.1 1718
Total na. na. 62.0 2875 62.0 3888 22.6 4842 21.4 3334
Figure 3 - Official Employment Rates of Roma in Hungary (1971-2003)
*Source of 1978 and 1987 data is the 1993 survey by Kemeny and Janky (2005:175), extracted from 
Kemeny (2005).
As John Wrench (2006) of the EU’s Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 
(EUMC) has noted, their integration into the larger social fabric - primarily through 
educational integration - has become a priority for all new EU member-states.
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1.3 The emergence of ‘human lights entrepreneurship*
In order to define behavior, an act of enterprise is necessary - Becker (1963)
One response to rising hostility and xenophobia - both officially, and in the public 
discourse since the fall of actually existing socialist regimes - has been the formation of a 
collective political consciousness amongst diverse groups of Roma. Within post-socialist 
Hungary, widely recognized amongst European policy-makers for its liberal and 
enlightened minorities’ policies, there are a large number of Romani cultural associations 
(some of them active since the 1980s), development and human rights NGOs (primarily 
launched in the mid-1990s), and media initiatives whose purpose is to raise the visibility 
of the Romani community. Parallel to these developments in the non-govemmental 
sector, a network of bureaucratic institutions resulting from Hungary’s ‘pro-minorities’ 
legislation in the early 1990s has also emerged, particularly those local offices connected 
to the Minority Self-Governments. This institutional expansion surrounding Romani 
issues has generated a particular nomenklatura of Hungarians - some of whom are 
Romanies themselves - whose primary task is to govern and manage the growing Romani 
minority (Kovats 1998, 2001a, 2001c; Trehan 2006b). They comprise a newly emerging 
epistemic community which generates knowledge and sets policy agendas in the area of 
Romani social inclusion (cf. Haas 1992).16
Throughout this thesis, I refer to one sub-section of this epistemic community as ‘human 
rights entrepreneurs’. I adapted this concept from Howard Becker’s (1963) ideas on 
moral entrepreneurship and the moral entrepreneur, building upon them in the context 
of human rights movements. Specifically, in the case of the rights movement for Roma, 
anti-racist activists working in post-socialist Eastern Europe function as moral
16Peter Haas (1992: 3) defines an epistemic community as “ ...a network o f  knowledge-based experts or 
groups with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within the domain o f  their expertise. 
Members hold a common set o f  causal beliefs and share notions o f  validity based on internally defined 
criteria for evaluation, common policy projects, and shared normative commitments.”
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entrepreneurs as they proscribe certain kinds of behaviour in their societies. Through 
their interventions at national and European levels, they exhort politicians and polities to 
overcome their racism towards Roma, emphasizing that it is not tolerable in an 
enlightened, contemporary Europe. Thus, while previous generations of Europeans 
viewed Roma as ‘problems’ (and to a large extent, still do), and therefore willingly 
supported anti-Gypsyism in their society, human rights activists working in the area of 
Romani civil rights view racism itself as one of the core problems of contemporary 
Europe and broadly attribute the Romani communities’ current predicament to it. Thus, 
moral entrepreneurs in the arena of human rights are persons who attempt to generate 
and/or enforce moral conduct (as they view it), seeking to influence groups to adopt or 
maintain particular norms. Becker (1963) divided moral entrepreneurs into two primary 
categories: rule creators and rule enforcers. He viewed rule creators as moral crusaders, as they 
are chiefly concerned with the successful persuasion of others (though they are not 
necessarily concerned with the means by which this is achieved). Becker also noted that 
moral crusades are generally dominated by those in the upper social strata of society:
Moral crusaders must have power, public support, generate public awareness of
the issue, and be able to propose a clear and acceptable solution to the problem 
(Becker 1963:147-148).
The majority of human rights entrepreneurs working in Romani rights issues fall into the
former category of rule creator as they are primarily concerned with the expansion of
human rights norms. In addition, I argue that human rights entrepreneurs exhibit
‘classical’ entrepreneurial skills when they seize opportunities for working in post-socialist
civil societies in the areas of democratisation and human rights. The overwhelming
majority of these human rights entrepreneurs are non-Roma, and the implications of this
are raised in the thesis.
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1.4 Thesis summary and research questions
Post-1989 Hungary witnessed a dramatic rise in the number of both domestic and 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) which embraced the tools of 
human rights advocacy. Domestic Romani activists began to contest violence and 
hostility towards their communities in CEE countries, whilst INGO human rights 
interventions tended to focus on reforms at the constitutional and legislative level 
(Trehan 2001). In post-socialist countries, civil society (that is, religious groups, 
independent media, NGOs, private foundations, and so forth) emerged as an influential 
force, and during the mid-1990s, Hungary had one of the largest numbers of NGOs per 
capita in Europe. Indeed, during the late 1990s, there were approximately 50,000 
registered NGOs in the country, with an estimated 10,000 considered to be ‘active* 
NGOs (Kud 1996; NIOK 2004; World Bank 2005).
It was in the late 1980s that Romani activists, along with former dissidents and liberals in 
the emerging Romani emancipation movement began to visibly contest the vilification of 
Romanies as belonging to a ‘criminal subculture* and to challenge the ‘Gypsy problem* 
discourse by exposing discrimination and racism on the part of the state and private 
actors. While the ‘Gypsy problem* discourse — covered in Chapters 2 and 4 - constructs 
the problems that Roma experience, such as unemployment, poverty, poor educational 
achievement, and other manifestations of social marginalisation as essentialised by­
products of their own culture (for example, Roma being perceived as ‘socially 
unadaptable* and intellectually deficient), the emerging ‘Romani rights* discourse - 
covered at length in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 - focuses on racism and discrimination as lying 
at the roots of the problems that Roma face (cf. Kohn 1995; Trehan 2006a). By analysing 
the corpus of materials covering the human rights of Hungarian Roma documented by 
various NGOs and international organisations since the early 1990s - as well as the
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personal narratives of key individuals who have attempted to fight anti-Gypsyism - I 
exposed the ideologies which underpin their work. In investigating the sources and forms 
of human rights discourses and their social construction, as well as the practical influence 
of the expanding third sector (primarily non-governmental organisations) on Romani 
communities in Hungary, I examined the dominant role of human rights entrepreneurs, 
an elaboration of Becker’s ‘moral entrepreneur’ concept (1963) within the arena of 
contemporary human rights. To a large extent, the remarkable shift in the public 
discourse on Roma from that of ‘Gypsy problem’ ('ciganjproblema) to the more politically 
correct concept of ‘Roma rights’ within merely one decade has been the result of 
vigorous efforts on the part of human rights entrepreneurs, both Hungarian and those 
from abroad (in particular, the United States).
The core questions addressed in my work are the following:
- Is the discursive shift from ‘Gypsy problem’ to ‘Roma rights’ an indicator of parallel 
changes in practices related to the treatment of Romanies in Hungary? Or are the 
changes merely visible at the level of “elite discourse” (Van Dijk 1993), perhaps 
functioning to conceal discriminatory practices at the societal level?
- How has a primarily neoliberal human rights approach manifested itself in the ‘Romani 
rights’ movement? What order is it (reproducing and whose interests does this reflect? 
What happens to emerging human rights movements in an age of neoliberal policy 
hegemony? Furthermore, as the thesis investigates human rights discourses in post­
socialist Hungary, and as INGOs and NGOs have been the primary vehicles for the 
generation and diffusion of these discourses, additional questions revolving around the 
NGO sector are posed in the thesis:
- What are the origins of ‘Roma rights’ discourse currently promoted by NGOs in 
Hungary?
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- How do the ideologies adapted by NGOs in Hungary articulate, construct, shape 
and/or penetrate Romani ideological forms and advocacy culture?
- How do they relate to global (neoliberal) social forces and political structure(s)?
- What connections exist, if any, between discourse and practice in the work of the 
NGOs?
- Inherent to the neoliberal, technocratic policy approach towards NGO development, 
how has the TMGOization’ of human rights (Lang 1997; Jad 2003; Roy 2004; Stubbs 
2007a) impacted the development of an autonomous, democratic voice representing the 
needs of European Romani communities?
- Are there alternatives to the current trajectory of the INGO-led Homa rights’ 
movement?
1.5 Summary of chapters
Chapter Two: Towards the development of a critical studies approach to human 
rights and Romani studies
This chapter contextualises the interdisciplinary research that emerges within my thesis, 
exploring critical sociological theories and their applicability to the lifeworld of human 
rights entrepreneurs in post-socialist Hungary. Key literatures include texts within the 
sociology of human rights, critical ‘race’ studies, social movements and civil society, and 
the emerging field of Romani studies. In addition, I trace the development of a specific 
type of Orientalism to have emerged in Europe vis-a-vis Roma — Gypsylorism - and 
discuss its impact on research in the Romani studies area.
Chapter Three: Methodology, Methods and Sources
This chapter expounds on both my methodological framework and research methods. I 
sought to understand how social ‘reality’ is constructed in Hungary by anthropologists,
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sociologists, and other social scientists, as well as how Romani activists and human rights 
entrepreneurs navigate and shape this social reality through their own interventions. I 
employed a qualitative and reflexive approach, combining intensive ethnographic field 
research and participant observation with critical analysis of key texts generated by 
human rights entrepreneurs. In addition, semi-structured interviews with policy elites as 
well as numerous dialogic conversations with NGO activists were conducted.
Chapter Four: Discursive and political antecedents of the ‘transition’ era: the 
transformation of the ‘Gypsy problem’ to ‘Roma rights’
This chapter offers a historical contexualisation of the discourse on Roma in Hungary 
from the 1960s to the 1980s, focusing on the primary ideas and ideologies of the socialist 
era. The role of social scientists and Romani dissidents in the construction and (de) 
construction of the ‘Gypsy problem’ discourse (commonly referred to as the ‘Gypsy 
question*) is explored. In addition, the voices of prominent Romani intellectuals and 
elites who participated in the construction of public narratives on the human rights of 
Roma serve to highlight the continuities and discontinuities of discourses from this era to 
the present day. In addition, illustrations of discursive and policy transformation as 
exhibited in the Hungarian press from the period of 1950s socialism to transitional 
Hungary of the early 1990s are included.
Chapter Five: ‘Roma Rights’ -  Origins, Framework, and Practices
This chapter, the first of three related Chapters (5-7) comprising the empirical heart of 
the thesis, focuses on the rise and role of Romani-related NGOs in Hungary. Chapter 5 
discusses the four key sources - primarily reactions to the problems confronting Roma in 
‘transition* Hungary - of the rise of Tloma rights* discursive practices in post-socialist 
Hungary. These include a) the collapse of socialist ideologies and structures which 
created an ideological vacuum for the absorption of aspects of neoliberal human rights
discourses and practice, as well as a space for growing nationalism, b) increasing racist 
violence and scapegoating of Roma, c) the general disillusionment of Romani 
representatives with mainstream political parties and electoral politics (especially after 
1995), and d) the expansion into Hungary of Western philanthropic groups, human rights 
entrepreneurs, and capital from primarily, though not exclusively, American sources. 
Chapter Six: The influence and impact of NGOs in the ‘Roma rights' arena
This chapter connects the rise of human rights entrepreneurship covered in Chapter 
Five, and analyses critical issues related to the rapid consolidation of the Roma NGO 
sector in Hungary in the 1990s. It then covers the work of elite NGOs and interrogates 
their role vis-a-vis the social construction of ‘Roma rights’ discourses and its significance 
for Romani communities. In addition, it looks at the impact of increasing 
institutionalisationof NGOs (NGO-isation) and its impact.
Chapter Seven: Popular discontent - consequences of and challenges to neoliberal 
conceptions of human rights
This chapter pursues some of the questions raised in Chapters 5 and 6 to expose the 
limitations of contemporary neoliberal human rights ideologies and practices in Hungary. 
It offers insights into critical debates within the human rights arena itself, for example, 
the impact of litigation and legislation; the limits of the ‘rule-of-law’ approach; and the 
power asymmetries between human rights lawyers and entrepreneurs and their Romani 
clients. I also discuss how the ‘professional’, top-down, technocratic human rights model 
for achieving rights for Roma has become hegemonic and furthermore, elides with the 
neoliberal trajectories of INGOs. An additional challenge posed for Romani intellectuals 
and others is the hidden danger of a diffusion of ‘Roma rights’ discourses themselves: 
there is rising concern that the discourse itself may increase anti-Gypsyism and social 
exclusion by emphasriing ‘Romani difference’ or ‘exceptionality’ to the majority of
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Hungarians, thereby exacerbating the existing social distance between Roma and other 
Hungarian citi2 ens (cf. Kovats 2001a). This chapter reflects on the contentious meaning 
of emerging human rights discourses and political organizing around Romani 
emancipation in the context of post-socialist Hungary.
Chapter Eight: Conclusion - the moral entrepreneurship of the Romani subaltern
This final chapter summarises the primary arguments and observations of the thesis. The 
empirical evidence challenges the a priori belief in the effectiveness of the liberal human 
rights framework, as well as policy practices emanating from within the ‘Roma rights’ 
context. This human rights approach, as espoused by ‘Roma rights’ human rights 
entrepreneurs and their constructed constituency, has resulted in a paradoxical outcome. On 
the one hand, it has strengthened the awareness of human rights discourses within 
Hungary; on the other hand, NGOs who promote this liberal human rights framework 
are themselves the site of asymmetries and hierarchies which pose serious obstacles to 
the construction of alternative emancipatory pathways for social justice.
Therefore, for the Romani communities of post-socialist Europe, the movement as 
currendy led by human rights entrepreneurs who conform to and/or subscribe to the 
neoliberal agenda for socio-economic transformation in the region can only go so far in 
attempting to overcome the entrenched problems of deprivation they face. Conversely, it 
may actually obscure relations of domination and structural violence embedded within 
Hungarian civil society and internationally, particularly with respect to the work of 
INGOs. Evidence suggests that the neoliberal approach to human rights work is not 
necessarily geared towards meeting the needs of the vast majority of Romani-Hungarians, 
let alone equipped to reaching an understanding with the Hungarian population at large. 
The prospects for convivial existence as discussed by social theorists such as Gilroy 
(2004) or cross-community solidarity will remain without promise as long as a narrow 
focus on the achievement of legal rights and law reform takes precedence over socio­
33
economic justice. The thesis also touches upon the implications of Hungary’s accession 
to the European Union and the pan-European dimension of ‘Roma rights’. I suggest that 
contemporary policy on Romani peoples is increasingly becoming consolidated at the 
European institutional level within a small circle of policy elites who are even more 
removed from the mass of Romani European citizens than those in Eastern Europe.17
17 See the ‘Decade o f  Roma Inclusion’ and the open letter from over 50 prominent MEPs on 15 October 
2007 to Janez Jansa, Slovenian Prime Minister (cf. de Groene-Kouwenhoven 2007) during the period o f  
the Slovenian EU Presidency, giving impetus for a consolidation o f  policy on Roma at the European level. 
This eventually culminated in the first EU Roma Summit held in Brussels on 16 September 2008, and was 
followed up by the more recent ‘Roma Platform’ meeting in April 2009.
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CHAPTER TWO -  TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CRITICAL 
STUDIES APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND ROMANI STUDIES
This chapter contextualises the inter-disciplinary research strands that emerge within the 
thesis, exploring critical theories and their applicability to the human rights of Roma in 
post-socialist Hungary. I grapple with the literature in the sociology of human rights, 
critical ‘race’ studies, NGOs and social movements, post-socialist studies, as well as the 
emerging field of Romani studies.
2.1 A critical sociology of human rights
Although historically the study of human rights has been dominated by positivist 
approaches, p rimarily by Western scholars with legal backgrounds who after the end of 
WWII and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
subscribed to doctrinal ‘universalist principles’ of human rights, contemporary 
sociological and ethnographic scholarship on human rights appears to be moving 
towards an invigorating inter-disciplinarity which aids in contextualizing human rights 
struggles. My research is informed by theoretical contributions in the areas of critical 
legal scholarship (Douzinas 2000; Garavito-Rodriguez & de Sousa Santos 2005; Kennedy 
2004; Mutua 2002; O’Connell 2007; Williams 1991; Wright 2001), sociological and 
political considerations of human rights (Chandler 2002; Cohen 2001; Cohen and Seu 
2002; Evans 2001, 2005; de Waal 1997, 2003; Farmer 2003; Guilhot 2005; Nash 2007; 
Pogany 2004; Toivanen 2004; Welch 2001; Woodiwiss 2005), as well as a critical reading 
of the autobiographical works of liberal human rights entrepreneurs themselves (Laber 
2002; Neier 2004). More recently, ethnographies of human rights organizations such as 
Amnesty International (Hopgood 2005) have emerged, expanding our understanding of the 
ideologies and motivations of campaigners, as well as the intricacies of work within 
advocacy organizations. In addition, scholarship on the internal dynamics and politics of
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the US civil rights movement and the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, have 
enriched our understanding of the complex tensions within emancipation movements 
(Brienes 2006; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). Welch (2001), Ost (2005), and others 
point to the importance of contextualising human rights discourses generated by activists 
in post-socialist Europe within a globalised discursive setting. The writings of Keck and 
Sikkink (1998) offer further insights on the role of transnational advocacy, as well as the 
rise of networks and epistemic communities amongst such activists.
The sociological study of human rights requires scholars to suspend normative 
assumptions and pre-suppositions about the ‘inherent benevolence’ of human rights 
activities, and focus on the interplay of discourse and praxis within the human rights 
arena. It problematises areas of human life which are contentious, emotive and, 
significantly, annas of contemporaiy power. My research grounds this body of critical 
scholarship on human rights with the realities of the Romani movement in Hungary by 
examining post-socialist human rights discourse and praxis.
2.2 The Romani subaltern and ‘white* civil society: NGOs, social movements and 
critical race analysis
A. dijfennt pictun emerges if  from the beginning one admits the coexistence of 
competing public sphens and takes account of the dynamics of those processes of 
communication that an excluded from the dominantpublic sphen 
- Habermas (1992: 425), cited in Jacobs (2000: 20)
‘W hite civil society* and the ‘Roma rights*m ovem ent
The employment of a critical intersectional approach (examining both questions of 
power and positionality with respect to class, gender, ethnicity and other vectors of 
identity) is fundamental to a deeper, more nuanced understanding of the hierarchies 
embedded within the domain of civil society. Thus, it is no coincidence that a Romani 
woman activist from an isolated eastern Hungarian village has a decidedly different voice
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within the human rights arena than an Ivy League-educated male lawyer who holds an 
American passport.
A number of conceptual critiques of the contemporary liberal human rights framework 
apply both to the interventions of the state, to the role of NGO actors, as well as the 
complex and dynamic interplay between the two. As my research confirms, the bulk of 
reports, statistics and other forms of literature on policy vis-a-vis Roma are generated by 
academics, governmental bodies and NGOs external to the Romani community, with 
minimal or only symbolic input from Romani representatives themselves. This fact alone 
suggests the (re) emergence of asymmetries of knowledge-power (cf. Foucault 1972- 
1977) within post-socialist Hungarian civil society, and this has implications for the 
autonomy of the ‘Roma rights’ movement itself.
For the case of Romani civil society, it is instructive to look at the works of scholars who 
have identified lacunae in Habermasian conceptualisations of the public sphere in 
Europe. Whilst Habermas’ (1992) insightful contributions focused on the 
interdependence of the lifemrld (public sphere) and system (the nexus of the state and 
market economy) and the negotiation of political power, other scholars have built upon 
his work to examine the role of subaltern groups within the public sphere (Calhoun 1992). 
Keane (1995; 1998), for example, correcdy emphasizes the multiplicities of public 
spheres which go beyond bourgeois conceptions of civil society (for example, the ethos 
of middle-class volunteerism); similarly, Jacobs (2000) expounds on the notion of 
‘multiple publics’; in other words, the public sphere (inclusive of organs of civil society) is 
not a monolithic entity, but represents a site of contestation of multiple, criss-crossing 
publics.
Nancy Fraser (1992) has coined the term ‘subaltern counterpublics’ to refer to those 
spaces within the public sphere which are staked out by subaltern groups, acting as:
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.. .parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent 
and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their 
identities, interests, and needs (123).
Jacobs’ (2000) rich empirical study of the rise and role of black newspapers in urban
America points to the limitations of inclusion within mainstream (white) civil society and
the creation of an alternative public sphere created by Black Americans, in part to
increase visibility within mainstream civil society. He reminds us of the early abolitionist
press in the United States which was dominated by white Americans and their general
indifference to the formation and success of independent Black media in the late 1800s
(2000: 20-21). Similarly, the position of Roma in post-socialist Europe is today of a
minority seeking visibility within ‘white civil society’. As Jacobs asserts:
...the challenge of multiple publics.. .suggests that civil society has a fractured 
quality which is not being overcome by some trend towards an integrated public 
sphere (2000: 20).
In illuminating the denials and limitations of “white civil society” (cf. Jacobs 2000: 4-5), 
we are forced to confront a (re)conceptualization of the Romani movement in light of 
the reality of exclusionary mechanisms within civil society itself. Political scientist Cox 
(1999), in commenting on the position of the subaltern within civil society, illuminates 
this exclusion, “Corporatism left those who are relatively powerless in society out of 
account; but being powerless and unorganised they could hardly be considered part of 
civil society” (7). As I elaborate in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis, contemporary Romani 
civil society is an embryonic and fragile sphere, as ‘counterdiscourses’ and dissident 
ideologies continue to remain marginalized. Moreover, I suggest that the creation of the 
contemporary ‘Roma movement’ (covered in detail in Chapter Five) was itself an 
imposition from outside the Romani communities and has been an arena of strategic 
instrumentalization by elite participants (both Roma and non-Roma). However, what is 
equally important to note is that the subalterity of Romani civil society functions at
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another level: that is, within Hungarian civil society, which is itself embedded within a 
broader global civil society, dominated by neoliberal ideological and policy trajectories 
(Trehan 2006a).
Furthermore, Gramscian and neo-Gramscian critiques of contemporary civil society 
apply direcdy to the Romani NGO sector in two key ways. Firsdy, Gramsci’s (2001) 
observation that civil society becomes a site for the hegemony of the established, order, rather than 
a site for emancipation applies to the hierarchies which abound in the Romani NGO sector, 
thereby reflecting the interests of global multilateral organizations and INGOs, as well as 
that of Hungarian elites, who are their willing partners (Cox 1999; Gramsci 1971, 2001; 
Katz 2006: 333-334). The influence of local Romani NGOs in the past decade has been 
supplanted by the interests of powerful INGOs (including Hungarian NGOs which take 
on international projects) and this is the subject of my analysis in Chapters Six and Seven.
Secondly, Gramsci (2001) - writing about Italian society in the 1920s - contrasted organic 
intellectuals (from primarily bourgeois backgrounds), who had close links to their 
communities and were determined to organise them, with traditional intellectuals 
(scientists, writers, religious orders, government, etc) who continued to serve the ruling 
class as part of the dominant order. Citing the importance of organic intellectuals who 
would also emerge from working class backgrounds, Gramsci (1971) noted that “the 
mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence.. .but in active 
participation in practical life, as constructor, organiser, ‘permanent persuader* and not 
just a simple orator...” (10). With respect to the emerging Romani movement, we see the 
rise of organic intellectuals from various ideological trajectories and broader national 
(Hungarian, German, Romanian, etc.) traditions, but all have in common their desire to 
organise their communities to bring about social justice (Horvath 1999; Kawczynski 
1999; Kocze 1999, 2006; Kwiek 2008; Zoltan 2006). Indeed, even the few organic
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intellectuals amongst Roma who work in conventional intellectual professions such as 
academia or the law maintain strong linkages and share active responsibilities in their 
home communities. Within the Romani communities of Hungary, these intellectuals 
offer resistance to conventional neoliberal narratives generated within the NGO sphere, 
even as they may simultaneously work in the mainstream NGO or political sector. 
Furthermore, Gramsci’s insights on civil society as being an optimum site for the 
(reproduction of hegemony by the bourgeousie serve as an important corrective to 
prevalent neoliberalist understandings of civil society popular amongst both Western 
and, to a lesser extent, Eastern European elites - namely, that it is a straightforward site 
for ‘emancipation’ or empowerment of the masses (cf. Cox 1999). Another critical 
perspective on civil society comes from Chandhoke (2003), who has looked directly at 
the role of the subaltern within civil society at both the global level, as well as at the level 
of Indian society. Concurring with Hearn (2000: 816) about the limitations of formal 
democracy, she posits that:
The contemporary political aid industry is at its core.. .about system maintenance. 
Democracy, through and in political conditionalities, fits neatly with neoliberal 
agendas that have been pushed by donor agencies and multilateral funding 
agencies, particularly in the aftermath of the ‘velvet revolutions’ of 1989 in 
Eastern Europe. And neoliberalism is about system maintenance.. .In effect, 
informed as it is by neoliberalism, democracy in its current avatar is safe, as it 
simply has no potential to pose a threat to entrenched power structures 
(Chandhoke 2003: 6).
In my research on civil society vis-a-vis Roma, and in particular, the NGO-dominated 
sphere, it became clear that few theoreticians of civil society in post-socialist Europe 
have examined the position of subaltern communities in their analysis, and moreover, 
despite the growth of NGOs putatively serving the ‘Romani interest’, few scholars of 
civil society have looked critically at their assumptions about the general sphere being a 
space for emancipatory projects or active citizenship. Thus, mainstream scholars of ‘civil 
society’ such as Cohen and Arato (1992) have not sufficiently interrogated the position of
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subaltern groups such as that of the Roma and others within east European civil 
societies. For various subaltern groups these arenas may, in fact, be ‘uncivil’ (Keane 
1997). Therefore, the works of alternative theorists — Black, ‘Third World’, and feminists 
- such as Chandhoke, Fraser, and Jacobs mentioned above, offer us useful 
(re)conceptualizations of civil society, including within the sphere of NGOs.
As the Romani movement has been primarily an NGO-driven phenomenon, it has also 
been useful to examine key texts on NGOs and social movements in tandem. Inherent to 
the embrace of neoliberal policies in countries where the State became relatively weak 
during the course of the ‘transition’ in tandem with privatization and de-regulation, social 
movements became institutionalized via the rapid growth and ‘professionalisation’ of 
NGOs. These developments ultimately led to the ‘NGOization of human rights’ and the 
creation of bureaucratic hierarchies within civil society (Lang 1997; Jad 2003; Roy 2004; 
Stubbs 2007a, 2007b). This insight on the institutionalisation of ‘causes’ taken up by 
human rights entrepreneurs seems to be a lacuna within the mainstream social movement 
literature, which either overlooks or diminishes these critical developments in the 
contemporary NGO sector (Fowler 1997; Ghosh 2006; Slater 2004).
L isten ing to the voices ‘from below*: the victim s o f human rights abuse
The ‘NGOization of human rights’ has been a key phenomenon in suppressing Romani 
‘voices from below’, as many of the NGOs have been structured along hierarchical, top- 
down models, based on prominent Western NGOs such as Human Rights Watch for 
example. Even if the subaltern can speak - as Spivak’s (1988) provocative, rhetorical 
refrain reminds us - who is listening? Particularly in the case of the Romani victim or 
survivor of human rights abuse, her voice, her perspective, and her vision for justice is 
many times missing from the human rights literature produced today within the field of
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‘Roma rights’ (Bukovska 2005). This issue is covered in greater depth in Chapters 6 and 
7.
In examining how socio-economically marginalized communities attempt to organise 
strategically, and consolidate grassroots power in order to gain jobs and better access to 
education, healthcare, and public transportation, the classical works on local level 
organizing by Alinsky (1946; 1971), Castells (1983), and Fox-Piven (1977) are instructive. 
In particular, recent works by social scientists who have examined the contemporary 
work of the Industrial Areas Foundation-IAF (founded by Alinsky in 1940 to organise 
working class neighbourhoods in the United States), illuminate the structural obstacles 
encountered by poor and working class communities when they attempt to organise their 
communities into coalitions (Warren 2001: 40-45).18 Moreover, Freire (1970), Barroso 
(2002), and Giroux’s (2006) works in the area of critical pedagogy suggest ways forward 
to answer the question of “what is to be done?” (Farmer 2003: 229-230).
C ritical ‘race* and Roma
Another enriching body of literature instructive for my research has been that of critical 
theories on the forms and functioning of racism(s), both modem and post-modem. 
These are to be found in theorists such as Balibar (cf. Rorke 1999), DuBois (1965), Essed 
(2001), Gilroy (2004) and Hall (2000). In addition, Solomos and Back’s (1995) works on 
‘racialised’ political mobilisation is useful as a model which challenges the conventional 
static concepts of race, and demonstrates the complexity of everyday processes of 
racialisation within the political life of contemporary Europe. Hall’s (2000) observations
181 had the privilege o f  working for the IAF-Southwest office in Austin, Texas for six months in 2001 
under the supervisions o f  Carrie Laughlin and Ernesto Cortes (a prominent disciple o f  Alinsky) as a 
researcher for the ‘living wage’ campaign. I saw first hand how schools, churches, and unions, as well as 
community-based organizations in working class communities could organise in the face o f  tremendous 
structural obstacles, not least o f  which was neoliberal policy ascendancy. I witnessed the unfolding o f  
leadership development skills amongst some o f  the poorest (Latino) communities in South Texas. This 
experience convinced me that there were clear alternatives to the ERRC’s elite model o f  human rights 
activism and organizing amongst marginalized communities.
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on ‘multicultural drift* in the United Kingdom are applicable to post-socialist countries 
such as Hungary, where the rise of institutions specifically addressing Romani integration 
issues has been a noteworthy political development in which liberal campaigners 
participate. Hall argues that the diffusion of schemes whose aim is to generate 
‘multiculturalisiri are not sufficient to address the entrenched problem of ghettoisation 
and the poor integration of minorities, and moreover, these ‘multicultural drifts* can co­
exist unproblematically with contemporary forms of racism.
In recent years, an emerging body of scholarship by political scientists and those from 
sister disciplines specifically examines politics and policies vis-a-vis Roma, as well as 
human rights activism within Romani civil society (Kovats 1998, 2001a, 2001c); 
Vermeersch (2006); Sobotka (2003); Pogany (2004); Barany (2002) and Klimova (2005), 
adding to the contributions of an older generation of scholars on the subject (Acton 
1974, 1976; Liegeois 1976). I engage with their work throughout the thesis, primarily in 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7.
2.3 Critical Romani studies and transdisciplinarity: busting out of the ‘Gypsylorist 
ghetto’
From Gypsylorism  to Rom ani studies
The Gypsies are an eastern people, and have eastern notions. It is inherent in uncivilisedpeople, 
particularly those of Oriental countries, to he strongly attached to their own habits - Grellman 
(1783: x), cited in Lee (1998: 10)
Akin to Jewish studies, African-American studies, women’s studies, and other group-
centred inter-disciplinary areas of scholarship, contemporary Romani studies focuses on
the social, economic, cultural, and political life of the diverse Romani communities
throughout the world, as well as the interaction of these communities with ‘majority*
societies.
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Nonetheless, Romani studies as a discipline differs from the above-mentioned ones in 
two significant ways. Firsdy, despite recent attempts at synthesizing knowledge in the 
field and offering critical trajectories within it, its historical roots are steeped in 
‘Gypsylorism’, which is a form of ‘Orientalism’ specifically applicable to the study of 
Romani peoples and culture. The term ‘Orientalism’ follows the teachings of Said (1978; 
1991) in this context, and refers to an organised “ ...set of concepts, assumptions, and 
discursive practices that were used to produce, interpret, and evaluate knowledge about 
non-European peoples” (Kohn 2006: 11-12). Precisely because Orientalism was 
embedded in a Eurocentric epistemological framework, research within the Gypsylorist 
vein generated scholarship which - either implicidy or explicidy - legitimated the global 
dominance of European power. As Wallerstein (1997) emphasises, Orientalism played 
“ ...a primary role in the ideological carapace of Europe’s imperial role within the 
framework of the modem world-system” (5).
The emergence of Orientalism in late 18th century Europe led to parallel developments in 
Gypsylorism, and the publication of Heinrich Grellman’s (1783) Die Zigeuner marked an 
important shift in how Romanies were conceptualized.19 Lee emphasizes the pivotal role 
that Die Zigeuner (‘The Gypsies’) played as one of the first pieces of European scholarship 
where Roma were “ ...constituted as discursive subjects for systematic study” based on 
rational, scientific principles of the time (1998: 8-9; cf. Mayall 2004: 152-153). Though 
Grellman continued the tradition of essentialising and objectifying Roma, his work is 
notable for 18th century Europe as it marked a clear discursive break on ‘conceptualising’ 
Roma: from the prevailing vagrancy discourse of the late 1700s to a new ‘racialised’ 
discourse. Lee (1998) explains why Grellman can be considered the ‘father’ of
19 Grellman’s book, considered paradigm shifting, was a relative success in Europe: its second edition came 
out in German in 1787, followed by an English edition in the same year (and a second English edition in 
1807) with French and Dutch language versions appearing around the same time (Lee 1998: 6).
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Gypsylorism, and why his text has endured as a critical source on Roma for over two 
centuries:
By introducing a theory based on linguistic comparisons to account for the origin 
of the Gypsies in India, Grellman's work marked a significant genealogical 
disjuncture in the othering process of Romanies (8-9).
Nonetheless, even during the time of Gxellman, there were scholars who held markedly
different methodological approaches with respect to their research on Roma. Indeed,
Grellman’s contemporary Johann Christian Rudiger (1990/1782: 60) exhibited a far more
enlightened view of Romanies, emphasizing in his-work the “living speech of the
Gypsies” as being the scholar’s greatest asset (“man hatte ja  iiberall die lebendige Sprache der
Zigeuner3’). He perceived the Romani language as a form of cultural capital, through which
much could be gleaned about the life of Romani communities. Working with a woman
who was a native Romani speaker — even if he did not credit her by name20 - it was
apparent to him that understanding the linguistic capital of Romani people served to
contradict both the volkisch racial hatred (‘volkshass) and nationalist hatred (‘nationalhasf)
of Europeans for Roma, which prevented a proper understanding of their history
(Rudiger 1990/1782: 46-49; cf. Matras 1999: 89-116). Furthermore, it was apparent to
Rudiger that European society was characterized by a form of hypocrisy that co-existed
with ‘enlightenment values’:
This is still a political inconsistency, which our enlightened century should be 
ashamed to tolerate. For, the mistreatment of the Gypsies has no other cause but 
deeply rooted xenophobia (1990/1782: 45, cited in Matras 1999: 93).
As Matras (1999) incisively points out, Rudiger was:
...unique among his contemporaries to call for a socially engaged and morally 
responsible scientific discussion, accusing society and its political institutions of 
marginalizing and persecuting Gypsies, and showing sympathy and understanding 
for the causes of their misery. There is no doubt that today’s empirical, engaged,
20 She was later identified as one Barbara Makelin by Adelung in 1815 (Matras 1999: 91).
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and theoretical investigation of Romani [language] must look back at Rudiger’s 
earlier work when tracing the roots of its discipline (91)
and
... Rudiger is a reformer. He reminds society of its own modernized moral codes 
and demands that their implementation be extended to offer justice and 
protection to the Gypsies (93).
Nevertheless, Rudiger’s astonishingly modem sociological analysis of the impact of racist 
ideology on both scientific and popular understanding in Europe had little impact on the 
thinking of the time, though it was later referenced by some Gypsylorists (Bussell 1919; 
cf. Fraser 1992). Why Grellman’s work was taken up as an earlier source and popularized, 
whereas Rudiger’s became progressively marginalised can be explained in part by the 
sensationalist imagery on Roma at the time - including second-hand reports of 
cannibalism - that the former’s writing luridly referred to. This conformed to existing 
anti-Gypsy prejudices in Europe, placing a nominal ‘scholarly’ veil around otherising 
stereotypes of Roma (Hancock 2001; Lee 2005; Willems 1998). These essentialising 
works simultaneously reinforced both the exoticisation and patbologisation of Roma, carrying 
these constructions and misrepresentations into modem-era Gypsylorist or ‘neo-lorist’ 
writings, as Hancock refers to them (personal conversation, 2007).
By the 19th century, among the coterie of early ‘Gypsylorists’ were to be found many 
prominent Orientalists of the time, including Sir Richard Burton, Archduke Karl Ludwig 
Josef von Habsburg, and Elizabeth Robin Pennell (Macfie Archives 2007). These early 
European adventurers, folklorists and international travelers were cognizant of the Indie 
roots of the Romani language, and indeed reinforced the Romanies’ cultural and 
linguistic connections with the Indian subcontinent through their (pseudo) scholarly 
interventions. The salience of these studies was even more pronounced as a result of the 
strengthening British imperial presence in India — which was ironically fortuitous for 
Gypsylorists — who were keen to compare and contrast various Romani (sub)groups with
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Indian (sub)groups, thereby solidifying the notion of Romanies as Orientals within or
Europe’s ‘internal Orientals’ (Bussell 1919; cf. Lee 1998). As Lee (1998: 6) explains:
.. .Gypsylorism is but a particular variant of Orientalism, in that it began with the 
discovery that the Romani populations of Europe had originated in India- that is, 
that they were an exotic and Oriental Other. Thus, whilst Orientalism was the 
discursive construction of the exotic Other outside Europe, Gypsylorism was 
the construction of the exotic Other within Europe - Romanies were the 
Orientals within [original in bold].
Secondly, unlike Jewish studies, one of whose earliest strands extends back to the study
of Judaic scriptures themselves within yeshivaZ1, and African-American and women’s
studies - both of which emerged prominently in conjunction with emancipation struggles
by activists from their respective groups - Romani studies in the United Kingdom and
elsewhere in Europe emanates from specific Orientalist perspectives on ‘Gyspies’/Roma
constructed by intellectuals external to Romani communities themselves. As a result,
Romani studies (Romologia in Hungarian) has been far removed from the emancipation
struggles of Romani peoples, notwithstanding the interventions of a handful of scholars
who have attempted to synthesise their scholarship and politics (Acton 1979, 1998;
Hancock 1996; Marsh and Strand 2006).
As Kohn (2006: 11-13) emphasises, Said’s pioneering work Orientalism (1978) took the 
reader beyond an analysis of the economic or political dynamics of colonialism, and by 
doing so, sharpened her understanding of the intimate connection between knowledge 
and power:
By foregrounding the cultural and epistemological work of imperialism, Said was 
able to undermine the ideological assumption of value-free knowledge and show 
that “knowing the Orient” was part of the project of dominating it. Thus, 
Orientalism can be seen as an attempt to extend the geographical and historical 
terrain of the poststructuralist critique of Western epistemology.
21 Apart from this overtly religious and traditional source o f Jewish scholarly pursuit, there were also secular 
developments such as the spread o f Yiddish literature and theatre which nurtured Jewish studies, 
prompting its expansion in different areas.
47
Following Foucault (1977; 1979), Said's concept of discourse identified the ways in which 
knowledge is not merely used to serve power, but rather, is a form ofpower itself One can 
readily apply these insights and techniques of discourse analysis to the production of 
knowledge about Roma in Europe, who are akin to an internal Oriental (cf. Lee 1998; 
Kohn 2006).
The progression o f Gypsylorism
As a part of Orientalist scholarship, Gypsylorism developed into an inter-disciplinary 
study encompassing the fields of history, sociology, literature, anthropology and 
especially philology/linguistics and folklore. Within the Anglo-American tradition of 
Gypsylorism, the foundation of the Gypsy Lore Society (GLS) in Liverpool in the late 
19th century solidified the Gypsylorists’ role in the production of discourse on Roma, 
with an emphasis on cultural and linguistic attributes (Bancroft 2005: 160-161). The GLS 
kept in close contact with prominent Orientalists of the time: for instance, both Max 
Muller (Indologist and scholar of Sanskrit) and Kamill Erdos (one of the founding 
fathers of Gysylorism in Hungary) were active members of the society (New York Times 
1888; cf. Macfie Archives 2007).22 This latter intellectual used to exchange letters 
regularly with Dora Yates, who was honorary secretary of GLS and editor of its 
publication, the Journal of the Gypsy Lore Society from 1955 to 1973.23 I refer to the 
implications of these developments further in Chapter 4, the focus of which is an 
interrogation of discourses generated on Roma during socialist times in Hungary. 
Simultaneous to developments in the UK and Europe, a sustained interest in ethnology 
and folklore in the United States resulted in the foundation of the North American
22 The German cultural centres in India today are known as ‘Max Muller Bhavans’ (similar to Goethe 
Institutes across Europe), and there is a museum and cultural centre for Roma in southern Hungary named 
in honour o f  Kamill Erdos.
23 See http://sca.lib.liv.ac.uk/collections/colldescs/gls.html for details o f  Yates’ contributions to the GLS 
(Liverpool University Library 2007).
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Chapter of GLS in 1977. This chapter of the society eventually took over the running of 
GLS in 1989 under the leadership of Sheila and Matt Salo, and began re-publishing the 
JGLS in 1991 (Fraser 1992: 210-211).24
Concomitant to the growing interest in Romani folklore, in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, the study of ‘Gypsy crime,, its purported methods, and its magnitude in various 
European countries also emerged. Cesare Lombroso’s (1878) work on the causes of 
crime singles out Roma as a criminogenic population: in Uuomo Delinquente (Criminal Man, 
2nd edition), he describes Roma as a “thoroughly criminal race, with all its passions and 
vices”, including for him, cannibalism (Lombroso 2006: 19).25 He therefore repeats the 
sensationalist narrative of Romanies as cannibals, recycled by the intrepid Grellman one 
hundred years earlier. This is symptomatic of a body of literature which researchers in 
critical Romani studies can investigate and deconstruct when looking at early ‘scientific’ 
writings in Europe which produced distorted knowledge on Roma, and which is 
continually regenerated throughout the centuries - at times unconsciously - but many 
times willfully, in clever guise.
The problem atic legacy o f ‘G ypsylorism ’ throughout the g lobe
The discussion above demonstrates that the critical deconstruction of various 
Gypsylorist texts is an important prerequisite for understanding how they reflect and 
reinforce stubborn stereotypes which have carried over through the centuries and have 
been dispersed globally, not least because of the hegemonic position of the English
24 See Gypsy Lore Society at http://www.gypsyloresociety.org/. Liverpool University houses the Scott 
Macfie Gypsy Archives, one o f  the largest collections o f  Romani-related materials in the UK, see 
http://www.archiveshub.ac.uk/news/0606gls.html. In 2000, Liverpool UP began publishing Romani 
Studies. Its current editor is Yaron Matras, a prominent linguist at the University o f  Manchester.
See further, http://www.llc.manchester.ac.uk/Research/Projects/romani/files/24_joumal.shtml and 
http://www.liverpoolunipress.co.uk/html/publication.asp?idProduct=3714
25 Lombroso’s book was translated into several languages, including German and English, and had a strong 
impact on Western legal attitudes towards Roma. For more information about Lombroso’s work and 
legacy in Europe, see the website for the Cesare Lombroso Museum, MUCRI (Museo Criminologico), 
Ministry o f  Justice, Department o f  Prison Administration, at www.museocriminologico.it
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language as a result of British imperialism.26 This vital task of deconstruction remains
incomplete, and, as Lee (1998) suggests, is rendered even more difficult by a continuous
stream of research on Roma by scholars who persist in using essentialist
conceptualizations and ‘neolorist’ (neo-Gypsylorist) ideas in their work (cf. Hancock
2007, personal conversation). One example of work that essentialises Romani culture is
that of Braham and Braham (2000), academics in the area of international relations who
surmise that Romani culture itself is inimical to education, without deconstructing a priori
beliefs about cultural reproduction and taking into account social constructionism. Here
they discuss the contentious issue of the social distance between Roma and non-Roma:
Given that the Roma have been in Europe for some seven centuries, it would 
seem one-sided to apportion responsibility solely to majority attitudes: social 
harmony requires willing partners on both sides.. .There may in fact be a ‘cultural 
script’ that underlies the ‘root causes’ of Roma migrations old and new, and one 
that operates alongside majority culture prejudice.. .Roma ‘non-identity’ [with the 
majority societies] may not only be an effect, but also a cause of their 
marginalisation. Their sense of integrity, their belief in their racial purity, and the 
importance they attach to their social system has meant that Roma have also 
chosen not to integrate and identify with their countries of residence.. .While one 
could argue that it is because schools in the CEE, for example, are ‘Gadjo 
institutions’ in which Roma will hear little that is positive or accurate about 
themselves; or that poverty and poor health — a consequence of majority 
prejudice — prevents their attendance; or that there is no schooling for them in 
their mother tongue; there may be another point for consideration: that 
traditionally-oriented clan leaders, suspicious of majority society, and committed 
to the continuity of Romani culture, are hostile to accepting more than the 
minimum of formal educational requirements being imposed upon Roma 
children (110-101).
What is remarkable about Braham and Braham’s comments above is their clear lack of 
familiarity with Romani lifeworlds in contemporary Europe, their inability to account for 
the legacy of Romani oppression, and their incapacity to see the reality of the diverse 
forms of integration of Roma in the face of it. First of all, though Roma have migrated
261 was a witness to this in the summer o f  1996, when, at my first year o f  working for the ERRC in 
Budapest, I attended a lecture given by an Indian anthropologist from a Panjabi university at the ELTE 
(Eotvos Lorand University) within their embryonic programme in cultural anthropology. His lecture 
demonstrated a strong belief in biological determinism and was full o f  19th century European fallacies 
about race and ethnicity. Much o f  his regrettable work was peppered with references o f  a Gypsylorist 
nature as well (Shidore 2007, personal communication).
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for centuries, Roma have been settled in various European lands (which they consider 
their ‘home’) and have forged strong bonds of identity; again, if this were not the case, 
we would not be witnesses to the diversity of cultural syncretism within Romani cultural 
practices, and the linguistic diversity of Romanes. Furthermore, the authors do not provide 
any evidence for their strong assertion of a ‘belief in racial purity’ by Roma, certainly, 
during my field research in Hungary I never came across this phenomenon. What I did 
come across was an understandable lack of trust in the majority society and a certain 
pride in a particular value system. To be sure, traditional Romani communities continue 
to practice certain ritual pollution codes, but this does not translate into a belief in ‘racial 
purity’ as the Brahams suggested (cf. Trehan 2000: 117-118). Hungarian Roma — even 
today, in the face of resurgent violence - continue to identify as Hungarians, hence it is 
far too simplistic for the authors to suggest that Roma do not identify with the nations 
and peoples with whom they have lived for centuries (whilst most Roma are familiar with 
the national heroes, epic tales, and poetry of the country in which they live, rarely is the 
majority aware of the contributions of fellow Romani citizens to society or the richness 
of their cultural forms). Whilst the divide between Romani and non-Romani lifeworlds 
remain, the possibilities for conviviality (cf. Gilroy 2004) to overcome entrenched anti- 
Gypsyism should not be underestimated; but this would require a clearer analysis of the 
roots of oppression embedded within contemporary Romani lifeworlds.
Another illustration of essentialism in scholarship on Roma is the work of Scheffel (2004: 
101-117), a Canadian anthropologist who conducted fieldwork amongst Roma in a 
particularly impoverished community in Slovakia in the 1990s. His book ‘Svinia: in Black 
and White’ suggests - without any problematization - that homosexuality is a form of 
pathological ‘deviance’.27 Within broader post-Orientalist discourses, there are substantial
27 Indeed, the section o f  his book covering same-sex relationships - along with other presumed 
‘pathologies’ to be found in the Romani village - is entided, ^Deviance, handicaps, and pathology’.
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debates about the role of anthropologists, however, within ‘neolorist’ scholarship today, 
few challenges are forthcoming, and academics, along with policy-makers, are free to 
generate epistemic violence (cf. Spivak 1988) vis-a-vis Roma with impunity, often times 
with litde regard for the political consequences of their well-meaning interventions.28
Social construction, m ystification and m isinterpretation
As Marvasti (2004: 5) has observed, “constructionism assumes that our knowledge of the 
social world is a) subjective, b) situational and culturally variable and c) ideologically 
conscious.” Building upon the previous section, one form of possible epistemic violence 
emanates from a particular stream of scholarship on Gypsies and Roma, which I view as 
a misinterpretation of the social constructionist project. I refer here to some of the works 
of Western European scholars such as Willems (1998), Lucassen and Willems (1998), 
Okely (1983; 1997), and more recendy, the scholarship of Bolton (2005). While I share a 
methodological interest in social constructionism with their work, and appreciate their 
use of Foucaultian insights as well as Said’s critical works, I believe that the notion of a 
priori nomadism is not sufficiendy interrogated in their social constructionist scholarship. 
While it is certainly true that some Romani peoples in the past (and some in the present) 
were ‘commercial nomads’ (cf. Acton 1995/1995), it is not clear how or why this form of 
economic survival and innovation actually emerged in the first place. Perhaps the scholar 
who comes closest to addressing this question of genesis is socio-linguist Yaron Matras 
(1999). If social dynamics and experiences influence culture, then surely another
28 Several years ago, I was asked to offer an assessment (along with Professor Acton o f  Greenwich 
University) on an ‘ethnicity determination’ case before the UK Home Office o f  a young asylum-seeker 
from K osovo who at the time o f  his arrival to the UK was a minor. I was shocked to discover that one o f  
the questions on his form that he was required to fill out upon his entry to the UK was to describe the 
‘Romani flag’ — his response to this question then fed into the initial Home Office assessment o f  the 
veracity o f  his claims. Persons familiar with the Romani movement are aware that knowledge o f  the flag 
(only adopted and designed by a handful o f  activists in the 1970s) is limited to small groups o f  Romani 
activist circles in Europe. Nonetheless, the UK  Home Office officials (who had probably read about this 
from a scholarly source or from a website) were using this as bona fide information to determine asylum 
claims from Kosovo, thus placing in jeopardy the claims o f many genuine asylum seekers.
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interpretation of ‘Romani nomadism’ could be that it has been the result of cyclical 
persecutions and harassment, as well as economic survival. It is a historical fact that 
Roma - similar to Jews - were not allowed to settle in town centres and were excluded 
from European guilds which regulated particular trades, and more broadly, economic life, 
in the Middles Ages. However, the persistence of European anti-Gypsy persecution and 
violence, and the inability of Roma to gain a solid foothold in mainstream societies quite 
possibly resulted in a way of life that required flexibility and mobility in order to a) avoid 
and/or escape further persecution and b) to seek economic opportunities in less hostile 
environs. It is most certainly the empirical study of the lifeworlds of Romani 
communities of Eastern Europe (Hungarian Roma and Balkan Roma of the former 
Yugoslavia in particular) that informs my understanding, reading, and contestation of 
‘traditional nomadism’ amongst Romani people. It would be important to deconstruct 
further an understanding of nomadism itself within the Romani cultural context. 
Certainly, if Roma were constantly on the move, they would not have formed the strong 
bonds — linguistic, cultural, and identity-wise — as they have in Europe throughout their 
long and rich history on the continent and in the British Isles. Romani mobility or 
itineracy has itself consisted of circuits of cyclical movement for commercial and family- 
related purposes as well as ‘settlement’. Therefore, to my mind, the formula “Romani 
person = nomad” (as it persists within the European imaginary, and in some cases, such 
as in Italy today, even defines the governance framework for thousands of EU citizens) 
does not reflect the reality. Were I to subscribe to such a view, I would then have to 
believe that the majority of British Romanichals are, for example, no longer Romani, as 
they are in fact settled, living in brick and mortar housing, in council flats, or as residents 
of on authorized (permanent) caravan sites. This absence of the deconstruction of a priori 
nomadism of Roma, and the belief that Gypsies are nomadic ‘by definition’ suggests a 
lack of sufficient interrogation by some Western European scholars. One academic who
has conducted a detailed analysis of how nomadism is seen as part and parcel of Gypsy 
life and has also critically examined Romani studies scholarship is British social historian 
Mayall (2004: 36-48). Whilst I agree broadly with his social constructionist approach to 
identity formation amongst Gypsies, much of his criticisms of historical and 
contemporary scholarship in Romani studies (for example, the high incidence of 
obfuscation, misinterpretation and recycling of Gypsylorist myths amongst other 
dangers), it appears that he too conflates Western Gypsy experiences with Eastern 
European Gypsy and Romani experiences with respect to the issue of nomadism. He 
states:
The second major component which is always present in some form in every 
version of Gypsy identity is that of nomadism. Indeed it is almost universally 
agreed that Gypsy and nomadism go hand in hand, leaving the settled or 
sedentary Gypsy at best marginal and more usually an invisible figure in tests and 
the popular imagination (11).
Now, while this above discourse construction may hold true for Gypsies residing in the
British Isles, similar debates on the nomadism of Romani populations are far less salient
amongst Eastern European scholars and within the polities of the region. There are key
socio-historical reasons for this, including the fact that the millet system as organized
under the Ottomans produced a different set of relations between Gypsies and non-
Gypsies, a dynamic which fostered Romani settlement (see further Marsh 2009). In
Austro-Hungary and Iberia by contrast, the ancestors of present-day Romani populations
in these lands underwent regimes of forcible assimilation, which also resulted in
settlement along particular patterns (usually exhibiting spatial segregation to varying
degrees). This is not to suggest that nomadism no longer functions as a marker of
identity for some Romanies and affiliated groups such as Travellers, however, the
importance of a thorough contextualization of this ‘cultural trait’ is crucial to both the
54
aims of critical scholarship and to the success of potential policy outcomes (cf. Clark 
2006; Mayall 2004).29
In addition, various forms of ‘reified’ social constructionist approaches found in some
scholarship on Roma illustrate another key oversight: few of these scholars have taken
existing empirical evidence on the Romani language seriously in their own research to
determine their conclusions on Romani origins, identity, and lifeworlds. Matras (1999:
113) offers succinct criticisms of Willems and Okely’s work in this regard:
...by rejecting a connection between language and origin, Willems excuses 
himself from studying the linguistic facts, including those pertaining to language 
transmission. While earlier sources were already able to distinguish between 
Romani and the jargons and vocabularies of the roads, it was Rudiger who first 
demonstrated the structural coherence of the language by composing the first 
concise grammatical description. Both Willems and Okely owe us an explanation 
as to how and why a full-fledged language with grammatical inflections will have 
been transmitted from Asia to Europe and expanded there to become the 
everyday language of millions, without the physical migration of a population of 
speakers at an early stage (113).
As a consequence, their self-ascribed ‘social constructionist’ analysis of the
‘GypsyVRomani lifeworld, in attempting to avoid the trap of essentialising Roma,
remains narrowly constrained itself, possibly giving birth to other forms of
misinterpretation and obfuscation on Roma, including the myth that Roma are a people
outside of history, and furthermore, have no interest in the endeavour of (re) discovering
and (re) constructing their own historical narrative, let alone recording this as written
historiography. Apart from Okely (1984), this latter assertion is present in the
anthropological writings of Stewart (1997), who suggests Roma are not interested in their
own history. Ignoring the truism that “history is written by victors”, he seems to dismiss
the relevance of the syncretic heritage of Roma traced back to south Asia thus:
...talk of Indian origins unnecessarily exoticizes the Gypsies, and second it 
ignores their own view of themselves. For the fact is that most nonintellectual
29 Indeed, there can be serious negative policy outcomes resulting from false labeling, see for example, the 
case o f  campi nomadi (nomadic camps) in Italy, cf. Sigona (2005).
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[sic] Rom do not seem to care where their ancestors came from...For them, 
identity is constructed and constandy remade in the present in relations with 
significant others, not something inherited from the past (Stewart 1997: 28).
Firsdy, though I agree with Stewart’s empirical observation that most Roma do not
demonstrate much concern about their ancestry, this is true for various groups and
cultures across the globe, particularly persons socialized within working class
communities. This also holds true for persons who are part of various diaspora
communities.30 Panjabi culture, like many cultures across the globe, is syncretic in
content, constructing and constandy re-fashioning identity “in the present in relations
with significant others”, as Stewart (1997) points out above, in his analysis of Romani
identity. By identifying this characteristic as a peculiarly Romani trait, ironically,
anthropologists like Stewart may themselves inadvertentiy exoticize Roma. Moreover,
this reticence to make connections to the language(s), cultural mores, and other aspects
of Romanipe (the Romani way of life) with cognate cultural experiences in South Asia,
Persia, and the Balkans (where their ancestors spent significant amounts of time) is
puzzling. The construction of history has always been a project and a preserve of the
elite.31 Therefore, when Stewart exhorts us to attend to the Romanies’ views of
themselves, he also implicidy suggests that this view is somehow static and unchanging in
one respect: that it cannot integrate knowledge of south Asian or Balkan heritage; whilst
Romani cultures in Europe are ‘whole’ without any direct connection to ‘mother India’, it
would be unwise to suggest, that, as a younger generation of educated Roma become
more aware of the complex web of their ancestry, they would not wish to make meaning
of this emerging knowledge base. Moreover, as Romani intellectuals — whether from
have no idea o f  who my great-grandparents were. My knowledge o f  my family history stops at my 
grandparents, nor have I felt a particularly strong desire to dig up my genealogy, although I am curious 
about my mother’s side o f  the family who hail from what is now Pakistan.
31 Indeed, much early Indian historiography was researched and written by non-Indians, mainly British and 
other Europeans during the colonial era (apart from the diaries, memoirs, and travelogues o f  Greek, 
Persian, Chinese and Arabic scholars, travelers, and conquerors whose incursions pre-dated the British 
Empire in India).
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‘traditional’ or ‘assimilated’ backgrounds - begin to analyze their current predicament in 
Europe today, the discussion in many cases leads to Eurocentrism, which, at its core, has 
also been an enduring edifice in the construction of racialized hierarchies across the 
globe, fitting hand-in-glove with colonialism (cf. Wallerstein 1997; Zoltan 2006; Trehan 
and Kocze 2009; Galjus 2008; Mile 2008).
The discussion above sheds light on another missing element in much of the 
contemporary scholarship within Romani studies: the silence surrounding power 
asymmetries. Unlike Lemon (2000), whose exceptionally rich anthropological work 
investigates and underscores the nuances of power and negotiation amongst Roma and 
gaje (non-Roma) in Soviet and Russian society at multiple levels, much of the 
contemporary research either ignores or obfuscates issues of knowledge/power 
(Foucault 1977; cf. Vermeersch 2005).
Recent scholarship on the subject of identity by Belton (2005: 7-11) sets up a ‘straw 
person’ argument, namely, that the English appellation ‘Gypsy’ (whether in its common 
little ‘g’ form or capitalized), refers to a problematic umbrella category referring to a 
variety of different ethnic groups that have erroneously (or for political reasons) been 
lumped together. Though I concur with this observation, I do not find it to be novel or 
innovative, as many scholars today working in the area share this view. He also elucidates 
further on the dangers of merging various Travelling groups into one category (Belton 
2005: 18, citing Willems), raising concern on the social construction of Gypsy culture. 
That cultures are socially constructed, are contextual and dynamic, under-going constant 
negotiation with the environment and other forces is also not a particularly striking 
observation within contemporary scholarship (cf. Barth 1969).
For generations, European scholars have been studying the diversity amongst various 
Romani groups, and continue to be vexed by disputes over their classification. The actual 
peoples that the labels and umbrella categories refer to, whether they are self-ascriptions
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such as ‘Rom’ or (sometimes) exonyms such as Traveller’ (popular within UK 
administrative and policy circles, for example, the “Traveller Education Service”), know 
who they are, which family they are from, and so forth (cf. Clark 2006). Therefore, from 
a sociological perspective, self-knowledge poses a significant deterrent to potential 
obfuscations that may be generated about real Gypsies, Roma, and Travellers from those 
external to the community. It is the social scientist’s task to deconstruct the origins of 
these labels and to respect (in my opinion) the self-appellations of various groups (for 
example, ‘Sinti’ or ‘Kale’).
Viewed from an Indie perspective, the diversity amongst Roma is perfectly logical, given 
the parallel linguistic, occupational and sub-cultural or group diversity present within the 
Indian subcontinent for millennia. Along with Ian Hancock (2008), I have consistently 
pointed out that contemporary Romani studies is in fact dominated by Eurocentric 
scholarship (whether consciously or subconsciously), and thus the contributions of 
scholars from different regions of the world (such as Iran and Western Asia) would need 
to be examined (and encouraged) in order to render a more complete picture of Romani 
historical narratives and their connection to contemporary lifeworlds (Trehan 1996; cf. 
Marsh 2009).
The pronounced absence of Romani voices participating within Romani studies is 
common to this day, as suggested by the attendance at meetings of professional bodies 
such as the Gypsy Lore Society, where it would be unusual to find more than a couple of 
Romani or Gypsy scholars themselves. Similar to research conducted on the “Other” 
over a century ago in Europe, contemporary research on Roma continues to be 
conducted almost entirely by scholars outside Romani communities, that is, by non- 
Roma. Said emphasizes that organizing and classifying knowledge about the Orient is a 
mode of exercising authority (Kohn 2006). As seen through the study of discursive practices 
in this thesis, the organization and classification of knowledge on Roma is invariably in
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the hands of non-Roma. If we contrast the power asymmetries present within Romani 
studies to other disciplines, perhaps only those of the colonized world come close — such 
as African studies. Within Romani studies, the position of Romani scholars themselves 
has strong parallels with the position of African scholars in African studies programmes 
of the 1960s and 1970s when many peoples on the continent itself were struggling to 
overcome colonial rule (cf. Kenyatta 1938,1965; Brailsford 1938).
As I discuss in subsequent chapters, Romani researchers and scholars themselves 
continue to be viewed as ‘objects’, and are rarely considered for full-fledged partnership 
on research projects conducted within their own communities (Zoltan 2006). Using 
Fanon’s critical insights on this subject, Kocze and I suggest that this is another form of 
infantili^ ation of Roma (Trehan and Kocze 2009; cf. Schmitt 1996). The aforementioned 
dangers of neo-lorism and its discursive production will persist as long as critical Romani 
scholars and their perspectives are not included in the debate, and do not serve as a 
corrective to misinterpretations by those whose knowledge of the Romani life world is 
conjectural at best. The reasons for the exclusion of Romani perspectives is complex: 
many prominent Romani scholars are only too keen to participate, whilst some have 
become disillusioned and contribute to their own self-marginalisation by refusing to 
participate in mainstream debates which they perceive to be — perhaps correcdy - 
hijacked by non-Roma. This is indeed a worrying trend, and is being contested by a new 
generation of independent scholars who have begun to write about these contentious 
dynamics of power openly (Oprea 2004; Trehan and Kocze 2009; Kwiek 2008). 
Furthermore, there are — broadly speaking - some national ‘traditions’ or ‘schools’ within 
Gypsy/Romani studies, usually led by scholars who act as influential gatekeepers for 
information and knowledge on Roma: in the UK, Professor Acton of the University of 
Greenwich, (where Romani studies was taught for more than a decade), teaches courses 
on identity, based on - amongst other aspects - commercial nomadism, and on a
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spectrum of ‘Gypsyiness’ ranging from Irish Travellers to Domari and Nawar groups in 
Western Asia; in France, there is Marcel Courthiade’s extensive body of scholarship in 
linguistics, who along with Jean-Pierre Liegois, and contributors to the academic journal 
Htudes Tsiganes, have played a dominant role in French-language scholarship; in Italy, 
there is anthropologist Leonardo Piasere who has trained and supervised many young 
researchers; in Czech Republic there was the late Milena Hubschmannova, an Indologist 
who provided training in Romani language and exposure to Romani culture for a 
generation of young Czech scholars and social workers; and in Spain, there is a strong 
tradition of research on Gitanos in the disciplines of anthropology, education and social 
work (Gay y Blasco 1999, 2002; Fernandez Enguita 1999; Laparra 2007). In Bulgaria, 
Elena Marushiakova and her husband Vesselin Popov founded Studii Romani, a Romani 
studies centre in Sofia in the early 1990s which specializes in Balkan Romani culture and 
history. There is also an annual summer course in Romani studies at the Central 
European University (Budapest), led by British anthropologist Michael Stewart and 
Hungarian sociologist Janos Ladanyi. Perhaps most significantly, there is the Romani 
Archives and Documentation Center (RADOC) at The University of Texas at Austin. 
Developed by Ian Hancock, a distinguished linguist who was the first scholar to teach 
Romani language and culture courses in the United States in the 1990s, his efforts have 
culminated in an endowed chair in Romani studies, as well as a doctoral programme on 
the subject. He is the only scholar amongst those named above who is of Romani 
ethnicity and has a full-time academic post.
Towards the developm ent o f  a critical Romani studies
As alluded to earlier, as interest in Romani issues has been increasing, so have the 
number of PhD theses on Roma and Romani-related issues (cf. Kovats 1998, Pinnock 
1999, Vermeersch 2003, Klimova 2005, Sobotka 2003). In addition, mainstream social
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science journals are also accepting for publication more articles in the field (cf Sociology, 
Ethnic &  Racial Studies, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies). Book-length publications in 
English are also on the rise from various speciality (cf. Romani studies, University of 
Hertfordshire and Interface collection) and mainstream academic publishers (Bergahn, 
Palgrave and Routledge). Nonetheless, much of this intellectual production remains 
disconnected to and uncontested by Romani people themselves, and examining the 
implications of this is worthy of further research itself (Lee 1998; Hancock 2007; Trehan 
and Kocze 2009). Given its problematic ‘Gypsy^Est’ lineage, in recent years, Romani 
studies appears to be slowly taking a ‘critical turn’ with the emergence of the work of 
critical Romani scholars - including Roma - who are now at the forefront of examining 
issues of epistemology and ontology within the field, as well as a critique of power- 
knowledge asymmetries (Lee 2005; Hancock 2006; Kocze 1999; Kwiek 2008; Lemon 
2000; Oprea 2005; Zoltan 2006). As was shown earlier, Romani interlocuters are 
effectively disengaged from mainstream academic discourse on Roma. Although Roma 
figure prominendy as the objects of research, unlike other groups in society, they rarely 
engage in the dialectical process of affirming and/or contesting the knowledge which is 
generated about them, on their behalf, or even in quest of the elusive ‘neutral’ 
advancement of science and scholarship.32 The works and insights of critical Romani 
public intellectuals emphasise these lacunae and oversights, and thus work to counter-act 
the structural violence their communities confront, foregrounded at the level of 
discourse. Perhaps it should come as no surprise then that many of the younger 
generation of emerging scholar-activists, as a result of their intimate experience with 
multiple forms of oppression, are women, and their interventions to the discourse are the most 
trenchant (Kozma INT: 1999; Oprea 2004; Zoltan 2006).
32As Wallerstein illuminates, “The idea that science is over here and sociopolitical decisions are over there 
is a core concept that sustains Eurocentrism, since the only universalist propositions that have been 
acceptable are those which are Eurocentric” (1997: 9).
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Nonetheless, it remains a truism that both critical scholarship and even scholarly activism 
are a ‘luxury’ for most Roma, including those who are organic intellectuals. Apart from a 
tiny number of elite entrepreneurs - both of the classical business variety (usually 
disengaged from formal politics and thus out of public view), and the new variety of 
human rights entrepreneur whose interventions are examined in this thesis, most Roma 
are too busy coping with the realities of declining socio-economic security within a post- 
socialist Europe characterized by neoliberal policy prerogatives. In Chapters Six and 
Seven, I discuss the visible trend of the past decade where Romani intellectuals have 
joined the dynamic non-governmental sector in post-socialist Europe in large numbers.
In summation, key literatures that constitute an emerging ‘Critical Romani studies’ stress 
the importance of mainstreaming this interdisciplinary field, thereby exposing it to as 
wide an audience as possible to undergo scholarly scrutiny (cf. Kovats 2001b). Foucault’s 
(1977; 1979) insights on power/knowledge dynamics and their consequences for 
govemmentality, offer us an understanding of how knowledge generated on Roma has 
been used as an instrument of power to define and confine policy design, 
implementation, and outcomes. The bulk of reports, statistics and other forms of 
literature on Roma and their situation in society are generated by elite NGOs, 
governmental bodies, and academics. The majority of this intellectual and policy 
production is currendy external to the Romani community, with very litde input by 
Romani people themselves (Romani elites are an exception to this rule as their voices are 
‘managed’ rather successfully by power elites within the field). Overcoming the twin 
legacies of Eurocentrism and Gypsylorism is a huge challenge in countering the epistemic 
violence generated by previous scholarship on Romani peoples.
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2.4 Struggling for truth: countering epistemic violence
The Roma...should not be regarded simply as the passive objects of experiments in social 
engineering throughout different historicalperiods. They live within the broader macro-society and 
are affected by its many varied influences (economic, political, ideological, etc.) which have had a 
marked impact on the development of their community. This development is uneven, multi­
directional, sometimes even contradictory...- Marushiakova and Popov 2001: 47.
In this thesis, I have combined a critical sociological perspective on human rights and 
Romani studies in order to highlight the reality of epistemic violence which Roma are 
subjected to within contemporary academia (Guha and Spivak 1988). I have done so in 
order to explain and contest the epistemological boundaries of current scholarship in 
Romani studies whose foundation can be traced back to Gypsylorism.
Given the exigencies of contemporary Romani existence today, academic work on Roma 
cannot be a purely disengaged ‘scholarly’ pursuit, for the very products of scholarly 
output on Roma impinge upon policy-making, potentially affecting the lives of countless 
numbers of people. For a conglomeration of diverse communities within Europe who 
are consistendy labeled as being something other than what they truly are, and for a 
people whose destiny has been systematically wrested from outside their own control, the 
interventions of the scholar-translator-interpreter of the Romani lifeworld deserve far 
more than superficial scrutiny (cf. Hancock 1997). A further exploration of some of the 
dilemmas inherent to research in this area is undertaken in Chapter 3, which covers 
issues of research methodology and methods, including ethical dimensions of the work.
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CHAPTER THREE - METHODOLOGY, METHODS, AND SOURCES
3.1 Antecedents to the research and methodological considerations 
Case study Hungary: trans-European implications
Though the ‘meta-universe’ for my research is contemporary Europe, I focused on the 
situation in post-socialist Hungary as a primary case study in order to investigate the 
transformation from an entrenched discourse on the ‘Gypsy problem’ to the 
construction of an oppositional discourse of Roma as an oppressed minority group 
struggling for their human rights.
Where appropriate, empirical data from other post-socialist countries was employed a) 
to underline the diversity of the discourse(s), and b) to highlight - by contrast - the 
uniqueness of one country’s policy or experience, particularly that of Hungary. In 
addition, I placed a strong emphasis on the broad trans-European implications of this 
study. In all post-socialist European countries, it may be argued, Roma are perceived in 
popular culture as ‘deviant’ members of society, and human rights activists purport to 
contest this characterization.33 Apart from Hungary’s accession to the wealthiest political 
bloc globally (the European Union) in 2004, another reason one cannot so easily separate 
Hungary from the rest of Europe is because of the now evolving discourse on ‘Romani 
rights’ which has become part of a broader liberal human rights consciousness to emerge 
— and converge — in an era of globalization (Brysk 2002; Evans 2005; Guilhot 2005; 
Klimova 2005; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Sobotka 2003). Simultaneously,
33 Nonetheless, though human rights entrepreneurs across the EU defend Roma in this way, there are 
significant differences in how Romani culture is conceptualized, and thuis in what manner policy is 
generated by policy-makers. In the case o f  Western Europe, many Romani communities are still perceived 
solely as ‘nomads’, that is, they are categorized as itinerants or those with a ‘traditional nomadic way o f  life’ 
for whom caravan sites must be built: this elides quite nicely with segregationist policies at the local level 
based on virulent anti-Gypsyism. However, in eastern Europe, the Roma are perceived as a population 
which is settled, and thus in need o f  brick and mortar housing along with other citizens; nonetheless, 
broader spatial segregation and the rising privatization o f  the housing sector has exacerbated Romani 
marginalisation since the end o f  actually existing socialism. Currently, Roma are bearing the brunt o f  an 
evictions crisis all across post-socialist Europe (cf. COHRE 2006).
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transnational capitalist flows and investments into Hungary since the early 1990s have 
ensured that the country cannot be separated from the rest of Europe since its domestic 
socio-economic policy priorities must now be subordinated to the market logic of Euro- 
Atlantic neoliberal policy agendas (Chen and Churchill 2005; Gowan 1996). I discuss the 
implications of the confluence of neoliberalism and human rights in Chapters Six and 
Seven.
As a result of the spread of information technologies, as well as financing from private 
philanthropies, states, multilateral institutions, and the European Union, the 
phenomenon of ‘international Romani activism’ has become pronounced in the last 
decade (cf. Klimova 2005; Sobotka 2003; Vermeersch 2006). During the course of my 
fieldwork between 1999 and 2001, from Brussels to Budapest, conferences were held 
almost weekly on a broad range of issues connected to the human rights of Roma, as the 
internet became a popular means of disseminating information and promoting advocacy 
amongst various participants in the ‘Roma rights’ movement. These conferences and 
workshops usually focused on education, legal rights, culture and identity, and 
occasionally, on social integration. A notable focus on employment issues - including 
discrimination in the labour market - emerged only relatively recently, though much of 
this discourse continues to be effectively decoupled from a discussion of structural 
economic exclusion (Kallai and Torzsok 2000; ERRC 2006; TArKI 2005; Zoltan 2006). 
In addition, public forums tended to be divided along linguistic lines as well, whereby 
those workshops sponsored by INGOs or multilateral agencies were conducted usually 
in English, and if they had the resources for translation, in Hungarian and/or Romani. 
This ensured that members of the ‘international human rights community’ were in 
attendance; nevertheless, these forums generally excluded non-elite Romani voices. 
Conversely, there were many lectures and workshops in Hungarian alone, attracting more 
Roma and Hungarians. These were forums where the elites of Hungarian society
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(lawyers, constitutional experts, journalists, and other intellectuals) rubbed shoulders with 
organic intellectuals from the Romani community, many of whom would come from 
outside of Budapest. In many instances, these Romani community representatives were 
local leaders in the Minority (Gypsy) Self-Government (MSG), teachers and sometimes, 
social workers. Unsurprisingly, events which were solely in Hungarian were rarely 
attended by INGO workers and foreigners, so that what one experienced was the 
construction of parallel, but disconnected discourses. There were elites (both Roma and 
non-Roma) who at times attended both, and thus acted as bridges between these two 
communities. Many of the meetings sponsored by multilateral agencies were ‘invitation 
only’, and this ensured that only a few select Romani elites would be proferred 
possibilities for engagement with the debate, and for representing the ‘Romani voice*.
It is crucial to understand at this juncture that Hungary is one of the most visibly 
‘Romani-sensitive* states in contemporary Europe. This has to do with Hungary’s own 
minorities policy, codified over a decade ago with the passage of the Law on Ethnic and 
National Minorities (1993), which reflected both a keen nationalist interest in the fate of 
ethnic Hungarian communities in neighbouring countries (connected to its post-Trianon 
history which resulted in substantial loss of territory and people), as well as — 
paradoxically - the growing influence of a liberal civil society in Hungary which pushed 
the government for key legislative reforms in the areas of civil and political rights for 
Hungary’s minorities (cf. Kovats 1998; Blanka 1999: INT; Stewart 2001; Vermeersch 
2006). For over a decade now, the post-socialist Hungarian state has been keen to 
demonstrate its ‘goodwill* on the rights of its Romani minority, both nationally, and 
within the European Union as a new member state, as it realized early on that the 
Copenhagen criteria (amongst other legislative yardsticks) would be used to measure its 
preparedness for membership to the European Union.
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Another practical reason for focusing on Hungary is because of my familiarity with the 
research landscape there. In 1992, several years before my human rights work for the 
European Roma Rights Center,; I completed a three-month public policy exchange 
programme for my M.A. in public policy at the University of Texas at Austin, and then 
conducted postgraduate research for seven months in 1995 on minority educational 
policy vis-a-vis Roma. In particular, the latter experience enabled me to build up a strong 
rapport with key Hungarian and international figures in the emancipation movement for 
Roma. Finally, and perhaps most significandy, the city of Budapest emerged as a center 
for Europe-wide civil society activity on Romani issues. Numerous national institutions 
(both governmental, non-governmental, Romani and non-Romani led), INGOs, and 
multilateral agencies spedalixing in CEE countries are located in the heart of the city 
(ERRC, IOM, NEKI, HHC, etc), and access to these organi2 ations proved relatively 
straightforward during the course of my fieldwork.
M ethodological considerations
Problems related to data collection and interpretation, such as the translation of materials 
and concepts from Hungarian to English were given due consideration. Indeed, key 
terms such as ‘civil society’, ‘democratisation’, and ‘human rights’ have linguistically 
specific, culturally contextualized meanings, exhibiting particular forms in post-socialist 
societies. For example, in Hungarian, the word for ‘politics’ and ‘policy’ are the same — 
politika - and only through context can one discern the meaning. In addition, during the 
interviews, there was the further problem of tacit knowledge (cf. Polanyi 1973) whereby 
with some of the interviewees and informants, I attempted to make explicit (through 
various linguistic cues) what in my previous interaction with them during the course of 
my human rights work for the ERRC had only been made implicit. To illustrate, during 
some dialogic conversations with Romani representatives, I used the word ki^ sakmanyolds
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(exploitation) in the context of the ‘Roma rights’ movement. As I was to find out later 
on, this word is now considered a quaint term suggestive of the previous regime’s 
socialist ideologies — and is therefore rarely used within the liberalist public discourse 
today (Vidra 2007, personal communication). I noticed that when I used this term, in 
some instances my interlocutor’s eyes would become wider, and there would be a wry 
smile appearing on their face (Kozma 1999: INT; Horvath 1999: INT).
Ethical dilemmas within the research
Bourdieu's...micro theory of social power...aimed at an anti-essentialism that 
would reveal all the sources of domination, but especially that symbolic or genteel 
violence used by the dominant to legitimate their power. Such an approach 
enables the sociologist to analyse cultural relations in society without imbuing the 
reader with the anti-humanist melancholy so prevalent in post-modern academics 
- Fowler (2000), cited in Formosa (2002).
There are ethical issues that are particularly relevant to my research, as it looks at the 
lifeworld of a marginalised group who have remained in a powerless position for most of 
their history in Europe, and who have an on-going ‘image problem’. During the interview 
process with both Roma and non-Roma interviewees, I took care to make clear that this 
information would be used for my analysis of the current social transformation, and 
respected interviewees’ right to confidentiality when requested. The field of ‘Romani 
Rights’ and other issues revolving around Roma are politically sensitive topics of research 
within Hungary, as well as throughout Europe as the European Union expands both 
eastwards and southwards. The vast majority of my interviewees were, however, public 
figures and NGO entrepreneurs who have given numerous interviews and in some cases, 
have had much of their ideas published in the public domain (through conference 
proceedings, the internet, and the press), and it was important for me to credit them.
As addressed in Chapter Two, the legacy of Gypsylorist thought in the guise of 
contemporary neolorism continues to influence the Romani studies field, requiring
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therefore a robust anti-essentialist and reflexive approach. The fact that the quantity of 
publications on Romani issues is on the rise does not necessarily translate into a 
strengthening of Romani agency within the process of the production of this knowledge, 
nor does it mean that the publications themselves will render epistemological shifts in 
conventional (stereotyped) thinking on Romani populations and their lifeworld. Too 
many assertions within the field remain conflated, simplified, and unsubstantiated as a 
result of the absence of academic ‘checks and balances’, suggesting the need for 
disciplinary rigour as well as cross-disciplinary scholarly reflexivity (cf. Kovats 2001b; 
Barany 2002; Zoltan 2006). This first problem of conflation is quite a widespread one. 
An author may publish a solid monograph on the life of one Romani community or one 
particular phenomenon within a community in CEE, and then the ‘findings’ or ‘insights’ 
are taken as a priori representative of all Romani experiences everywhere, ultimately becoming 
decontextualised from their very source (cf. Mayall 2004). Given the tremendous 
diversity within the Romani lifeworld that cuts across class, language/dialect, geography, 
and occupation amongst other interstices, this form of reductionism can pose grave 
dangers when translated into policy vis-a-vis Roma. These inherent dangers convey the 
importance of scholarly accountability towards the impact or repercussions of 
publications in the field, that is, the consequences of our generative knowledge output. 
This ethical commitment suggests something beyond merely ticking a box saying that 
“consent was obtained by all respondents involved”, it encourages, indeed, necessitates a 
deeper self-reflection on the part of the researcher as to her or his own privileged role in 
constructing image (s) of, as well as knowledge about Roma and the social field(s) 
surrounding them, as these may eventually be employed by policy-makers, both domestic 
and international. The insights of feminist scholarship (Bailey 2007; Oprea 2004; 
Mauthner and Edwards 2007) and colonial and post-colonial studies add impetus to this 
commitment. Moreover, this ‘threshold of engagement’ is necessarily fluid, and
constantly changing as younger Romani scholars pose challenges within the field (Oprea 
2004; Lemon 2000). Finally, as stated earlier, the issue of informed consent is particularly 
crucial, as Romani informants - more than most — continue to remain vulnerable to 
exploitation and objectification in this regard. Therefore, I have not used the names of 
my interlocutors from those conversations which were clearly sensitive in nature, and 
have instead retained their anonymity (at times with the use of pseudonyms). However, 
with respect to public figures or key NGO activists, I do acknowledge their contributions 
in public forums and moreover, with respect to the interviews (the majority of which 
were recorded and transcribed afterwards), I made it clear that the data would be used 
for purposes of my thesis and would credit them. I also promised to keep ‘off record’ or 
to anonymize particular data when requested to do so. Many of my interlocutors were 
prominent activists within ‘Roma rights’ who have become adept at given interviews to 
both scholars and journalists.
3.2 Methods and sources
Travers (2001: 2) summarises five key methods used for data collection and analyis in 
qualitative research: observation, interviewing, ethnographic fieldwork, discourse analysis and textual 
analysis. Employing all of these methods, I adapted techniques of participant observation, 
in-depth interviews (both with elites and non-elites), and textual analysis of a variety of 
written documents, including both official and non-governmental.
Participant observation: the intricacies o f  an active membership role
Marvasti notes that “roles are based on epistemological choices, structural necessities, 
and personal characteristics and preferences” (2004: 51). As mentioned in the preface, I 
was in the unique position of being an active participant in the ‘Roma rights’ movement 
itself, having worked intensively for two years at the ERRC in 1996 and 1997.
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Nonetheless, as a sociological researcher (as distinct from being a human rights 
researcher) I was conscious — upon returning to the same ‘field’ where I had previously 
worked — of my new reflexive and critical role. Gradually, I also became aware of the 
privileges, the symbolic and social capital I was granted as soon as I spoke, as a Western- 
educated foreigner and as a native English speaker, but also due to the symbolic power 
that came with being from the United States; being an American in Eastern Europe in 
the 1990s - and in effect, having moved from a ‘global centre’ (London) to do research in 
the ‘periphery’ (though within its relative universe, urban Budapest is definitely not a 
peripheral space) - particularly in light of the neo-colonized space of Eastern Europe in 
the 1990s (Gowan 1996; Trehan and Kocze 2009). In my interviews with Hungarian 
government officials and specialists in the areas of legal and constitutional reform for 
example, being an American was a distinct advantage, as it conferred upon me an entree 
which I might not have had, say, for example, if I was an Indian citizen. It is important to 
remember that at this time, Hungary was a recipient of various forms of American 
largesse, including USAID sponsorship, and was keen to join the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), which it eventually became a member of in March 1999.34 In 
addition, when I interviewed human rights entrepreneurs (including employees — past or 
present - of the ERRC and OSI), I was cognizant of doing so as an American.
On the other hand, as an American woman of Indian birth and (partial) Indian 
upbringing, I was imbued with a sense similar to Dubois’s (1965) “double- 
consciousness” within the Black diaspora, and this cognizance, this prism of seeing 
myself through another’s eyes was something I had in common with Roma in Europe.35
MFor the government’s exposition o f  the importance o f  Hungary’s membership to NATO, see the website 
o f the Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs, Republic o f  Hungary, available in English at
http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/en/bal/foreign_policy/security_policy/hungary_in_nato/history hungari
an_nato_relations/
35Without meaning to essentialise Romani culture(s), or to misrepresent phenomenon by conflation, I 
would have to confess, that by transporting myself to my childhood in Panjab, amongst Indians, as well as
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That is to say, as an Indian woman in diaspora, I was already conscious of the global 
struggles of various other minority groups and diasporas, and thus when I first 
encountered ‘Roma rights’, I had a particular (subconscious) schema that I could place 
the struggles of Roma into. In the beginning, this process was perhaps not very critical or 
reflexive, but as time passed this led to an understanding of the complexities and nuances 
of phenomenon particular to Roma in post-socialist Europe, phenomena that generally 
defied easy categorization or full explanation. Furthermore, being a woman, I was 
conscious of the gendered space(s) occupied by those within the movement, and these 
were noted in my fieldwork.36 One of the mechanisms I used to get informants to ‘open 
up’ was heightening rapport through self-disclosure, and using various techniques applied 
by reflexive anthropologists, including auto-ethnography (Marvasti 2004: 47). As the 
majority of my interviewees’ were familiar with me already in my previous role as a 
human rights researcher and educator within the ERRC, I was prompted to create a 
fuller identity for myself before them as a sociological researcher interested to record and 
witness the movement. Thus, I revealed my own childhood experiences with racism in 
the United States during the course of my conversations in an attempt to contextualize 
my personal interest in ‘Roma rights’. Indeed, upon reflection, my childhood experiences 
with issues of ‘race’ in the United States had indeed been one of the key motivating 
factors for me to take up work as a professional human rights researcher and trainer.
In addition, as a member of the Indian (Panjabi) diaspora, and myself a native speaker of 
Hindi, which is also a Sanskrit-based language similar to Romani, and having experienced
my Indian family in diaspora, many things would begin to make immediate sense. Despite the tremendous 
diversity in both communities/cultures, there are strong linguistic and metaphorical elements in common  
between Panjabi and Romani languages, as well as cultural mores, such as the notion o f  ritual pollution. My 
class privilege, and to an extent my ‘American-ness’, did however mitigate the burden o f  ‘otherness* which 
comes from this understanding o f  double-consciousness. Although I discuss some key gendered 
dimensions to my research, a fuller exploration o f  these has been saved for future research.
36 Many Roma were curious about why I was not yet married, and in some cases, tried to arrange ‘dates’ for 
me. At one point, I took to wearing a gold ring so that I would not receive any more questions (in fact, it 
was my kaleechari ting, a symbolic ring given to the sister o f  the bride by the groom, and had been a 
present from my brother-in-law). But most people assumed I had a partner when I wore the ring.
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multiple migrations in my life, I could bring an array of insights similar to those some 
Roma themselves experience (not necessarily out of choice, one could add). In this sense, 
I had experiences similar to a Japanese-American anthropologist who conducted 
fieldwork in Japan during the early 1980s. Although she did not speak Japanese, she was 
constantly reminded by her subjects that she looked Japanese, and because of her 
physiognomy, she was treated differently than white foreigners (Kondo 1990). As 
someone who was already a multiple migrant (having resided for many years in India, the 
United States, and Hungary), and being part of an Indie diaspora myself, I could not but 
think differently about Romani issues than others educated in the West and particularly 
other foreigners who were white and non-Roma. That was what immediately 
differentiated me from the other non-Roma in the ERRC, for example.
Moreover, during my field research, as well as my previous experiences with the ERRC, 
first as a human rights researcher for one year, and then as a human rights educator for 
another, I engaged in numerous informal conversations with key dissidents and activists 
about their earlier human rights interventions, and was able to experience first-hand the 
climate of anti-Gypsyism in the mid-1990s. Being perceived as a Romani woman at 
times, there were numerous occasions when I experienced (and felt) what Roma 
themselves experience on a daily basis. Here, I will provide only two examples of 
‘everyday racism’ that one encounters if one is Romani. The first involves an incident 
from 1995 at the railway station in Pecs, a city in the south of the country with a 
picturesque centre. It was while I was a postgraduate exchange student with HE 
(International Institute for Education), and I happened to be with a young Beash Gypsy 
woman who was then eighteen years-of-age. We were waiting for her foster father to 
arrive on the train from Budapest. It was approximately 8 pm, and we were approached 
by two young Hungarian men who, as quickly became apparent, were drunk. At the time, 
my Hungarian language was quite basic, and so I did not understand what they were
saying, but they started yelling at us, chanting what I later learned were nationalist 
slogans: tcYou don’t belong here [get out]!” and “Hungary for Hungarians!” At that 
moment, I realized that I was perceived as Romani: I happened to be wearing a long 
black skirt with folds, which was, ironically, a traditional dress from Hungarian 
Transylvania, and moreover, both of us are darker than the average Hungarian. My 
young friend quickly grabbed my hand and told me to run from the station with her. I 
turned around and stared at the young men, and began to feel angry, wanting to say 
something in our defence, but followed her advice.
The second experience was on St. Stephen’s Day, about five years later, in August 2000, 
and like most people in Budapest that day, I had gone out to the Danube river (by bike) 
to catch a bit of the traditional fireworks on display. I did not take much notice of being 
alone, I know Budapest fairly well, and indeed, consider it one of my ‘homes’. After 
watching the fireworks display (which usually last for about half an hour or so), I went to 
get my bicycle which was parked on a railing adjacent to the famous Chain Bridge 
(lanchid) near Adam Clark Square on the Buda side of the city. As I proceeded to unlock 
my bicycle, a tall Hungarian man of middle-class appearance who was passing by with his 
girlfriend stopped next to me, paused for a few seconds, and said sardonically, l.lyen 
egys^ eru ellopni egy biciklti?” (Is it really this easy to steal a bicycle?), and then he laughed 
and walked off. It took me a few seconds to register what he had actually meant to say, 
but the fact that his intention was to ‘control me’ and put me in ‘my place’ was clear 
enough. Again, I had to swallow my anger at this old label of ‘thief which is commonly 
foisted upon Roma. Needless to say, these experiences of ‘elegant racism’ in Hungary (cf. 
Kocze 2004: INT) were demeaning, and had a profound impact on my understanding of 
the forms and functions of anti-Gypsyism, even at its most ‘benign’ level.
As a woman of colour, I was able to relate to the narratives of many of my Romani 
interlocutors (both men and women), and willingly shared my personal experiences of
74
oppression and racism in both the United States and Europe. Nonetheless, I was 
cognizant of the ‘class dimensions’ which separated me from the majority of Roma, and 
of my privileged position as a middle-class, university-educated woman from an Indian 
diasporic family setded in the United States. I attended, and on appropriate occasions, 
participated, in meetings sponsored by NGOs and Romani activists in Budapest as well 
as in towns throughout the country such as Szolnok, Pecs, and Debrecen. These included 
participation in public forums such as the Roma Cafe, which was a regular, if sporadic, 
discussion group beginning in the late 1990s by Aladar Horvath (director of Roma 
Foundation for Civil Rights) and other colleagues from the vibrant Romani NGO sector. At 
the Roma Cafe, activists passionately debated and discussed key themes such as school 
segregation of Romani children, legislative reforms, media policy, and other topical issues 
of the day (cf. Pogany 2004). Many of these forums were held in cultural centres, and 
were commonly followed by music and Romani folk dance performances which attracted 
a multi-generational audience (complete with young children encouraged to go dance on 
stage). Indeed, these events — which combined both art and politics - comprised the 
lifeblood of a key segment of Romani civil society in Budapest. It was attendance in these 
venues where I gathered an appreciation for what both elite and non-elite Roma in 
Hungary were thinking about, their ideas and interests, their problems, and their visions 
for the future. Interestingly, one of my informants recently told me that I was perceived 
as an ‘eccentric type’ by some people in the field — including many Roma who would 
(perhaps self-deprecatingly) wonder “who in their right mind would want to study us?” I 
was also considered to be humourous, and indeed, I did use irony or jokes to break ice at 
times.
Perhaps most crucially, as a sociological researcher, I was able to overcome my previous 
problem of conflicting loyalties. I had been part of the NGO world whose impact I was 
now interrogating, and I had empathized with the cause of Romani empowerment and
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had witnessed first-hand the contradictions of my work within a human rights NGO not 
offering much space for autonomy or self-direction for Roma themselves. I could now 
view the situation from the outside, and realized that I could attempt to be ‘objective’ 
about the power asymmetries I witnessed. Nevertheless, my field role was complex at 
multiple levels: former NGO worker, sociological researcher, sympathetic witness. At 
times, some of my Romani interlocutors wondered whether I was a Romani woman 
from the US who was hiding her cultural heritage deliberately.37 The other extreme was 
the suggestion, once made to me by a prominent Romani NGO activist in Hungary (only 
in partial jest), that as an American citizen, it was possible that I was an undercover 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent. The sheer surreality of my research role and 
reception in the field was astounding at times.38 Thus, autobiographical narratives and 
experiences within the NGO sector are important to highlight in order to engage in 
scholarship reflexively.
Interviews and conversations
My functional knowledge of the Hungarian and Romani languages expanded the 
repertoire of interaction within the field, enabling me to conduct interviews and hold 
conversations with a broad range of interlocutors. My interviews with key informants 
were a combination of both open-ended in-depth interviews which in many cases were 
supplemented with prior field interaction in NGO work and/or social gatherings, as well 
as ethnographic interviews, in which ‘observations from the field [were used] to assess 
the meaning and relevance of interview data’ (Marvasti 2004: 22).
37 This also happened to me on several occasions in Skopje, Macedonia where I worked with Kosovan 
Romani refugees as a part o f  a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) project for 
nine months in 2002.
38 In retrospect, this does not appear to be as far-fetched or fanciful an idea as I initially imagined. Lindsay 
Moran, a Harvard graduate who had befriended Romani intellectuals in Skopje, Macedonia during her job 
as an American foreign service officer from 1998-2003, was indeed working for the CIA, gathering 
information on ethnic tensions in the Balkans. She eventually published a book - Blowing My Cover - 
about her experiences as a CIA operative (Moran 2005) in which she discusses her interaction with Roma.
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25 semi-structured interviews with key framers and participants of ‘Roma Rights’ (both 
Hungarian and international figures), with media policy-makers, and with key 
government officers were conducted (see list of key interviews on page 251-253). 
Following, McCracken (1990), I conducted long interviews with open-ended questions as 
prompts which focused on the phenomenon of ‘Roma rights’, discrimination against 
Roma, and government policy and NGO activity, all contextualized with particular 
reference to my interviewees’ various positions within the field. Thus, in interviewing a 
Hungarian government officer from the socialist era, I was interested in their knowledge 
of the continuities of experience; this actually held true for most of my informants who 
were over thirty-five and had some first-hand adulthood experience of the socialist era in 
Hungary. One advantage of this interview technique was that “ ...by not limiting 
respondents to a fixed set of answers (as in a survey), in-depth interviewing has the potential to 
reveal multiple, and sometimes conflicting attitudes about a given topid’ (Marvasti 2004: 21, 
emphasis mine). I also held innumerable, informal conversations with various activists 
and participants in the movement from different life paths. These included young 
Romani college students (many of whom were involved with Romaversitas, an ‘invisible 
college’ for Hungarian Roma in Budapest), Romani musicians at various venues, Romani 
leaders in various towns in the countryside (eastern and southern Hungary in particular), 
along with the ‘usual suspects’ or elite Roma who are the visible representatives in public. 
I also paid informal visits to various Romani homes and met with ‘average’ Romani 
families (those not participating directly in the ‘movement’ per se).
Documentary and archival data
Within the research field in Hungary, focus was placed on important works related to 
Tloma rights’ and Hungarian Romani communities. The large body of literature 
produced over the past decade within the Romani-related non-governmental sphere has
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been fundamental to my work, as have documents produced officially by the Hungarian 
state and intergovernmental bodies. Written (textual) data was collected from 
monographs, journals, and other publications in the fields of political science, sociology, 
anthropology and social psychology, as well as additional works by economists and 
linguists. The corpus of literature produced (primarily after 1985) within the Romani- 
related non-governmental sphere in Hungary, along with official documents published by 
the Hungarian state and European intergovernmental bodies were assessed.
In addition, with respect to the discourse on the ‘Gypsy problem’, data was collected 
from both Hungarian and other international press sources; electronic listserves such as 
Romnet and Romanonet, as well as key websites on Roma; reports published by 
government offices; and academic articles dealing with various human rights issues.
With reference to the discourse on ‘Roma Rights’, the newsletters and human rights 
reports of the European Roma Rights Center (primarily from 1996 to 2005) were analysed. A 
content analysis of relevant human rights reports by the Human Rights Watch were 
conducted, along with a study of the annual reports and publications of approximately 
six major NGOs dealing almost exclusively with Romani rights issues. I analysed the 
materials gathered and investigated the claims of all participants in both discursive 
frameworks, that is, ‘Romani rights’ and the ‘Gypsy problem’.
In addition, throughout this thesis, I have incorporated illustrations of various types of 
visual documentation that have been relevant to the creation of the discourse on the 
‘Gypsy problem’, and by contrast, ‘Roma rights’.
Access to archival data: OSA fellowship
During the summer of 1999, a research fellowship with the Open Society Archives, housed 
at the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest, afforded me access to primary 
research materials at two archives in Budapest: the Hungarian National Archives, where I
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accessed government documents from the socialist period, and the archives of the CEU, 
enabling me to investigate nascent human rights (dissident) ideologies in late socialist 
Hungary. NGO reports and scientific studies from the 1990s were reviewed; indeed, 
Hungary has a solid tradition in statistical research, in particular, the collection of census 
data. I also reviewed a comprehensive sample of articles from the Hungarian press and 
primary periodicals, focusing on the subject of discourses on Roma during the socialist 
Kadar regime.
3.3 Data analysis
Using an inductive approach to the sociological questions posed above, theory arose 
from qualitative, empirical research, whereby theory evolves through the research process 
and does so through “...the continuous interplay between analysis and data collection” 
(Strauss and Corbin 1990: 273). My primary data was broadly divided into three research 
clusters:
1) Interviews with human rights entrepreneurs and elites
2) Texts which constitute ‘Roma rights’ discourses (primarily in English, but some were 
in Hungarian)
3) Archival materials and government documents in Hungary (as referred to above).
With respect to the analysis of the first category of interviews, my key objective was to 
obtain an understanding of the influence and transmission of human rights ideologies in 
contemporary Hungary. With respect to the second category of texts, these were 
primarily publications generated by Hungarian or international NGOs such as NEKFs 
White booklets from 1994 to 2005, and the ERRC’s Roma Rights (which began as a 
newsletter in 1996, but became a human rights quarterly by 1998); indeed, due to its 
global distribution, the latter has played a hegemonic role in the production and diffusion 
of human rights discourses vis-a-vis Roma for an English-speaking, cosmopolitan
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audience. Here, I was interested in assessing the primary discourses generated, as well as 
observing their ideological trajectories (and if possible, tracing their origins). I examined 
the construction of ‘Roma rights’ and the frameworks used by human rights 
entrepreneurs as I was keen to understand if, for example, civil and political rights 
discourses were privileged over those of social and economic rights. In addition, it was 
important for me to see how ‘Romani victimisation’ was portrayed by the human rights 
entrepreneurs. Were the narratives of human rights violations vis-a-vis Roma dry and 
legalistic? Or were they infused with a more nuanced contextualization generally found 
wanting in human rights reporting? Was the Romani voice included in the text, and if so, 
how was this done? The final category of Hungarian documents were used heavily in 
Chapters Four and Five, as I attempted to create a genealogy of the activities of 
dissidents and activists in Hungary, as well as to investigate the birth of neoliberal human 
rights entrepreneurship.
Discourse analysis
Whilst conducting an analysis of discursive frameworks, with a particular focus on the 
transformation from ‘Gypsy problem’ to ‘Roma rights’, I used techniques and insights of 
sorting and analyzing through ‘key themes’ as suggested by McCracken (1988). I 
identified primary concepts and constructions within the discursive framework of my 
interviews and textual materials, and then organised these clusters of concepts in order to 
ensure as comprehensive a presentation of the data as possible. I also employed the 
insights of Teun van Dijk (1993) on critical discourse analysis when interrogating 
discursive frameworks generated by elites, and their connection to (at times) subtle racist 
trajectories. In summary, I conducted both textual analysis and critical discourse analysis 
of documentary materials from newspaper articles, NGO publications, and a smaller 
number of government reports on Romani integration policies and programmes. In the
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subsequent chapter, I cover the primary discourses on Roma in Hungary during the 
socialist era, focusing on a number of key themes. The primary themes of education, 
health, and labour policy which emerged in the 1950s are once again re-surfacing in post­
socialist Hungary, and the continuity of these discourses from the past will also be 
explored.
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CHAPTER FOUR - DISCURSIVE AND POLITICAL ANTECEDENTS OF 
THE ‘TRANSITION* ERA: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ‘GYPSY 
PROBLEM* TO ‘ROMA RIGHTS*
4.1 Introduction: a discursive chronology of the ‘Gypsy problem’
Retween me and the other world there is ever an unasked question: unasked hy some 
through feelings of delicacy; by others through the difficulty of rightly framing it. Ally 
nevertheless, flutter round it. Thy approach me in a half hesitant sort of way, eye me 
curiously or compassionately, and then, instead of saying directly, How does itfeel to be 
a problem? Thy say, 1 know an excellent colored man in rny town; or, I  fought at 
Mechanicsville; or, do not these Southern outrages make your blood boil?* A t these I  
smile, or am interested, or reduce the boiling to a simmer, as the occasion may require. 
To the real question, How does itfeel to be a problem? I answer seldom a word.
- W.E.B. Dubois (1897) The Souls of Black Folk
As discussed in Chapters One and Two, the discursive construction of Gypsies39 as 
‘problems’ has been deeply embedded in European popular and scientific discourses 
(including in the UK) for several centuries. History is replete with examples of customary 
and legal exclusion of Romani communities in European territories. Although perhaps 
not termed consistently as the ‘Gypsy problem’ (cigdny problema in Hungarian), the use of 
this phraseology to describe how Roma are a priori perceived as incompatible with 
European society, and their perceived otherness, dates back to at least the late 19th century, 
which was a time of Empire for a number of European powers, including the Habsburgs. 
In some discursive constructions, the term ‘problem’ was perhaps more of a synonym for 
the French noun problematique, especially as used by folklorists, ‘Gypsylonsts’, and other 
Orientalists (Bussell 1919; Hancock 2000: 9). Although not ‘overdy’ racist perhaps, this
39 Roma became known as Gypsies from ‘Egyptians’. One current theory, following up on Ken Lee’s 
(2005: 33-38) criticisms o f  conventional theories on the subject, surmises that since their ancestors traveled 
through Egypt Minor (which also included Mediterranean lands), they announced themselves as people 
from ‘Little Egypt’ upon their arrival to Europe (Fraser 1992; Marsh and Strand 2006). To this day, many 
Romani communities use the term ‘Gypsy’ or its equivalent to refer to themselves.
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type of usage was certainly pregnant with the power of ‘othering’ and objectification. In 
other cases, however, its usage implied the inferiority and deviance of Roma, and left a 
damaging legacy which reinforces Romani subalterity to this day (Crowe 2000; Trehan 
and Kocze 2009). Although the Hungarian state was never a ‘coloniser* vis-a-vis the 
Romani communities in the classical sense of the term, the governance and regulation of 
Romani communities has been a continuous reality throughout European history. Thus, 
the strong homogenising aspects of the nation-state40 and the cultural subordination of 
Romani communities emanating from this have contributed to a subalterity of Romani 
lifeworlds, as well as diverse forms of epistemic violence directed squarely upon them 
(Spivak 1988; Zoltan 2006).
There are notable parallels with discourses constructed on European Jewry and that of 
European Roma: the ‘wandering Jew* stereotype of the Middle Ages; the ‘Jewish 
question* (Judenfrage in German) raised in debates about the integration of Jews in 
Europe; as well as the literature produced on Jewish ‘emancipation’, mainly by Jewish 
intellectuals themselves (Felsenstein 1999; Marx and Ruge 1844; McCagg 1989). The 
critical difference between the Jewish and the Romani case is that with respect to the 
latter, these mythical social constructions continue to be hegemonic in the contemporary 
European imaginarium of Roma, for example, even to the point where Romani culture is 
itself perceived as synonymous with nomadism. In contrast, many of the aforementioned 
social constructions on European Jewry are now viewed as points of historical interest 
alone, with the possible exception of the experience of Russian Jewry in the past decades 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
40 In connection to this, the Habsburgs also enacted strong regulatory measures targeting Romanies within 
its territory, and in addition, although the Socialist regime renounced national or ethnic feeling, 
nevertheless, the institutions within the purview o f  the Hungarian socialist state—the schools, hospitals, 
factories, orphanages, prisons—all served to stamp a particular ‘Hungarianness’ on its diverse Romani 
communities (Kallai and Torzsok 2000). The literature on this phenomenon remains scant and under­
researched.
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Moreover, references to ‘Gypsies’ in Hungarian popular culture contribute to the 
reinforcement of particular stereotypes on Roma. One example is the popular novel, 
‘The Stars of Eger’ (Egri Csillagok), a late 19th century literary classic about a genuine 
historical event - the Battle of Mohacs (fought in 1526 against the Ottoman Turks). Read 
by all Hungarian children in elementary school, the novel contains depictions of Roma as 
lazy and cunning (this latter stereotype had positive connotations as well), but also as 
amusing buffoons (Gardonyi 1899/1991). General stereotypes (and thus social labels) 
about the Roma of CEE continue to range from the negative to the ‘forgiving,: Roma are 
depicted as work shy; engaged in pick-pocketing, robbing, burglaries, and begging; they 
are seen as always looking for trouble and unrestrained (‘hot-blooded’); Romani women 
are seen as prostitutes, while the men are thought to have voracious sexual appetites; 
Roma are dirty (connected to poverty). With respect to the more ‘forgiving’ or positive 
side, Roma are seen as good musicians and entertainers. In Hungary, the use of 
colloquialisms in daily speech persist, such as, for example, ‘swallowing the wrong way* 
[ciganjutra ment translated literally as ‘went down the Gypsy alley’] (Kishonthy INT: 2005; 
cf. Stewart 1997: 113-114).
Analyses of these types of diffuse and persistent popular prejudices - mapped on to 
Hungarian culture for generations, including during the Socialist era - are not well 
documented. Therefore, this section of the thesis, which focuses on public discourses of 
Gypsies during state socialism, offers an exploratory contribution in this area. In order 
to understand how — despite clear Socialist party objectives to the contrary — Romani 
marginalisation persisted within state Socialist structures (albeit to a far lesser extent than 
previously in Hungarian history), it is important to contextualize Hungarian politics at the 
time, and in addition, to examine the ‘Gypsy question’ at the level of popular culture and 
everyday society. In this chapter, I cover a history of ideas and ideologies, including a 
discursive overview of the ‘Gypsy problem’ or ‘Gypsy question’. The research is based
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on original archival materials gathered from the Open Society Archives (OSA) and the 
Hungarian National Archives in Budapest, which included some rare government 
documents on the Romani population, as well as newspaper articles from publications by 
Hungarian dissidents or the demokratikus elienees (democratic opposition).
4.2 Policy on the ‘Gypsy question* during State Socialism
Egyiitt dolgoytunk, egyiitt buli^ tiink! We worked together, we partied together!
Blanka Kozma (1999), Romani woman’s activist and Budapest City 
Council member, commenting on her life in Socialist times.
H ungarian society from the 1950s to the 1980s
The state socialist period in Hungary includes the decades spanning the 1950s to the 
1980s, and are also known as the Kadar years, named after the key political figure at the 
time who was to become the architect of so-called ‘gulyas Communism’ in Hungary. 
Kadar came to power immediately after the failure of the 1956 uprising, and the 
subsequent murder of its reformist leader Imre Nagy, who had been implicated by the 
Russians. It was therefore during this climate of political repression, in the early days of 
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP) rule in Hungary, that ‘official’ social science 
research came to be marked by the work of state bureaucrats who produced 
ethnographies influenced by Marxist-functionalist theoretical approaches on the ‘Gypsy 
question’ (Ban and Pogany, 1957; cf. Stewart 2001). There were also other party 
functionaries who wrote reports on the ‘progress of integrating Gypsies’ in the fields of 
education, employment and housing, as well as some studies on the phenomenon of 
‘Gypsy crime’ (OSA 1999). Many of these official discourses on the ‘Gypsy question’ 
were then picked up by Hungarian broadsheets, and several illustrations of these are 
analyzed in this chapter.
85
By the late 1960s, with the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), the 
economic policies of Hungary gradually moved towards a mix of socialist and small-scale 
market-oriented policies, with increasing, but proscribed, liberalization (Swain 1996). 
Nonetheless, the socialist period was marked by strong social control engineered by the 
State. Although Roma were encouraged, much like other Hungarians living in 
predominandy rural areas, to join the industrial proletariat by becoming miners, 
construction and railroad workers, there were state policies in addition, which targeted 
Roma specifically. Particularly after the adoption of the 1961 declaration on ‘The 
problem of Gypsy integration,, the ‘Gypsy question* was constructed as a ‘social 
problem* devoid of any ethnic component; thus, socialist policies focused on the 
provision of jobs, housing, and education for Roma (cf. Stewart 2001). Nonetheless, the 
socialist state did not adequately acknowledge the barriers connected to the ‘customary* 
exclusion of Roma which posed a significant obstacle to their integration. Thus, in the 
Hungarian educational system, there was de facto segregation, on the basis of ‘customary’ 
spatial segregation (each village had its own Romani quarter or setdement, iciganjtelepT), 
and therefore many community schools which catered to Romani pupils were also built 
upon this de facto ‘separate but equal* precept under socialism. In this manner, large 
numbers of Romani children became tracked into substandard schools, including schools 
for children with learning disabilities.41 In the area of housing as well, Roma were 
subjected to the ‘separate but equal* prinbiple in the form of the ‘cs lakas* (csdkkentes 
comfortos) or so-called ‘reduced-comfort* housing built specifically in Romani setdements
41 This de facto segregation is currently being challenged in many court rooms across the region by human 
rights organizations conducting legal interventions (ERRC 2000, 2002; Winterboume 1999: INT). It is 
important to note that there are segregated facilities for children even in ‘mixed’ (Romani and non-Romani) 
schools across Europe, for example, in dining facilities. See also the special report, The Impact of Legislation 
and Policies on School Segregation of Romani Children, Budapest: ERRC, 1997.
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(despite the fact that in urban areas, there were some achievements in housing integration 
for Roma).
With respect to the criminal justice system, by 1970, the police had established a special 
department in Budapest for the express purpose of studying “Gypsy modes of 
criminality”, and these included the fingerprinting of approximately 2,000 Romani 
persons, the vast majority of whom resided in juvenile state institutions and did not have 
prior criminal records (Noszkai 1987, cited in Kocze and Versitz 1997: 24). These 
fingerprints were also used to assess whether or not criminogenic behaviour of Roma 
could be detected from dermatoglyphics. In addition, from 1974 to 1989, the Hungarian 
Socialist Republic kept separate, official statistics on Romani prisoners and developed 
special police units and methodology concentrating on ‘Gypsy crime* (Kocze and Versitz 
1997: 24).
Concurrent to government surveys on demography and crime, the folklorist tradition of 
modem ‘Romologia’ was propounded by Kamill Erdos at this time. As a member of the 
Gypsy Lore Society (covered in Chapter Two), he was a prolific ethnographer fascinated 
by Romani linguistic and cultural diversity, and published much of his work in the 1950s 
(Macfie Archives 2007). Nonetheless, Erdos himself ultimately believed that assimilation 
was the only future for Roma (Stewart 2001). However, with respect to Roma in Austro- 
Hungary, there is a large wealth of untapped material which pre-dates Erdos* work, and 
thus the written history of Roma remains incomplete.42
42 Much o f  these materials are kept in old scrapbooks and shoe-boxes within the homes o f  Romani 
families, generally unseen by researchers (let alone the general public). In the course o f  my field research 
throughout the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, I came across photographs o f  Romani musicians from 
the early 1900s, as well as newspaper clippings o f  Romani political activities during socialist times, which 
were carefully saved by Romani activists and intellectuals across the region.
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4.3 Social science, dissident politics, and the ‘Gypsy question*
This section offers a historical contexualisation of the socialist discourse(s) on Roma in 
Hungary, focusing on the primary ideas and ideologies of the era. In examining the role 
of social scientists and Romani intellectuals in the construction and (de) construction of 
the ‘Gypsy problem’ (also referred to as the ‘Gypsy question’), the role of prominent 
Hungarian intellectuals and human rights dissidents who participated in the construction 
of public narratives on ‘Roma rights’ was interrogated, with a view to highlighting the 
continuities and discontinuities of discourse.
Concurrent to the above-mentioned ‘folklorist’ tradition led by Erdos in the post-War 
period, there was another type of discursive framework on Roma that was emerging in 
the socialist era, particularly from the 1970s onwards. These were the works of 
Hungarian social scientists and social workers such as Istvan Kemeny, Rudolf Andorka, 
Gabor Havas, Ottilia Solt, and Anna Csongor, in which they examined the presence of 
poverty in their country. In doing so, some of them became particularly interested in 
Gypsies and began to conduct extensive demographic surveys on the Romani 
communities’ status in terms of employment, education, and health. In some respects, 
they were ‘pushing the envelope’ at that time, as these research subjects were not held in 
high regard by the Socialist state: by discussing the poverty that they encountered in 
Romani communities, they were — direcdy or indirecdy - raising substantial criticisms of 
the regime.
During the early transition period, social scientists (and frequendy, dissidents) who 
engaged with the subject of ‘poverty and Gypsies’ included Istvan Kemeny (who 
conducted a pioneering demographic survey on Roma in 1971), Gabor Havas, and Janos 
Ladanyi. In Hungarian, this question has always been articulated rather provocatively: 
ciganykultura vagy s^ egenykultura? Or, translated into English, ‘Gypsy culture or poverty
culture? Social workers and educators like Anna Csongor (currently director of the 
Autonomia Foundation, a development NGO working in Romani communities), Agnes 
Diosi (pedagogue) and the late Zita Reger (linguist) were also figures influential in the 
sphere of education of Romani children in Hungary. Journalists such as the late Pulitzer- 
prize winning Zsolt Csalog raised the public’s consciousness in the 1980s about the 
entrenched discrimination and racism Roma experienced in Hungary, despite their socio­
economic and cultural contributions to wider society.
These very same people were affiliated with the demokratikus ellen e^s (democratic 
opposition) in Hungary when it began to become more visible in the 1980s, having 
created ‘alternative’ institutions such as the political movement SZDSZ, the magazine 
Beszelo, as well as SZETA, which was a foundation specialized in assisting the poor. As 
Ferenc Koszeg, the director of Hungarian Helsinki Committee shared with me, this had 
an adverse impact on their career prospects, and many (including Istvan Kemeny) 
suffered professionally as a result of pursuing their research interests on the prevalence 
of poverty amongst Gypsies (1999: INT).
The Hungarian Press and D iscourses on Roma
A survey of local and national broadsheets, as well as more serious essays by Hungarian 
intellectuals (in periodicals such as Kritikd), suggests that during State socialist times, the 
‘Gypsy problem’ (or more benignly, and commonly, the ‘Gypsy Question’) occupied a 
significant place in Hungarian public discourse from the early 1950s onwards. For 
example, in a local paper from Szekesfehervar, “Gypsies on the Road to Socialist 
Development”, the journalist closes the article with a quote, “egyik ember annji, mint a 
masik, bar a bore bama vagy feher...” or “whether we have brown or white skin, we are all 
the same...” (S^ekerfehervar Ujsag 1951: OSA). The article (Figure 3) is featured below on 
the following page.
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k ir o h a n la k  az u t c ir a  A* o r d fta n i  
kezdtAk: . .N a g y m a m a  s lr l  N a g y m a n u  
lr!“  N a g y m a n u  u ta n u k  ra en t. kigiHt 
a k n p u b a . a  fA lf ih o z  tu m 's z k o d o t t  
As m o s o lv g o l l .  V an n ak  a z  d rd m n ek  
o ly a n  p i l la n a ta i .  m ik o r  m a r  e U V -d  
As kevAs a z  e m h e r i sz<5.
5.
A tm d ai V d rb on  rd v ld  id d  m u lvu  
V ezetdkApzA Isk o la  in d o l  A n n irab cta  
T a n fo ly a m n k  la n i ld i  s z im ir a .  A 
ta n fo ly a m  n z  Jnrz.e p ap a  teren  le.sz. 
a vo lt M O K fiP  i s k n l ib a n .  A ta n fo -  
Ivam nak  nz a Ciilja, t io g y  a d o lg a z o  
n > in i/o lrn (  l e p r i ren  t f  c ig n n g o k ln -  
Ib k m J t, A f t b c r m e g y c i  t a n i c s  r .ip -  
indvclAsj n lo sz t ii ly a  h a t  d o lg o z ii  r i  
g in y t  ja v a sn ll a ta n fn ly a n ir a :  a po 
lin k n h n zi A llam i g a z d a .u g  r su p a  c i  
g iin y  d olg iinrb i'd  a l io  n d v A n y le m w ld  
b r ig a d jin a k  k c l t o g j i t .  E rcsib d l k r l  
lu’pzenA szl s  e g y  m c z d sz e n lg y d r g y i  
d o lg o zd t,
A Sz iirrsa  'itr o lw n  !>csrAltrni e g y  
■hdsozvi f i g i n n r a l .  » k i m a r  o lv a s ta  
V v r b s m n r l t i lb l  A  v en  r ig a n y t.
Miijus r l j e j i a  az elsii tanfolyam  
b:illgati<i Harangozii istvan  Vcze.les.'- 
vcl vonultuk fel. Teli k e lo e l  d nckpt- 
lek. I -Jk ii»y zi-npclt a ..d r a g a  fo ld ,  
•ziiidbaz.-immtk fdldjc . . . "  Dp mintiiH 
fe i  fp jj.1  mngnsr.lvbrn emetkedb-V 
volna. mikor azokboz a  soroklioz f i  
'ck. bogy:
.E g y ik  rmlier n n m /i, m in f  n  nnis’k , 
llur n bore bur no voqij fehet..." .
R a f t ;  PAter,
Figure 4 - “Gypsies on the Road to Socialist Development” (1951)
Furthermore, contrary to prevailing simplistic readings o f the nature o f socialist 
discourses on the ‘ciganykerdes’ (‘Gypsy question’) as merely state propaganda, many of the 
articles I reviewed suggested a surprising level of honesty, understanding, and many 
times, even compassion for the socio-economic problems (and that o f integration) faced 
by Roma during the Kadar regime, suggesting a degree o f salience and importance given
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to the issue by the HSWP (Hungarian Socialist Workers Party) . 43 Moreover, there is also 
a sense of deja vu as one ploughs through article after article about employment, housing, 
education, and health and sanitation of Roma, as the discourse on Roma — particularly 
that taken up by Romani activists in post-socialist Hungary — concentrates on the very same 
problems which Romani communities struggle with today. This suggests the strong 
continuities of structural exclusion from the past, a form of exclusion that contemporary 
policy approaches beginning in the early 1990s - which privilege discourses of ethnicity - 
have failed to address (cf. Kovats 1998).
In the late 1950s, there were articles which celebrated Socialist ‘engineering’ for Roma,
and this continued into the 1960s, but at this point the focus shifts to discussions of the
implementation of the June 1961 HSWP Political Committee’s policy on the ‘Gypsy
Question’, thereby encouraging state officials in every Hungarian county to embrace
Romani integration seriously in key sectors: employment, housing, education, and health
policies (cf. Stewart 2001; OSA Archives 1999). Nonetheless, for a younger generation of
Hungarian journalists who were perhaps not too familiar with local press coverage of
Romani communities, the conventional view is that Socialist-era newspapers were almost
devoid of discussions on Roma. As one young journalist (in his early 30s) and NGO
activist emphasised to me:
Through the 1980s and before, Roma issues were not separated as such; 
according to the accepted government policy, and all the [news]papers were 
under strict governmental party control, there was no such thing as Homa 
issues’— it was considered generally as a social problem and the ethnicity of the 
people was not an issue open to be discussed, it fits very well into the hypocritical 
approach with which the mainstream politics handled the entire Roma issue, not 
making a debate about it, and not working out an efficient policy in terms of the 
largest ethnic minority in Hungary...but...afterwards, in the early 90s after the 
transition, the Roma issue became more of a centered theme and a focus of 
attention.. .(Miklosi 1999: INT).
43 By comparison, if  one does a quick survey o f  contemporary UK broadsheets, it is easy to reach the 
conclusion that the quality and depth o f  articles on ‘Gypsies and Travellers’ leaves much to be desired (cf. 
Clark and Greenfields 2006).
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Though Miklosi is correct in suggesting that Romani ‘ethnicity’ per se was not emphasised 
out o f ideological pressures, journalists writing about Romani communities in Hungary 
clearly had much more freedom of expression to discuss poverty, marginality, and 
societal exclusion than is commonly assumed. Furthermore, though the policies under 
Socialism clearly favoured assimilation of Hungarian citizens o f Romani background, the 
discourses on Roma which began to emerge by the late 1970s and 1980s resonate with 
today’s contemporary policy debates on education and employment as pathways to social 
integration.
Another scholar, Pogany (2004) has also pointed out the significance o f the sociographic
writing tradition in Central and Eastern Europe of the 1970s and 1980s {s^pciografia in 
Hungarian), and I offer a few samples of this type of innovative journalism below.
M u r i t  Hihu f R I p o  R T 1f?2. JANUAR ♦. VASARNAP 5
A r t  h ix z ite k .  h o g y  c sa k  i n  
acsoTQok J in y i r t  i s  n e r e t e i i n  
a  vuros kafpuja e ld t t . . .
A kapukon kivul p
v o lt m&s Isko laba  h e ly ez te tn i m a -  eatlg. A x  i n  ta n ltd to m a t l t r o i /~
S o k a n  v& r)uk  a  k a p u k o n  kivU l,
g i t .  A  'Az Av e m lek e iro t. ta p o sz -  bolja  a  xzillOi  hdz. 
ta la tm ro l azo c b a r. sz ivesen . s nA- S  a m ik o r  m egkA rdeztem , m it 
m i n o sz ta lg iav a l bcjizAl a m a te -  le h e tn e  tann i, e z t vA laszolta: 
sz a lk a l o rvoai U k a sb a n . — C lg d n y k o tlig iu m o k  k e l l t n i -
— H ogy m ia r t  n e h ez ?  A ci- n e k  tucaU zdm ra , hogy. k ie m e t-  
gdnyg y e re k ek  nem  lA rnak 6 v o -  H ttiU k  a z  e ld n y te U n  k 'o rnyezet-
h o g y  bU a lm a to k  r e zk ra fc a r ja tv a l ddba . m e r t a  kAt szd ld ju k  n em  bdl a g y ere ke ke t. 
m e g a )d n d 4 k o z za to k t do lgoz tk , > igy nem  v ts z ik  fe l  A zdta  feiszam oltA k a z t a  ny fr-
(B a r t K d ro ly) >&kei. A  sztU 6kt6l kevAs o ly a am lt egyhftzi c ig d n y te lep e t — a td rsa -  
)<allanak, la n u ln a k . am i nek a z  is- da lom  As a z  d llam  jdvoltA bol — 
M e g to rp an  a  kocsi. A a c to r  kolA ban h a sz n a t ve n n ek . A sz a k -  a  lakdsA p it Ashen sokiA le enged- 
n e m  fca jt be  a  mAly d to n  a  p u t-  iro d a lo m  ig y  lo g a lm a z  in p e rsze - mA nyt, kedvexm A nyt k a p  a el- 
r ik h o z . K isz a llu n k . O gy la tsz jk , Q iny  a M m y e z e t i ik .  Ez a z t j e -  gany lakossug . 0 }  h e ly re  jo b b  la- 
it t ,  a  c lg d n y te lep l g y e re k ek  kftrA- le n tl. hogy  td b b n y lre  n e m  ism e- kA aokba k b k d z tek  e ny lrvgyhdzi 
b e n  mAg e g y  o ly a n  kbzdnsAges r ik  fel a  sz in ek e t. nem  tu d jd k  c lgdny te iep  lak d l Is. S  vellik  
jd r m u  Is szenzdcld  szAm ba m egy , irash o z, ra jz h o z  togn i a  c eru za t. m e n t. a h o z z iju k  kozeli isko laba  
m in t  szerkesz t& A gO nk  6 reg  V ol- A z ily e n  k o n i .  A vodaban  k ioko - kArte magA t P a n k o ta l B am d n A is 
pnj a. P i lia n a  to k  a l a t t  k o ru lv w z ik  s f to tt g y e re k ek n e k . isk o tab a  m e -  J a v u ln a k  to h a t a  feltA telek  De 
vagy  tiz e n o te n  As LAxnulJAk, az in - n e t. A lta-dban  n U r  k la la k u lt a ha  fok rd l fo k ra  fel Is s i lm o l ja k  
t e  k b r illta p o g a tjd k  a  to k in te tu k -  sz im fogalrn i** , a cigA nygyere- a  c ixan y la k & e lep e k e  t, a p r o b li -  
k e l. A  s o fb ru n k  jo v i i l i s  e m b e r , k e im  v isz o n t nem  tu d td k  m eg- zna l in y  eg* sok  dip m eg  m a r ad  A 
s  e g y e t a  le g k ivA ncsibbak  kOzul k u lb n b b z te tn l a t  egvet a  ke ttd tC l. PankotAlnA-fAle ja v a s le t  vAlto- 
be en g e d  a kocsi szervtAlvAbe. A  a jd ts ia n i  a t  ta n u lia k  m eg  z a tla n u l ldeazerdnek  td n ;k  M ost,
b o rz a s  k a m a sz  fA16 dv a to ssa g g al g y e re k  k o ru kb a n . A fu ze ttlk e t so k  A w el a z  egykori r in o r t  ut&n 
te sz l u j j i t  a k o rm sn y k e r^ k re . nem  kbtnA k b e  a szb ldk . h la b a  i* u jn*  fe lk e res te m  le h i t  a n y fr-  
m ln th a  v a ia m i nag}’o n -« ag y o n  kArrA a  la n itd n d . P isakos a  k is  egy h az l c igA nygyerekek ta n itb n 6 -  
n e m ea  h o lm l erintokbzeU A gA be kezlik . am L kor Isko laba  j& nnek. jAt. As ve iem  io tt  a  m ezve i illetA- 
J u to i t  v o ln a . A  p u p ll la ja  k iU g u l. s  W lbl le ss  m ocskus a z  Irk a  is. kes. B at Art K Aim An Is. P lgyelem - 
u gy  f ig y e l l a z  AI16 sebessA gmA rd Sok k d z d tu ik  a pbsze  m eg a to la , r e  mAltd ellenvA lem enye v o lt a 
6 rA t . T d b b n y lre  a zo n b a n  nem  termA- c lgA nykollA glum okra v o«a tkoz6
D e b n rm e n a v ire  is kozbnsAge* sze ttd l, h a n em  m e rt a  szuieUctol J a v n s la tta l szem ben  
-  le g to b b  gyeyek s z a m i r a  e l-  is hibAs m a g > ar beszAdet haU ot- _  B arm ily e n o k  is a  clgAny-
A rhe td  a  b e te l je s l th e l6  vagy  e z : tak . 
e g y sz e r  a  v o la n  m e  lie  Ulni, 6be - 
161e v a !6 a z in a ie g  so h a sem  lesz  
so fo r. A h h o z , hog y  v a la k l gAp- 
j  a rm  lienged  e iy  t k a p jo n , isko lai 
vegzett&Ag k e ll. N e m  s6 k . D e e n - 
n e k  a  15 Aves fiu n a k  c sak  h a -  io ***  O rok lb tten  gyeneA bbek vo l-
szu ldk  o lth o n i v iszonyai, kdrbm - 
sz ak a d tu k ig  rag a szk p d n a k  a  gye-
ro m  o s2tA lya
Csodak es biitykok
-  T i v r i t , .  ho#y  a u te lK O IttM  “ C?" “ i " ™  
gva d ro lo tt  g  l- *; "
n d n a k  a  azellem l kepessA gelk, a ie m b e n  P a n k o la in e  e r -
m in t  azo k n a k  a  g y e re k ek n e k , v t , :  
r /  /  •  n  7  ,  i , /  A kiknek tehA r a boriik . So l, ro p -  — D e legaM bb m eg  ke llene
C f v e g z t :  J ,  /  S Z B Z d / C k  p a n t fogA konyak a  zenAre. r i t -  p rbbA lm  K i s i r l t t k ip p t n  it. O tt, 
m u sra . e rz e lm lle p  g azdagok, r a -  aho l td rh e te tle n  a helyzel. bi- 
A  S z a b o les  m e g y e i T an d c s Is- g a xzkodok . A h h cz  a zonban . hogy  zony  sok  csa la d n d l Id rh e te tlen . 
k o la i c so p o rtv ez e td je . B o td ri fCal- ok o so d ja n ak . s  ^ le r je k  k o ita r s a ik  A  ta n y a i koIlA gium ok szervezese - 
m d n  e z t m ond> e : te lie s itm enyA t. ituonyuam  so k  e»6- nA! is  ellend liA sba iitkttZi*. a z  ok-
— A  c igA nygyerekek  k A th a r-  fw zltA s ke ll. O ly a sm ik a t k e l le t t  ta ia s i osztdly. D e vAg&l az  e des- 
*nad  rAsze n e m  Ju t m a r  e l a z  o tb -  e lvA geznem  a 22 gv e re k em m el. apdk . A desanyak, ld tva . hogv  id 
d lk  o u td ly b a  sem . &m>yi lako la- e m it r.orm aiga kdrOtm A nyek k 6 -  kezektoen v a n  a  gye rek . mrgbA - 
z o tsag g a l p e d ig  m a  m a r  v a jm i .z o tt az  ovonok. az  e d e w n y ju k . k d ln e k  a  he lyze tte J. H a n e m  Is 
k e v ^ sre  v lsz i u z  e m b e r . N em  c su -  m eg a  logopA dus e g y u tt vAgez. v a iam e n n y l c igdnygyerek  asetA- 
p a n  ok  ia  id s  p o l i t ic a l  prob lA m a ez. kAaunosdsra, fAsdlkbdAsre szok- ben . d e  negyedAnAl. ha j-nw ddndl 
h isz en  sz d m o s  szocia lls  As a n y ag i ta tn i  6 k e t ugy. hogy  An m ag  a m  nA lkulttzhetetlen  vo ln a  a  koDA-
£
re tm  az  :*ptolat, U la n  be  is i t -  
jez ik  m a jd . -  
— T a p a s x u la to k a t  a  h oson ld  
je ik rgu  b ic sk ei IntA zroenytdl k a p - . 
lurfck. PAnzx a  nA pfront k o z re - 
mukodAsAvel k e rtte ttu n J t. m e g -  
hozzd ugy. bogy  a rv iz  IdeJAn 
fen n m a rad x  c sipcsup  bsszegeket. 
Api'iAanyagot h aszn d ltu n k  le i. A 
t&bblt k ip o to l ia  a  he ly l td e sz  
O v6n6nek  egy  kA pesitetlen. de  
m dr kepzO be JAr6 lcMcea As id  
•zandA kff f ia ta la saz o n y  szegodb tt 
e l. daJkA nak  fegy nyolc  MtalknomX 
eJvAgzett, n a g v o n  derAk As o k a s 
f ia ta l c ig in y a s sz o n y t a lk a lm a z -
(Vluctc U j m  r a ju )
te t  a  m egye. a r rd l a l l jo n  i t t  „a 
c ig a n y ta n u ld k  ia k o ld zta td sa n a k  
h a ly ze te ’' c i'm d na g y  pedagog ia i 
hozzaAriAssel m e g lo sa lm a z o tt U -  
n u lm a n y  As m b d sz e r ta n i le v e l no - 
h dny  Incfltvdnv-a: V egyenek  fe i 
n a g y o b b  s z d m b a n  dvodA ba c i-  
g a n y ta n u lo k a t .  U szta lkodds l ! t -  
heldeAget (m oedd td l. r u h a  e s  cl- 
potLsztitb le lsz c re le s t)  m m  Gen 
tar. te r  em be. K u lb n  e so p o rto k a t 
sz e rv az n ek  a  td lk o ro so k n a k . % r>»- 
ve lO iket a  te g jo b b  ta n ftb k , ta n a -  
rok  kOzUI ke ll k J v 4 l« z la n l ;  15 
cinAnvbanuIOnaX m d r  k lilb n  o tz -  
._ ^ te s i th e to ; osztd^yozb viza-
Figure 5 - “Outside the Gate”, M agyar Hirlap, January 1972 (source: OSA)
The article begins with an evocative poem by Romani poet Karoly Bari, from where the 
title o f the article is also taken:
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A%t his^tek, hogy csak en a csorgok fenyert es s^eretetert a varos kapuja eldtt. . .sokan varjuk 
a kapukon kiviil hogy bi^almatok re^krajcarjaival megajandeko^gatok! You think that I'm 
the only pilferer for light and love before the city gate...many of us wait beyond 
the gates for you to gift us with engravings o f your trust!
The ‘city gate’ is a very powerful symbol of an exclusionary boundary, and in this case 
epitomi2es centuries-long Romani marginalisation. ‘Engravings o f trust’ are a 
requirement for co-existence, and the Romani interlocutor awaits these.
Figure 6  - “The Problems of Gypsies and the Society”, N epszava, 5 August 1979 
(source: OSA)
The above is a sample article from the late 1970s. Featured on the right-hand bottom 
comer is Joszef Vekerdi, a prominent linguist, Orientalist, and Romologist44 who, one 
year prior to this news report, had co-authored a seminal text for the Patriotic People’s
44 By the early 1990s, Vekerdi’s earlier work was denounced by Romani activists and their supporters, who 
claimed that his work had racist overtones. Interestingly, he served as a member o f the Hungarian 
Academy o f Sciences’ Orientalist Studies council (MTA Orientalisztikai Bizottsaganak).
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vwon>ban. A r»«»n%z~»JCl»Dva1» 
grdtg  a it ben  doleeiraab, neve- 
Ilk a  ibbW eyerebvk  » W  »*• 
m .m k»i fdlUHM k. A lU l-ban 
ik k o r  nem ..aloak allaodo  
lunA kariM M TbtR’ . b m e th e  
/e>keoo a lectobabb  ri»7«ru 
la * rerckck  arm  k e rb lbH nab  
be u  b W a b * .
OR 1VAPP t.A.IOS 4 /  »>•*- 
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, '>i Jeheuweaar *  arm . h*»«v 
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Front (Ha^afias Nepfroni) entitled ‘Gypsies on the road to progress’ (Vekerdi and 
Meszaros 1978). Amongst other participants were Romani intellectuals Gusztav Balazs 
and Mrs. Otto Kovacs, as well as government secretary Lajos Papp.
Moreover, though government censors were clearly in operation (especially after the 
failed 1956 uprising), there appeared some very good sociographic pieces of writing 
which invoked humanist perspectives in the discourse on Roma, and discussed issues 
such as discrimination and deprivation as being at the root of many of the problems they 
face. Although journalists and writers were monitored by the State, Hungarian citizens, 
along with others in the eastern bloc countries, used creative means to subvert 
governmental agendas, and were able to discuss taboo subjects such as poverty, Gypsies, 
and the declining income of workers, as well as the problems faced by Hungarians 
outside of Hungarian borders amongst each other.
Another sample of such work is higlighted below (Figure 6), which is the book cover for 
a non-fictional monograph by Pulitzer-prize winning author Zsolt Csalog, based on the 
narratives of the lives of nine Gypsies from Hungary in the 1970s, similar in vein to the 
writings of the American progressive polemicist Studs Terkel, who tried to highlight ‘the 
people’s voices’. Nonetheless, as the Hungarian Helsinki Committee’s Ferenc Koszeg has 
correcdy emphasised, this discourse remained limited to dissident circles, and 
understandably did not have much impact on the Hungarian government’s policy 
approach to these sensitive issues at the time (Koszeg 1999: INT; cf. Miklosi 1999: IN'!).
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\\r  F t
,,320 0 0 0  ctg iny  61 ma M agyarorszdgon. Ez igen 
nagy szam , az aranyokat takintve is -  mindan 
harm incadik magyar em bar dgany! Tizenoi ev muiva 
m inden huszsnkettedik m agysr em ber cigany !esz. 
De az erinyokat nem naive is 6riasi tom eg: 
ha kezenfogva Idncba alininak, M 6tesiaikiit6l 
Soprom g i n t i  a I6ne. Gondolod, hogy ennyi 
em bert kepviseltethetsz, bem utaihatsz kiienccel ?'f 
-  idezi az ird kbnyve yidszavaban egyik baratja 
kdrdesfit. C saiog Zsolt igennel felel e k lrdesre. 
Megkfsdrii, hogy kilenc cigdny sorsan 
jelkepezve. u  egdsz magyarorszdgi cigenysdg, 
slsbsofban a flatalabb ntm zedek sorsarvak es 
eietenek legal abb a kckvonatatt bontakoztassa ki 
az  alvasd eldtt.
KOZMOSZ KONYVEK
Figure 7 - Extract from the back cover of ATine Gypsies by Zsolt Csalog (1976)
The caption above reads:
320,000 Gypsies live in Hungary today. This is indeed a large number, 
proportionally too - every thirtieth Hungarian is a Gypsy! After 15 years, every 
twenty-secondth Hungarian person will be Gypsy. This is a huge crowd, even 
without taking the proportion into account: if they all stood holding hands, they 
could form a chain which would go from Mateszalka [eastern Hungary] to 
Sopron [western Hungary]. D o you think nine people can represent that many?" 
Thus writes the author in the postscript of his book, citing a question from a 
friend. Zsolt Csalog answers this question in the affirmative. He attempts to 
describe the contours o f the life and fate of the whole Gypsy population o f 
Hungary and especially those o f the younger generation through the life o f nine 
Gypsies.
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Hungary in ‘Transition’
By 1991, with the strengthening of parliamentary democracy, the Director o f Hungarian 
Police, Andras Turos, declared that the aforementioned special ‘Gypsy crime’ units 
would be disbanded. Nonetheless, Kocze and Versitz (1997) caution that “the large 
reservoir of earlier studies on the Rromani [sic] may continue to contribute to biased 
police behaviour”, emphasizing their continued use within police training programmes 
(24). Moreover, by 1992, as a result of the Hungarian A ct on the Protection of Personal Data 
and the Publicity of Data of Public Interest (Chapter I, section 2), government agencies began 
to classify data on ethnicity as ‘special data’, thereby prohibiting such data from being 
gathered or used without the specific consent of the individual. The article below refers 
to the decision by the police (Ministry of Interior) to discontinue ‘Gypsy crime’
investigation.
A statisztikaban nem lesycigany^ bunozd
Irta: Do bo s  J inos rendor ezredes, az ORFK bun J/dozesi osztafyanak vezetoje
V alakinek m eg k e ll tenni 
azt. arrure tiibb szatczcr 41- 
U m p olg ir  v ir . m eg aickor is, 
ha ez2el n em  arat egyertel- 
mu sikert. Idegesen tu lfutott 
kozeietiiidt nehezen vis«ln4  
to v ib b  art a terhet, a m il egy  
nem egeszen ilgon d o lt rend- 
dri azakkileiezfes h aszn ila ta  
' bizor.yos kbrokben 4vek ota 
ok az, es az ezzel 4n n te tt em ­
ber eke: vlsszat*r5en kczaapi, 
ese:enk4nt — mert a szoban  
totgb szohasznklatokat tudo- 
rr.anyos kbr6k is 4tvett4k, de- 
f im ilia k  — tudom 4nyos v t-  
takra keszteti.
Am ikor a buniigyi renddr- 
seg a h etvenes 4vek kozepen  
a ..cigany bundzd' 4s a „ci- 
ganybunozds” kif«Jez4seket 
m egfogalm azta, es ennek  
z.ap;an a m eghatirozascknak
m eglelelo  elkovetdket a  bun- 
ugyl statisxtikaban egy k-Uion 
erre szolgalo koddal is m eg- 
kulonboztette, ext nem  faj - 
gyuibletbbl vagy «16it4letek  
tovabbeiesjrte9e. csetieg  sz itf-  
sa m iatt tette, hanem  azdzt, 
mert srakitani akart a  ker- 
des kdruli ilszem irem m el. es 
6sztm 4n neven akarta nevez- 
rw a  dolgokat. Bebizonyo&o- 
dott azonban. hogy a jbakarat 
itt is a pokolhoz vezetd  ut 
epnoanyaga lett.
M aig is igaz, hogy a ha- 
zankban elo, cigany szarm a- 
z isu  all<rrr.po.gart)k kdziil az 
buzlakossaghoz viszonyitott  
reszaranyuknal joval tobben  
kbvetnek el — igen gyakran  
sulyos, kornyezeviiket klhivb- 
an irrlt&ib — buncselekm e- 
nyeket Vannak csak c:g4-
nyokra jellem zd bdncselek- 
menylajtkk. Vannak cask bu- 
no to ciginyok  Altai alicalm a- 
zou elkovetesi trukkok, m od- 
szerek. Ezen tul a buntetdel- 
jirassa l szemben is annyira  
sajaiosan vtdekeznek. ajn’.ve! 
szem ben egy. ezt a taktikat 
nem Ssmerfi vizsgikStiszt egy- 
szeruen tehetetien A felsoroi- 
tak kesztetvek — 4s kesztet- 
Dek jelen ieg  is — m in k etar-  
ra, hogy ezeket az eredm e- 
nyes buniildbzks szem p on tji-  
bol elengedhetetlenul fontos 
jellem zoket t»nulm 4nyozzuk, 
nyomozdirvk agy re*z4t buno- 
zd cigSnyok altal elkdvetett 
btincse.ekro4n>ek feld«r(t4s4- 
re 4$ bizonyitisara sp ecia l!- 
zilju k . Erre a Jbvfiben is 
sziiks4g lesz  
Az em litett k ifejezdsek te-
h i t  eisdsorban knm in oiog ia  
k rim iaaitak iik ai 4s kr.m ir.i 
m etodikai, 4s
pen nem  buntetoeijaras ;oj 
kiildnbsegekel j e le n ie u e  
K 4pze!;ek el. m i tortenik a > 
kor. ha egy N ew  York 
renddr vagy nyomozd a feki 
tek lakta H arlem ben a kin 
negyed  szokasai szertn: pn  
b il  m eg intexkedni. A tars: 
dal m at ugyanaltkor nekursk 
bunozd ciganyok buncsele! 
fndnyeivel szem ben is v4de 
m ezni kell. Arrdl, hogy b> 
nbzfii m agatartisaban  a cig 
nyok egy resze az ttta lan o  
t61 elt4rd m 4ssagokat m u ’j  
6 m a g i te'jesec nem  hiba 
tathatd. M indez jdr4sz*. a c 
g in y s ig  m ultlaban, tortem  
m 4ben 4s jelendnek ebbd: i  
brbkolt terheiben gyokerez
Figure 8 - “No more statistics on Gypsy criminals” (OSA, 1991, date unknown)
Additional continuities of policy from late socialism to the present day were noticeable in 
assessing the influence o f government officials who began to specialize in minority 
affairs, especially that o f the Roma. These include Csaba Tabajdi, who was head of the
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state minorities office in the 1980s and early 1990s, and in addition, served as an MP for 
the Hungarian Socialist Party and a representative for Hungary in the Council of Europe 
in 2001; Imre Pozsgay, head of Patriotic People’s Front in socialist Hungary; and Janos 
Bathory, an architect of the pivotal Law on Ethnic and National Minorities (1993), and 
Head of the Office of Ethnic and National Minorities (under the purview of the Ministry 
of Justice) during the previous FIDESZ-led government from 2000-2002. Hungary today 
has a plethora of state offices and structures established specifically to manage the 
Romani population and to implement state policies vis-a-vis Roma, and Hall’s (2000) 
concept of ‘multicultural drift’ is direcdy salient for an understanding of the impacts of 
the bureaucratization of Romani policy. Hall (2000) refers to ‘drift’ in the case of 
programmes for minorities in the UK, and how well-meaning discursive practices of 
multiculturalism can actually obscure the need for more fundamental shifts in 
government policy.
With respect to discourses generated during late socialism, Wizner has identified 
interesting links between scholars, teachers, and social reformers of the time such as 
Agnes Diosi (pedagogue), the late Ottilia Solt45 (philosopher and former MP), and Zsuzsa 
Ferge (sociologist) who engaged in ‘poverty research’, and earlier studies on Roma, both 
independent research and those commissioned by the state. Nonetheless, this emphasis 
on poverty and Roma resulted in, at least partially, the Romani population itself being 
considered as synonymous with the poor.
In addition, ethnographers and social scientists Katalin Kovalcsik, Peter Szuhay and 
Michael Stewart generated further knowledge about Romani communities in Hungary 
during late socialism. ‘Late socialism’ was a period of increasing reforms in social policy 
areas such as education and healthcare. Within the economic sphere, international
45 In 2 000 ,1 was presented with a copy o f  her posthumous work Meltosdgot mindenkinek (‘Dignity for AIT), 
by the director o f  the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Ferenc Koszeg. The book has some her finest pieces 
on Hungarian Roma and human rights issues.
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financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank encouraged shifts towards a 
more neoliberal direction. Changes in the political sphere also transpired as the Socialist 
state began to open itself up to more consultative mechanisms outside the party 
apparatus.
The *Kossuth Klub*intellectuals: an elite Rom ani voice?
Another key question related to policy antecedents from the late socialist era is the role 
of urban Romani intellectuals whom I label the ‘Kossuth Klub’ crowd, as they used to 
meet in this popular venue in central Budapest on a regular basis in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.46 Many of these intellectuals participated actively in debates on the 
ciganjkerdes in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, and formed the first group of ‘dissident* 
Romani intellectuals in socialist Hungary. Data on their role in discourse and policy 
formation was compiled from their earlier writings as well as personal conversations and 
interviews. One sample of their writing from the transition period in 1990, by Pal Farkas, 
is offered below in Figure 9. His article offers a polemic about how Roma have not been 
viewed as humans, how the Hungarian socialist state did not want to recognize them as a 
national or ethnic minority, and how the foundation of the Hungarian Gypsy Socialist 
Democratic Party - of which he was then secretary in October 1989 - was a key 
development for the advancement of Romani people.
46 The Kossuth Klub continues to be a popular cultural/political venue located in the 8th district, on 
Muzeum Street. Most urban Roma living in Budapest have extended family links in the countryside.
MAGYARORSZAGI CIGANYOK SZOCIALDEMOKR AT A PARTJA
H.evfolyam 3. szam 1990. niarcius20. Ara:9,50Ft
W J _  jr
1
TESTVEREI
Abban az idoben szoiok H ozzatok, 
amikor vegre lehetosAgc nvflik az Av- 
szazadokota semmibc vctc ciganysag- 
nak is a demokracia gvakorlasara.
A  szocialdemokracia alapcriekei a 
demokracia, az igazsAgossag. a szolida- 
ritiis. R egou  ohajija mindezt ncmcsak 
a ciginysag, decgeszK eletEuropa ne 
pei, ciganyok. zsidok, szlavok, nAmc- 
tek, magyarok, romanok egyarant. A  
mul t szizadokhan. de 1945utari isa  ci- 
janvs^gQlsohasexu veUAkcmbcrszam- 
ba. A Kidar-rendszcrben a hozzi nem 
£rtes visszavonhatatlan karokat oko- 
zolt cigAnynak, magyarnak egyarant. 
Az atyiskodorendszer k iszol gal ta to il- 
sagba As felelembe taszilotta a cigany- 
sigot alamizsna szocial-segAlyrend- 
szeriveL
Az ingAzo ciginysag Apitctte fei 
tobbek kozott a nagvvarosokat, rab- 
szolgabArert, s kozben ok maguk nyo- 
morban, putrikban eltek As cluck a mai 
napig is.
Tcstvercim! Mi eb!>eii az orszAgban 
egy rossz politika vegeti szembe let* 
tunk alitva a tobbi nerazeiiscggel cs 
fgym issal is. A sztAlini definicio sze- 
rint nero voltunk alkalmasak nem zeii- 
sAgl-Ani Alni. mert nines pan tosan meg- 
' hatirozhato anyaorszagunk As kozos^ 
anyany^lviiak.
Drdga tesrvemm! Mi ugyanoiyan 
ncmzctiseg vagyunk. m int a velunk egy 
orszagban eld romanok. szerbek. szlo-
vikok vagy magyarok. Mirank, cigAny 
szocialdemokratakra var az a fdadat. 
melyet eddig figyclmen kiviil hagvtak 
a fennillo tarsadahni rendszerek. hogy 
a cigAny szellemiseget, a maskulturan- 
kat, nyelvunkel mentsuk, mint ahogv 
mcnti minden oemzet az 6  legjobban 
fAltett kincsct, hogy a megujuld de- 
mokratikus orszagban buszkAn valla] - 
Jiassuk ciganysagunkat. Csak akkor 
vallalbatjuk buszkAn magyarsagunkat 
is, ha ucm kcll szegyellnunk ciganysa- 
gunkat.
Ebben az orszagban sem a paraszi 
sagrol. sem a monkAssAgrdl, sem az Ar* 
tclmisAgrol nem illithatjuk. hogy ciga- 
nyellencs. BAkAbcn Altunk egyiitt Av- 
szazadokon at, s igy szcrctnenk a jo- 
vobcn is Alni. CsupAn a lakossag elenye- 
szo rAsze probAlja cUcnunk hangolni a 
tarsadalrnat.
Egy uj tortcnclmi korszak kuszo- 
l)An szoiok Hozzatok, amikor a tdbb_ 
mini 1 milliosciganysag legjobHJaTnak 
esAlye van, hogy bekcriiljenek a tor- 
venyeket alkoto parlamentbc, ahol ed­
dig nelkuliink boztak a rolunk is szolo 
torvenyekel.
A  szociAidemokricia alapertekei: a 
demokracia. az igazsAgossag. a szolida- 
ritas. Mi ugy hisszuk, ez As csak ez lchet 
a garancia a ciginysag politikai, gaz- 
dasagi, kulturalis lehclosAgeire, a de­
mokracia szulte jogegyenlosAgcn lh).
A megfAlcmlitctl tarsadalom fal-
vak szAlere szoritott ciganysaga vAgTe 
releszmelhet! Erre pedig csak egy szel- 
lemisAgeben As akarataban egysAges 
ciginysAg kcpcs.
AI
gklemokrata Partia >QftQ l -
jen alakult.Sm ira tobb mint 15ezren  
vagyunk, cigAny szocdem  fwrttagok  
TestvAreim! A  nyugati szocdcm panok  
kifcjeztAk segitdkeszseguket irintunk  
is.Toltik mi tdkct. tamogaiAst esszak- 
kep/Ast keriink. hogy a ciganyok Altai 
surun lakott, elsdsorban videki telepii- 
lAseken olyan m unkalehetdsAgekei 
hozzunk litre. amcHycl a csaladfo I 
muszak alatt annyit keres, hogy eltart- 
hat ja a csaladjat. Igy lanyainkat As asz- 
szonyainkat mi is felszabadithaljuk a 
nehAz fizikai segedmunka aid!.
A ciginysag allattartisi ismcretei 
kozisxnertck. Ezt lenne crdemes maxi­
mal isan tainogafni. hiszcn az Alclmi- 
szertermelcs elsdrendvi. a mezngazda- 
sag letkArdis mindannyiunknak. Biz- 
tositani kell a szuksAges felteteleket 
azoknak, akik allattartasra rcadezked- 
tek be vagyis szeretnenek berendcz- 
kedni.
Farkas PAI
az MCSZDP rdlitkira
(Elhangzott a Magyar Televfzio 
vdlasztdsi rmisordban 1990. ftbru&r 
27-dn.)
Figure 9 - “Brothers, Gypsies!”, E1SSzd (Living Word), March 20,1990
The above is an extract from the ‘Living Word’ magazine o f the Hungarian Gypsy Social 
Democratic Party and was written by Pal Farkas, then secretary o f the party. This party 
also co-operated with the Patriotic People’s Front (HNF), a quasi-state, communist-era 
body which activated Hungarian citizens at the grass-roots level (Pozsgay 1999: INT).
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4.4 The discursive transformation of the ‘Gypsy Question* in the ‘transition era*: 
(re)surfacing ethnicities
In the post-socialist setting in Hungary, research vis-a-vis Roma has grown visibly, 
particularly in the areas of sociology, anthropology, political science and social policy. 
These studies are similar to those conducted during the previous socialist regimes, with 
the visible exception that Roma are now clearly viewed as ethnic minorities. In particular, 
social policy research on ‘integration’ has become popular with various governments in 
post-socialist countries, who have been at great pains to demonstrate to the European 
Union their official goodwill on the ‘Roma question’.
Furthermore, the ‘Gypsy question’ discourse (though rarely called as such anymore), 
continues to manifest itself in the print media, broadcast television, public statements by 
politicians, crime control policies by the government, academic research by social 
scientists, and quite often, government policies themselves. An example of this was in 
January 1998, when Prime Minister Gyula Horn of Hungary - at the congress of the 
Lungo Drom National Gypsy Interest Association in Szolnok - made a statement urging 
Roma to distance themselves from “those who live off crime” in their community (cf. 
UNHCR 1999). Another example, published on the internet (and interestingly, 
disseminated by the CSCE’s Helsinki Commission), was by the Hungarian Ambassador 
to the US, Geza Jeszenszky. In an open editorial written to the Washingon Post in July 
1999, Ambassador Jeszensky complained of Hungary’s misrepresentation in Western the 
media:
Before you think that, as the ambassador of Hungary, I feel compelled to 
whitewash the problems in my country, let me state a few facts. Hungary has a 
large Gypsy minority with serious social problems deriving mostly from poverty, 
poor education and, in many cases, an inherited lifestyle that lacks any incentives to break 
out and do better. It also is a fact, however, that the Hungarian government, and 
society in general, recognizes this problem and accepts responsibility for its 
amelioration. The reporter blames “institutional racism” for the problems of 
Hungarian Gypsies. I find it reassuring that he cannot provide a shred of 
evidence to prove this point. What is “institutional” in Hungary is that we have a
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national government agency established specifically to deal with the problems 
and aspirations of national and ethnic minorities. It spends most of its budget on 
programs for the Gypsies, our largest minority. It is presently headed by a 
member of our Bulgarian minority. Earlier, however, its head was a highly 
educated woman from the Gypsy minority. Hungary has one of the most 
enlightened minority laws in the world. This makes it possible for Gypsies to 
elect their own self-governments, even in those places where they are dispersed 
among the general population and, consequently, cannot form a majority (see 
Appendix #4, italics mine).
There are two points worthy about the above statement by Ambassador Jeszenszky. First
of all, he attributes “serious social problems” to an “inherited lifestyle” of the Roma.
Secondly, he categorically denies the possibility of “institutional racism” in Hungary, and
instead, deflects the issue of structural disadvantage that Roma confront by highlighting
Hungary’s minorities legislation as a positive step taken by the government, which, at the
time, was one of Europe’s most far-reaching and seemingly progressive laws. Such
discourses emanating from national politicians (and published in the media) are examples
of what Van Dijk (1991) refers to as “elite racism” which he qualifies with the following
analysis:
...not only [do] various elites have a special set of racist ideologies and 
practices.. .their position allows them to ‘preformulate’ those of the population at 
large, and thus to produce and reproduce the white consensus (1991: 43).
By the late 1980s, and continuing into the transition period, Hungarian state policy
towards Roma became increasingly characterised by ‘ethnic coupling’ and the ‘politics of
difference’, as demonstrated by the growing number of Gypsy-specific programmes
(Havas et al, 1995; Kovats 1998; Stewart 2001). Therefore, the socialist era notion of
Roma as a class fraction devoid of any ‘cultural capital’47 was already being challenged
within Hungarian government circles, well before powerful NGO human rights
entrepreneurs (whose work is covered in the next chapter) began promoting the
recognition of Romani ethnicity. Viewing Roma as a people who have contributed
47Though it is crucial to note that the Hungarian state did, in fact, promote numerous Romani cultural 
activities, including the world-famous ‘100 Member Gypsy orchestra’, which even performed in such far- 
flung places as Australia in the socialist era.
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cultural capital to Europe (including their knowledge and skills) is equally difficult for 
European liberals to recognize today, many of whom have only superficial 
understandings of historical contributions of Roma.
Moreover, during the transition period, the expectation that the state should be held 
accountable for alleviating poverty and socio-economic problems in post-communist 
Hungary began waning as neoliberal policy agendas became more prominent (UNDP 
2002). Thus, one on-going peril in the post-socialist era is that the current ‘plight of the 
Roma’48 can therefore be mistakenly read by the majority society as resulting from their 
‘different5 (read: inferior) ethnicity, rather than, for example, the chronic cycle of poverty 
which many Romani communities are trapped in. This polarization is also evident in 
much of European policy towards Roma (Acton 1998). The post-socialist version of the 
‘culture/poverty5 debate has been discussed by Szuhay (1995) and Noszkai (1995) in the 
Hungarian journal Tarsadalmi S^emle (‘Social Bulletin5), as well as various articles in Amaro 
Drom (‘Our Way5) magazine which covers Romani issues.
From 1998 to 2002, the right-of-centre, nationalist-leaning government led by PM Viktor 
Orban of FIDESZ tended to avoid discussions of the growing marginalisation in Romani 
communities, choosing instead to focus on ethnic difference. In April 2002, 
parliamentary elections brought a socialist-liberal coalition government to power. The 
pendulum has now swung in the other direction: whereas during the previous communist 
regime, Romani ethnicity per se was not a large part of the discourse, and focus was placed 
upon building the material circumstances of Romani families to working class standards, 
post-socialist administrations have tended to downplay the rising impoverishment of 
Romani communities, and have instead created institutions resulting in the highlighting 
of ethnic difference to Hungarians at large (Kovats 1998; Wizner 1999).
48This was the title o f  the first course on Romani studies at the Central European University in Budapest, 
‘Sun Summer’ course in 1998.
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4.5 From a politics of ‘dialogue’ to a politics of ‘declaration’: the evolution of 
contemporary Roma policy
During the 1990s, the expansion of third sector influence and immanent European 
Union accession resulted in greater pressure upon the State to place a stronger priority 
on integration of Roma vis-a-vis the minority rights framework, since one of the explicit 
requirements for EU membership included an improvement in the treatment of 
minorities (Kovats 1997; 1998).49 With respect to the influence of Hungarian civil society 
at this time, the National Soros Foundations began compiling reports on their Romani- 
related activities (particularly in the areas of education and culture). Furthermore, George 
Soros’ Open Society Institute (OSI) established and funded regional organizations in 
Budapest such as the Educational Policy Institute (EPI), Constitutional and Legislative 
Policy Institute (COLPI), and the Local Government and Public Service Reform 
Initiative (LGPSRI), and all of them participated actively in various Romani-related 
projects throughout the region (McDonald 2001: INT). In addition, the Roma 
Participation Program (RPP) was seen as a special effort on the part of George Soros and 
his colleagues to increase Romani participation mthin the Soros network itself, and by 
extension, within the rapidly developing civil societies of central and east Europe. OSI’s 
critical role in the development of the Romani NGO sector is covered extensively in 
subsequent chapters.
What is important to note here is that although Hungary’s legislative achievements were 
initially seen as a model for minority policy in the region (and continued to be viewed in 
this light within European Union policy-making circles), popular disaffection with the 
implementation of the Minorities Law of 1993 and the current Hungarian government’s 
policies, was leading to a re-assessment of the previous Socialist-Liberal coalition (1994-
49An article by Kovats (1997) probes the “relationship between increasing Roma poverty and the policy o f  
‘dialogue’.” See also his Phd thesis (1998).
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1998) government’s liberal and ‘multicultural’ approach towards Roma. One activist from
the Roma Press Centre, Gabor Miklosi, shared with me his personal assessment of the
situation in the late 1990s:
The state policy remains very hypocritical. This is the most tragic aspect of the 
entire problem, because there is no willingness from neither of the [political] 
parties to deal with this Gypsy issue in-depth.. .so state policies remain at a very 
surface level. Because of this integration towards the European political 
organisations, and NATO and the European Union.. .there is an external 
pressure on the government to deal with this issue, and for this reason, shop 
window-like organisations and shop window-like measures are being introduced, 
but the internal willingness to deal with this issue and to work out long-term 
plans with short-term exact measures is still missing— so, very low budgeted 
mid-term government programmes are being worked out, the deadlines keep 
being missed, and I can say that on a mainstream level, the politicians are doing a 
very very bad job and they will have a lot to be ashamed of in 20 years, but on the 
other side, as you pointed out, civil society is getting better, and I think it will be 
the Gypsies themselves who will force the prevailing governments or politicians 
or political powers to deal with them (Miklosi 1999: INT).
Looking at socio-economic indicators within Romani communities such as rates of
employment, educational achievement, health and housing from 1999, and comparing
them to 1989 is sobering (Kemeny and Kallai 2005). Though official socialist policy did
not strengthen Romani identity directly (in fact, it discouraged its overt development), by
providing for the basic material needs of Roma and by discouraging ethnic chauvinism in
the public sphere, Romani citizens enjoyed a modicum of economic integration into
mainstream Hungarian society as they were encouraged to join the working class (cf.
Pogany 2004).50
As discussed earlier in Chapter Two, policies vis-a-vis Romani communities have 
historically been generated by non-Romani elites. This continues to the present day, 
where both in the governmental sphere and in the (re) emerging civil society, the 
participation of the Hungarian intellectual class is dominant. As a result, the influence of 
Hungarian elites who frame policy on Roma such as social scientists, social reformers,
50 Conversely, state dependency was fostered in a number o f Romani communities, particularly those that 
had become proletarianised (though this was true for other Hungarian citi2ens as well).
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so-called ‘Roma experts’ and consultants, civil servants, as well as Romani intellectuals is 
worthy of scrutiny (Higley, et al. 1998). Government policy-makers and prominent 
intellectuals were in favour of fostering the development of a middle-class Romani 
intelligentsia, and the foundation of the Gandhi Gimna^um (Gandhi Secondary School) in 
Pecs51 was one concrete example of the will of the Hungarian state in this regard. 
Incorporating insights from research on Roma politics after socialism, I emphasised the 
post-1995 era in Hungarian policy vis-a-vis Roma, suggesting that the previous “policy of 
dialogue” as coined by Kovats (1998), has been replaced by intransigence and attempts at 
power consolidation on the part of the state, in which ‘declarations of progressive intent* 
serve as substitute for structural investments in ameliorating Romani marginalisation 
(Kocze 2004: INT).
This chapter sought to review the discourse and politics on Roma that dominated 
Hungary in the socialist and early transition period, and inquire into the linkages between 
the two (both in academia and policy-making circles) in the late socialist era of Hungary. 
It was noted that the discourse on the Romani population in Hungary at the elite level, 
(that is, what is consumed in government and political quarters, as well as amongst 
intellectuals), and the discourse at the level of the general public or ‘mass level’, exhibits a 
significant divide. At the elite level, we can perceive two contradictory streams of 
discursive production in the post-socialist era. The first stream is represented by dissident 
intellectuals, human rights entrepreneurs and liberal politicians within Hungarian society 
who emphasise the equal rights of Roma, while the other stream is one that exhibits 
forms of elite racism as illustrated earlier by the example of politicians such as former 
Ambassador Jeszenszky. By stark contrast, the discursive production within zones of 
‘everyday racism’ (cf. Essed 2001) shows us pervasiveness of anti-Gypsyism at the
51 A government-sponsored school founded in 1994 whose primary purpose is to foster the development 
o f  a Romani intellectual class.
105
societal level. However, the emphasis within Hungary on elite power — both discursive and 
political - once again highlights the subaltern position of the mass of Roma who are 
generally removed from these debates, inspite of the fact that the policies generated from 
these discussions profoundly impact their lives.
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CHAPTER FIVE - ‘ROMA RIGHTS’: ORIGINS, FRAMEWORK, AND  
PRACTICES
The chapter below is the first of three interwoven chapters (Chapters Five, Six and 
Seven) focusing on ‘Roma rights, NGOs: their origins, their rise and the role(s) that they 
play, along with their impact on human rights discourse and practice in post-socialist 
Hungary. Chapter Five constructs a genealogy of the contemporary human rights 
movement in Hungary vis-a-vis the Romani communities, illustrating both its sources 
and evolution. Chapter Six covers the structure, the content and the politics of national- 
level Hungarian human rights organisations, as well as their relationship to INGOs such 
as the US-based Human Rights Watch (HRW). Special attention is paid to the European 
Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), an INGO that has played a pivotal role in the formation of 
the ‘Roma rights’ movement in Europe since its foundation in Budapest in 1996. 
Chapter Seven grapples with the paradoxical consequences and the criticisms of the 
work of human rights NGOs in the ‘Roma rights’ field, and investigates the on-going 
challenges they face in light of neoliberal trajectories within post-socialist civil societies.
5.1 Introduction: the roots of Romani human rights activism
There are four key phenomena accounting for the dramatic rise in the level of NGO 
human rights activity vis-a-vis Roma in Hungary in the 1990s, and I offer a brief 
summation here, before elaborating on their significance in the remainder of the chapter 
First and foremost, the massive socio-economic changes in the country resulting from a shift from the 
command economy to neoliberal market capitalism laid the groundwork for the rapid marginalisation of 
Romani communities. During the 1980s, there was a weakening of the socialist structures 
that had underpinned the Hungarian state since the 1950s. This resulted in large-scale 
unemployment leading to increasing impoverishment amongst Romani communities 
(Speder 2001: 240). Only a small number of Romani entrepreneurs have fared better as a
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result of economic liberalisation (Stewart 1997; Tanaka 1998). Gabor Miklosi,
International Representative for the Roma Press Centre in Budapest in 1999 explains:
.. .because the Gypsies were the great losers of the transition, because of their 
under-education, because of their social circumstances and because.. .the big 
socialist industries were closed because they were working on a deficit, and most 
of the Gypsy/Roma labour force was consumed [by], employed by these huge 
industrial plants. Once they were closed, all these people were laid off. So, 
impoverisation, moving into shacks, being pushed towards the edge of 
society. ..marginalisation in one word has become a very strong process (Miklosi 
1999: INT).
As discussed in Chapter One, by 1993, the rate of unemployment for Roma in
transitional Hungary had dramatically risen, from 60-70% in many communities to
almost 100% in some compact, segregated communities (HRW 1993; Havas, Kertesi and
Kemeny 1995; Pogany 2004). Compared to the far lower national unemployment rate of
approximately 10% for men, Romani communities experienced a disproportionate (and
devastating) loss of employment and downward social mobility. Noted Hungarian
economist Gabor Kertesi (2004), summarizes the plight of Romani workers:
[the] employment of working age Roma fell from 75 percent to 30 percent in ten 
years. We put forward the hypothesis that the employment of Romany workers at 
the middle of the nineties was not only at a very low level, but was characterised 
by high in and outflow rates, and an employment pattern — known from the 
Third World — with unstable employment and short employment spells was 
emerging. Not only did most of the Romany population lose their jobs to a much 
larger extent than the average of the Hungarian population, but those Romany 
persons who held on had to give up the hopes of a long-term employment 
relationship. The spread of unstable employment has caused social disintegration 
of those with a job: the lack of steady employment also means the lack of a stable 
lifestyle, the continued presence of bread-and-butter worries, as well as a lower 
level of social transfers from the state and the employers — or even the loss of 
entidements (44).
This widespread and increasing impoverishment further deepened anti-Romani hostility 
and heightened perceptions of Roma as a people who are by nature work-shy; who 
engage in illegal activities; and are cunning abusers of state benefit. Offering his 
perspective on anti-Gypsyism in transitional Hungary, Miklosi (who is not Romani 
himself) pointed out that:
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.. ..most of the people have very strong prejudices in terms of the Gypsies, partly 
because they have bad experiences, and because they do not understand that 
crime cannot be associated with ethnicity and it's not depending on that, and 
partly because there was nothing about this particular people which could 
convince them to the contrary, and it’s not them [the Gypsies] that could be 
blamed for their misery, but the hypocritical policy which surrounded them and 
their existence during the last 100 years and very much so under communism 
(Miklosi INT: 1999).
In addition, by the early 1990s, there was a renewed emphasis on Hungarian national 
identity as well as a resurgence of ethno-cultural boundaries by political elites in Hungary 
(cf. Kenedi 1986; Brubaker 1996). This new political status quo effectively excluded Roma 
from its version of the Body politic’, and ironically, the political ideologies of both the 
nationalist parties (including the extreme right Party for the Hungarian Truth and Ufe or 
MIEP, an openly anti-Semitic and anti-Gypsy movement) and the liberals, who 
celebrated ‘ethnic difference’, created an environment in which ethnic consciousness 
became accentuated across the Hungarian political spectrum. Kovats (2001a) has 
correctly observed that the post-socialist liberal government policies were focused on 
cultural differences of minorities at the expense of social solidarity with all Hungarian 
citizens, thereby planting the seeds for further social fragmentation along ethnic lines in post-socialist 
Hungary For Hungary’s former anti-communist dissidents who became part of the liberal 
ruling class, these new liberal politics took the form of new legislation on minority 
protections, the promotion of minority cultures in media, culture, and education, and the 
creation of minority self-governments (Kovats 1998; 2001c). However, all these proved 
less effective at curbing anti-Gypsy racism and nationalist tendencies within broader 
society, than those of the previous Socialist regime.
Roma, as a particularly visible minority, became targets of discrimination and violence by 
large sections of society: not only by extreme nationalists (far-right politicians and 
members of neo-fascist youth groups) but also by police and state officials, particularly at 
the local level. The old popular anti-Gypsy mythologies (covered in Chapters One and
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Two) once again surfaced, and open intolerance and hostility towards Roma became 
widespread.
Moreover, as Szikinger (2000) argues, central authority had weakened considerably by the 
late 1980s, with both the police and judiciary increasingly characterized by negligence, 
incompetence, and in some cases, conspiring with xenophobic elements, especially at the 
local level. At this time there was also a general confusion about new laws and their 
enforcement; this resulted in the uneven implementation of laws, and in some cases, their 
active subversion by state authorities, including the police. In addition, the political will 
necessary to deal with the increasing number of skinhead attacks and emerging neo- 
fascist formations was missing. These were the key factors that combined to strengthen 
the scapegoating of Roma, thereby laying the groundwork for renewed anti-Gypsy 
racism, details of which are covered further in the next section. The swift rise of the 
‘rights movement’ for Roma can therefore be read as a response to the violence and 
hostility against them that grew in transitional Hungary.
The growing incidence of skinhead attacks in the early 1990s pushed indigenous 
Hungarian advocates (both Romani and non-Romani) to mobilise and call for a stronger 
response by the State52 (Human Rights Watch 1993 and 1996; Noszkai 2000: INT). 
Although there were a handful of Romani and non-Romani social reformers and 
politicians who raised awareness of these issues nationally and abroad, and urged the 
government to act, the majority of Roma in Hungary (along with other people of colour) 
continued to bear the brunt of racist violence that police either ignored or only 
responded to tepidly.
Secondly, the repudiation of state socialism, and the gradual erosion of attendant institutional structures 
in the 1980s, resulted in an ideological (as well as material) vacuum. Explaining how this
52 In addition, human rights lawyers and experts on the police Gabor Noszkai and Istvan Szikinger took an 
early lead in demanding greater protections o f  minorities from the State.
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ideological space has been filled comprises a complex narrative vis-a-vis human rights 
ideologies in Hungary. On the one hand, former dissidents who had been vocal 
opponents of one-party rule in the previous regime, quickly adopted a liberal politics 
embracing classical Northern (or Western) human rights concerns rooted primarily in 
civil and political rights and rule of law ideologies modelled on the American experience 
(Carothers 1998; Guilhot 2005; Mutua 2001; Welch 2001). As covered in Chapter Seven 
in greater depth, economic and social rights were either divorced from, or took a back 
seat within, the liberal human rights framework that was adopted in the broader context 
of Hungary’s globalising and increasingly capitalist economy. Arguably, these practices, 
emanating from the liberal human rights paradigm, have done a disservice to those 
subaltern groups in the country who continue to suffer the most social deprivation. On 
the other hand, the ideological vacuum also resulted in the virulent anti-Gypsyism 
mentioned earlier. These two opposing, contradictory socio-political forces (the embrace 
of liberal political ideals such as human rights versus nationalism which feeds anti- 
Gypsyism) have characterised Hungarian socio-political life since the late 1980s.
Thirdly, and equally importantly, the material means necessary to conduct \rights’ work became 
readily accessible as Western philanthropic organisations and private donors (primarily from the United 
States) supported NGOs whose philosophies conformed to their own liberal ideologies about progress - 
which for them meant an emphasis on strengthening ‘civil society’ and human rights 
standards (Carothers 1998; Chandhoke 2003; Guilhot 2005).53 In addition, strong anti­
communist ideological impulses were also present, particularly among American private 
foundations, and these were reflected in the interventions of key human rights 
entrepreneurs (for example, Dr. Deborah Harding of the Open Society Institute). Other US- 
based foundations, such as the Princeton-based Project on Ethnic Relations (PER)
53 Here the umbrella term ‘democratisation’ refers to the establishment and formalised functioning o f  civil 
society that aspires to be independent from the state. In addition, the term is also applied to State organs 
themselves. For an excellent discussion on the fluidity o f  this concept, see T. Carothers (1997).
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headed by Livia Plaks, emphasised ‘security issues’ in post-socialist Europe in their 
work.54 Here, the role of key Western human rights entrepreneurs and their Eastern 
‘disciples’ or partners was pivotal in setting the policy agendas on Romani communities. 
Fourthly, and related to the point above, the increasing disillusionment of progressive Romani 
representatives with mainstream politicalparties and national electoralpolitics - particularly after 1995 - 
buttressed the role of the NGOs as key vehicles for the promotion of the human rights of Roma. This 
was farther compounded by the introduction of the Minority Self-Government system 
(based on the 1993 Law on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities), which Roma 
representatives have participated in actively since its inception. The establishment of this 
law was mired in controversy, with allegations of electoral fraud and corruption, though 
reforms have been instated over time in response to these complaints (Kovats 1998, 
2001c; Koulish 2001). Miklosi (1999) describes how the MSG operates for Hungary’s 
Roma:
When I was referring to the ‘shop window institutions’, I had exactly this... [the] 
system of Gypsy self-government in mind... [though] the underlying intention of 
this ground-breaking institution was good, but the way it has been actually carried 
out isn’t entirely. The problem is that the local MSGs [minority self-governments] 
are working in tandem with local self-governments in the villages, and they have 
to share their tasks — basically cultural and educational tasks - but they don't have 
their own budgets, so they are always financially dependent on the local 
governments, which makes their negotiating position in the local self-government 
inferior all the time because they are receiving the money from them, in this 
sense they cannot represent their interests because they will always remain 
financially dependent, and it's a kind of vicious circle, and they will never have a 
chance to break out from that. On the national level, the problem is that when 
they have their minority elections, the Gypsy parties receive funding. The ones 
who cooperate with the ruling government receive their funding from the state 
budget, so they are always made to be financially interested. They are made to be 
on good terms and not to be very demanding towards the government, which 
means that for the purpose for which this system was set up, it is dysfunctional, 
because they cannot represent their own people if they can be financially turned 
down at any moment (INT).
^See their programmes online at http: /  / www.per-usa.org/ .
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Progressive representatives of the Romani communities perceived this system as a clever 
mechanism of political control on the part of the State to co-opt Romani leadership in 
Hungary, effectively neutralizing radical critiques of the situation (Kozma 1999: INT; 
Horvath 1999: INT).55 Nevertheless (and perhaps unsurprisingly), large numbers of 
Romani leaders — particularly those in the countryside affiliated with lsungo Drom - have 
tacitly accepted the importance of the MSG system, which they view as a type of ‘training 
ground* for a career in professional politics as community representatives.
5.2 Racism and violence: growing anti-Gypsyism
We will do away with everything bad;
Everything base and evil will disappear;
A blazing gun is the 
Only weapon I can win with.
I will kill every Gypsy, adult or child...
When the job is done, we can post 
“Gypsy-Free Zone”56
Growing anti-Gypsyism in the late socialist and early transition period (mid-1980s to 
early 1990s) created tremendous insecurity amongst many Romani communities who 
began to fear for their physical security in Hungary. For 1991 alone, Hungary’s National 
Security Office reported 25 skinhead assaults in Budapest. The Martin lather King 
Association (which assisted foreigners, especially students at the time), subsequently 
reported 63 victims in the first half of 1992 (ADL, 1995). Indeed, many attacks were 
never reported, in large part because of fear of retaliation on the side of the victim, and
55 Nonetheless, it is important to note in by the time o f the MSG elections in 2003, many Roma from the 
‘progressive’ wing also saw merit in contesting these elections, in a kind o f  ‘can’t beat them, join them!’
ethos. These included Aladar Horvath, Blanka Kozma, and Jeno Zsigo amongst others (Origo 2003). 
5<s‘Gypsy-Free Zone’ was a popular song amongst skinhead groups from the early transition period (mid- 
1980s), and was sung by the band ‘Mos-oi’, whose name was a play on the word for ‘Smile’ [/zroso/y] 
(Hockenos 1993: 75).
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in part because Romani communities were skeptical of the Hungarian justice system, as 
the response to such violence had been weak in the past (HHC/Roma Press Center 
1997). As discussed in Chapter 4, some theorists of the transition attempted to explain 
the rising wave of violence directed at Roma by pointing to the social insecurity prevalent 
in Hungary, and this causal factor was also identified by some officers of the state. In 1985, 
for example, Dr. Gyorgy Gabriel, a detective who headed the Tamily, Child and Youth 
Protection, division of the Budapest Police Force, attributed the increasing skinhead activity 
thus:
This is a society in crisis, everything is in crisis: the economy, the family, the school 
system, the legal system, the police.. .it’s no wonder that the most sensitive stratum, 
the youth, is reacting this way (Anti-Defamation League 1995: 44-48).57
Amongst the socio-political antecedents that led to the (re)emergence of the scapegoating
of Roma, were tensions resulting from increasing unemployment after the closure of
factories and State-controlled firms, resulting in part from austerity measures
promulgated by the International Monetary Fund (1982) and the World Bank (1984).
Therefore, economic liberalization in transitional Hungary had an adverse impact on
societal cohesion. Other contributing factors included the rapid political realignment
(from membership in the Warsaw Pact to NATO in 1998), and the identity crises
resulting from the steady erosion of institutions (as a result of shrinking state budgets and
privatization) which had previously supported the mass of Hungarians.
Some scholars have pointed to the historical anti-Gypsyism in Europe, and argue that the
contemporary manifestation in Hungary is a continuation of centuries-old, deeply
ingrained prejudice (Hancock 1995; Matras 2000). However, Kovats (1998) more
57Ten years later however, by 2005, such a statement would not sit well with Tloma rights’ activists who 
would advocate serious punishments for youth offenders (‘hooligans’) committing racially-motivated 
crimes. Recently, in early 2009, Hungary has experienced a resurgence o f  violent anti-Gypsyism as a series 
o f  vigilante murders targeting Romani families has shocked the nation, also bringing into sharper focus 
Romani socio-political vulnerability during times o f  economic crisis (cf. Sigona and Trehan 2009).
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precisely highlights the reductionist dangers of the ethnic ‘difference’ discourse, thus 
demonstrating how state and institutional mechanisms create the symbolic and material 
foundations for divisions amongst different groups in modem societies. Kovats (2001a) 
further posits that political manipulation by the state in the form of a ‘politics of 
difference’ also contributed to anti-Gypsy racism by promoting the ethnic particularism 
of Roma at the expense of social solidarity with the Hungarian majority. Significantly, 
Romani activists such as Aladar Horvath and Angela Kocze share similar views, though 
they themselves have formed strategic alliances with liberal politicians and have worked 
within this policy framework themselves (Horvath 1999: INT; Kocze, personal 
communication 1998). Ironically, post-socialist governments that attempted to display 
their ‘liberalist’ credentials to the EU and the West by supporting programmes which 
focused on Romani culture and identity, were at one level exacerbating already existing 
notions of ‘Gypsy otherness’ in Hungary. Moreover, state-sponsored programmes in the 
areas of civic and cultural activities tended to obscure the broader issue of the wholesale 
socio-economic exclusion of Romani masses that emerged with the transition.
By the late 1980s, it was clear that Hungarian institutions such as the police and courts 
were failing to protect Romani citizens from perpetrators of racially-motivated crimes 
such as skinhead attacks (Szikinger 2000; Szabo 1998). Small, but active skinhead gangs 
were well established in major Hungarian towns, including the capital, Budapest. 
However, as national and international media began to focus on the violence directed at 
Roma in the early transition period, pressure was placed on state authorities to act (The 
Washington Times 1990). For example, Arpad Goncz, a respected writer and intellectual, 
who was then President of Hungary, wrote a compelling piece in the Pest Weekly entitled 
“ 1 9 9  Years from Human Rights? Arpad Goncz on the Situation of Gypsies” (Goncz 
1990). In his essay, he openly attacked growing anti-Gypsy sentiments in Hungary, and
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other intellectuals followed suit at this time, showing solidarity with Hungarian citi2 ens of 
Romani ethnicity.
Moreover, pressure from human rights organizations such as the Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee (founded in 1989) also resulted in some reform measures. For example, in 
response to the growing skinhead violence at this time, the government conducted a 
large-scale sweep of skinhead gangs in Budapest. Although this curbed skinhead activities 
in the capital, by 1991, a new epicentre of skinhead activity emerged in northeastern 
Hungary, where the town of Eger (the seat of Heves County) and its environs, became 
notorious for its large number of violent attacks on Roma and others (HRW 1993; 
Noszkai 2000; cf. Kurti 2000). Though the city is relatively prosperous, the surrounding 
towns and villages are economically depressed, in particular the large Romani settlements 
in the area. To illustrate the climate of violence at the time, in May 1991, an estimated 
150 skinheads attacked Roma in a pogrom-like assault in Eger. This was followed by 
further attacks in October 1991 and in August 1992 (HRW 1993: 48-49). Nonetheless, 
by the mid-1990s violence perpetrated by skinheads had declined to some extent, as 
some skinhead formations dissolved, and the popular support for right-wing political 
formations such as, MIEP for example, led by the charismatic former MDF party 
member Istvan Csurka, dropped precipitously. This can be attributed in part to 
developments within Hungarian society as a result of the elections in 1994 when the 
Socialists were elected (replacing the more conservative, right-of-centre MDF), along 
with the implementation of government policy reforms in the run-up to EU accession 
which placed heightened focus on Hungary’s compliance with the Copenhagen human 
rights criteria for all new member states. Nonetheless, with respect to the influence of the 
Europeanisation agenda, one astute Romani observer had this to say about the impact of 
the EU human rights accession framework on domestic Hungarian politics back in 2001:
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[t]he Romani issue is generally not understood on the ground as one of systemic 
human rights violations, and is rather only seen as an imposed condition for 
admission to the EU. I am concerned that this results in a situation in which our 
issues are addressed only out of a fear of exclusion from the EU, and therefore 
that solutions devised may never be efficient and may never address the real roots 
of the problem. That is, EU pressure may possibly create a new obstacle in the 
struggle (Kocze 2001: 28).
Awareness o f civil rights for Roma
As mentioned in the previous chapter, during the 1970s and 1980s, voices showing 
solidarity with Romani Hungarians were to be heard amongst the ranks of Hungarian 
dissident intellectuals such as Zsolt Csalog and Ottilia Solt. By 1988, Aladar Horvath had 
established the Anti-Ghetto Committee in Miskolc, planting the seeds for Romani direct 
action and civil disobedience practices in Hungary. Horvath, who had already gained a 
reputation as a ‘troublemaker’ by the local communist power structure in the area of 
Miskolc in the northeast of the country, also served as a soldier for one year in a 
segregated army unit. Below, he reflects on his experiences of political socialization 
during the 1980s:
They [local communists] did not want me to politicize my fellow [Romani] 
soldiers.. .1 had a lot of conflicts because I was beginning to have a role in trying 
to enlighten them about their oppression...I saw that the people were living in 
extreme misery, the children in segregated schools, the soldiers in segregated 
units too. They did not want to place their hand in our hand, a Gypsy hand, 
because we were ‘untrustworthy’, this was the ideology then, we must work, that’s 
all.. .Then, in the summer of 1988 I participated -  because at that time the multi­
party system had just begun to be formed — in a forum put together by the MDF 
and SZDSZ and a few other parties. And I went there to educate the state [about 
our situation] and it turned out that they [the socialist government] were deciding 
on what to build for [us] Gypsies, and I thought, “I’m not going to allow 
this” . . .and they decided that they would build ‘reduced comfort’ housing for 160 
Gypsy fam ilies 2  kilometers outside the city...I then attended some meetings 
organised by the opposition parties in Budapest and it was there that I met Havas 
[Gabor], Ladanyi [Janos], and Biro Andras, and I asked them to come to Miskolc 
and support me. And well, with my intellectual friends from Miskolc, and 
Gypsies who understood the situation, along with some members of opposition 
groups in Budapest, I created the Anti-Ghetto Committee.. .it was likely the first 
citizens’ movement in Europe...the first Romani citizens’ movement, and we 
worked a lot, we made many plans and we organised professionally.. .on March 2, 
1989, we were successful and the local council had to withdraw their decision... 
and we won. And.. .from one day to the next, I became a politician, and I did not
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realize this, and I had never wanted to be one, and I still did not realize that I had 
actually become one (Horvath 1999: INT).
In the early years of the ‘transition’, the dangers of the growing marginalisation and
increasing number of human rights abuses perpetrated on Roma were raised by social
reformers and politicians from the liberal SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats), along
with the MSZMP (Hungarian Socialist Party). This took place during the first multi-party
elections in the Hungarian Parliament, signaling the end of one-party rule, and newly
elected liberal and progressive MPs urged the government to enforce stricter protections
and generally strengthen the rule-of-law in Hungary. Aladar Horvath, a former teacher
and a national-level Romani activist, Ferenc Koszeg (chairman of the Hungarian Helsinki
Committee), and Tibor Derdak, a teacher specialising in Romani children’s education and
a key force behind the Gandhi Secondary School58 were all members of parliament from
1990 to 1994 to actively call for stricter legal protections, as well as rights for Roma
(Koszeg 1999: INT; Horvath 1999: INT). Horvath, director of the Roma foundation for
Civil Rights, one of the leading domestic human rights organisations in the country, was
also a founding member of both the Roma Parlament and Phralipe (‘Brotherhood’) Romani
civil organizations. However, despite the strenuous efforts of these reform-oriented
individuals, as well as those of fellow Parliamentary figures Ottilia Solt, Zsolt Csalog and
Gaspar Miklos Tamas - all of whom were prominent dissidents under the previous
regime - the majority of Roma in Hungary, along with other visible minorities, continued
to experience racist violence (HRW 1993: 48-52). The Human Rights Watch report,
“Struggling for Ethnic Identity: the Gypsies of Hungary” (1993), is the first such report
on the issue of ‘Roma rights’ by an international human rights organisation. It highlights
the progression and scope of skinhead violence directed at guest workers from Cuba,
58 A government-sponsored secondary school founded in 1994. Its primary purpose is to foster the 
development o f  a Romani intellectual class.
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students from Africa, and the Roma of Hungary, all of which intensified in the late 1980s 
(See Figure 6 for the cover of the report).
In addition to the dynamic Horvath, urban Romani activists such as Agnes Daroczi 
(journalist and advocate for Roma, who was then employed by the Ministry of Culture), 
Jeno Zsigo (social worker and the head of the Gypsy Social, Cultural, and Methodology 
Centre) and the late Bela Osztojkan (writer and poet) played key roles in the 
development of an independent Romani voice within the Hungarian public sphere. In 
1989, these Romani dissidents became the founding members of Phralipe and Roma 
Parlament, the first indigenous Romani advocacy formations in post-socialist Hungary. 
Meanwhile, Florian Farkas, along with colleagues from smaller towns in the Hungarian 
countryside, established ljungo Drom (Long Road) in the formerly communist stronghold 
town of Szolnok (central Hungary), a political movement that since its inception forged 
an alliance with the Hungarian state on Roma policy (Kovats 1998, Horvath 1999: INT). 
Farkas, a clever political operator, in fashioning this strategic alliance with the state, 
managed to become head of the National Gypsy Self-Government of Hungary from 
1995 to 2002 (despite being under investigation for corruption charges).
The rising violence facing their communities propelled members of the Roma Parlament 
and Phralipe to campaign with more vigour. On July 11, 1993 in Eger, these indigenous 
Romani activists organised one of Hungary’s largest post-War mass demonstrations 
against racism and fascism. Several thousand Roma and their sympathizers reportedly 
attended this event, protesting the lack of police protection and civil rights for Roma (see 
photograph below, in Figure 9). Gyula Naday, chairman of the pro-government 
Democratic Association of Gypsies (DAGH), one of the largest Gypsy organisations at the 
time (which was in opposition to Phralipe, an organisation far more critical of the state), 
termed the demonstration as “hasty and poorly timed from a political viewpoint” in light 
of the passage of the Law on Ethnic and National Minorities in the Hungarian
119
Parliament in May of that year. However, he did concede that the action was useful in 
bringing attention to the issue (OMRI 1993). Nevertheless, that same year, the Hungarian 
Supreme Court ruled that the law dealing with racially-motivated crime did not apply to 
skinhead attacks on foreigners, Gypsies or other members of ethnic minorities. Indeed, 
the few skinhead cases that managed to reach the courts were viewed as simple acts of 
‘hooliganism’ by Hungarian judges (Fox 1995). This meant that the litde faith Roma had 
in the Hungarian justice system diminished even further. Eventually, the impetus to 
change this legislation came about in 1998, fuelled also to a large degree by outside 
pressure rather than internal domestic mechanisms. Key organisations such as the OSI, 
the ERRC, Human Rights Watch, and European bodies as well as the OSCE were 
instrumental in reforming this law. The impact of these external actors is explored 
further in Chapters 6 and 7.
The cover photo below shows the demonstration in Eger (northeastern Hungary), held 
on July 1993, when thousands of Roma gathered to protest growing skinhead violence 
and anti-Gypsyism. It is taken from the first detailed report on the human rights situation 
of Roma in Hungary published by a Western INGO (HRW 1993). The Romani men 
photographed are holding leaf branches in their hands as symbols of peace; their 
expressions are serious and troubled, but also hopeful.
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S T R U G G L IN G  FOR E T H N IC  
IDENTITY
The Qypsies
Helsinki Watch
A DIVISIO N O F H U M A N  RIGHTS WATCH
Figure 10 - ’’Struggling for Ethnic Identity”, front cover of H um an R ights Watch 
report (1993). Photo credit: Csaba Toroczkay
Police-Roma Encounters
As alluded to earlier, apart from the rising number of skinhead assaults, Hungarian 
police, particularly those working at the local level, were also culpable o f anti-Gypsy 
racism. In February 1992, Hungarian police raided several villages using anti-terror units
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at the request of local officials who wanted them to discipline ‘troublemakers’. As a
result of the raids, several Roma suffered serious injuries. In May 1994, in the village of
Orkeny, nine Roma were injured in clashes with law enforcement. The police claimed
that the detectives, who had visited the village to investigate a robbery, had acted in self-
defense when attacked by 150 Roma. Such claims of self-defence have been routinely
employed by law enforcement to veil their acts of brutality against communities (Fox
1995: 3-4; HRW 1993; Szikinger 1999: INT). According to the ‘White Booklets’, a series
of human rights reports published annually by the Legal Defence Bureau for National
and Ethnic Rights (NEKI), a Hungarian NGO, Roma have continued to be the primary
targets of police misconduct. For example, in the 1996 report, nine serious cases of
police abuse of power were documented. Many of the cases involved verbal assaults on
the suspect’s ethnicity and subsequendy, physical beatings ranging from ‘mild’ slapping
sessions to serious injuries requiring hospitalisation. One expert on Hungarian policing
claims that institutionalised racism is rampant within its ranks:
Many foreign observers and domestic experts tend to accept declarations of 
police and political leadership about democratic transformation of law 
enforcement in Hungary. In my opinion, the problem of Roma-police relations 
alone points to the structural deficiencies, far from being explained by the “rotten 
apple” or “temporary difficulties of the transition” theories (Szikinger 2000).
Szikinger further cited the militarisation and centralization of police organs as a danger to
the constitutional principles on which the post-socialist Hungarian democracy was been
founded. As Geza Finszter (2001) notes, with respect to police reform in Hungary, two
distinct schools of thought developed in opposition to one another: the evolutionist
position vs. the reformist position, and Dr. Szikinger represents the latter. Reformists
wish to see the police structures firmly under the purview of public administration and
emphasise depoliticisation, decentralisation, and demilitarisation of the police. The
evolutionists focus primarily on police functioning, building up of self-confidence and
morale that had been lost during the political changeover, and discipline, thereby
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eschewing any attempts at fundamentally altering police organisation and operations 
(Finszter 2001: 139-141). This latter, more conservative approach to policing has come to 
represent the conventional wisdom in approaches to police reform in Hungary.
Push for Reform s: the Ombudsman institution
Domestic advocacy groups such as NEKI and the Romani Civil Rights Foundation also 
took advantage of external pressure placed on the Hungarian government in order to 
push for systemic reforms. In 1995, the Hungarian government created an autonomous 
institution, the Minority Ombudsman for the rights of ethnic and national minorities.59 
Since the office began its operations, a majority of individual complaints have been from 
Romani citizens.60 One indication of Dr. Kaltenbach’s autonomy as a civil servant was 
evidenced by his repeated calls for comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, despite 
a Hungarian Constitutional Court decision which suggested that such legislation was not 
necessary.61 Moreover, the government in the late 1990s, led by Viktor Orban’s right-of- 
centre FIDESZ party, and their coalition partners from the conservative Independent 
Small-Holders Party (FKP) and the Hungarian Christian’s Party (MKP), were strongly 
opposed to the enactment of anti-discrimination legislation, despite repeated calls from 
European bodies such as the Council of Europe, as well as INGOs working in human 
rights. One of the few parties to openly support such legislation at the time was the 
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP).
In the 1997 Annual Report of the Ombudsman’s Office, Mr. Kaltenbach (himself a 
member of Hungary’s German minority) reported that 63% of the plaintiffs who filed a
59 On June 30,1995 three Parliamentary Commissioners (or Ombudsmen) were elected by the Hungarian 
Parliament for three different areas o f  rights: one for Human Rights, one for Data Protection and Freedom 
o f  Information, and one for National and Ethnic Minorities. See detailed analysis by Krizsan (2001).
60 Since June 2007, the Minority Ombudsman o f  Hungary (selected by the Parliament) has been Dr. Em o  
Kallai, himself o f  Romani origin, see further http://www.kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/index.php?lang=en.
61 Act CXXV ‘On Equal Treatment and the Promotion o f  Equal Opportunities’ was adopted on 22 
December, 2003 by the Hungarian Parliament, and acts as the core anti-discrimination law in Hungary 
today.
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report with the office were of Romani ethnicity. Furthermore, the report gives a 
breakdown of the most frequent types of cases the office dealt with and lists police, 
judicial organs, and local governments as the primary offenders. By publishing these 
annual reports (in Hungarian and English) on the state of minority protections in 
Hungary, the Ombudsman’s institution has gained much respect from both the 
Hungarian Romani activists and the government alike.
The D ilem m a o f E thnic S tatistics
From 1974 to 1989, the Hungarian Socialist Republic kept separate, official statistics on 
Romani prisoners and developed special police units and methodology concentrating on 
combating ‘Gypsy crime’. By late 1989, these statistics were said to have been 
discontinued, and by 1992, as a result of the adoption of the Hungarian Act on the Protection 
of Personal Data and the Publicity of Data of Public Interest, government agencies began 
classifying data on ethnicity as ‘special data’, thereby prohibiting such data from being 
gathered or used without the specific consent of the individual (cf. Figure 9, Chapter 4).
A significant obstacle to gaining justice for Romani victims of racist violence in the post­
socialist period has been to prove the racial motivation or nature of the crime in a court 
of law. This problem has been further compounded by the lack of data on the victim and 
the perpetrator, because ethnic data/statistics are no longer legal under the 
aforementioned data protection law.
To address this issue, several international meetings and roundtables were organised to 
discuss the feasibility of such data gathering. In May 2000, the Council of Europe and the 
Project on Ethnic Relations (PER)62 organised a two-day joint roundtable on ‘Roma and 
Statistics, in Budapest to discuss the complexities and controversies surrounding this 
issue. Present were key participants and experts in the ‘Roma rights’ field: Jim Goldston
62 A Princeton-based IN GO connected to the US foreign policy establishment.
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(Director of the OSFs Justice Initiative, and currendy Board Member of ERRC), as well as 
Romani activists Rudko Kawczynski (Director of the Hamburg-based Roma National 
Congress, and currendy, head of the Council of Europe’s special advisory body ERTF), 
Dr. Nicolae Gheorghe (sociologist, and former Head of Romani/Sind affairs office 
within the OSCE), and Andrejz Mirga (Polish Romani ethnographer, advisory board 
member to the PER, and current Head of Roma/Sind Affairs in the OSCE). Discussion 
was focused on the conflict between protecting Romani individuals and communities 
from potential abuse of statistics, and the need for ethnic based statistics in order to 
prove discrimination in a court of law. Goldston vociferously came out in favour of 
ethnic data collection in order to prove race discrimination, and emphasised how this 
works in practice in the United States.
The importance of this issue to liberal human rights entrepreneurs was underscored by a 
second conference held in Budapest at the end of 2000, entitled ‘Race/Ethnic Statistics 
and Data Protection’. It was held at the Central European University and sponsored by 
the Open Society Institute (Goldston, the former Deputy Director of OSI-New York 
was a driving force behind this conference) via INDOK, the Human Rights Information 
and Documentation Centre which at that time was headed by prominent Hungarian 
constitutional law expert Gabor Halmai63. In addition, specialists from various countries 
(including Germany, Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria) were invited to speak and present 
their views. Indeed, the subject matter of the conference was clearly intended to be 
applied to the cases of Romani victims of rights violations, as referred to in the Project 
description below:
Since there exists a need for ethnic statistics by governments and anti- 
discrimination advocates, the Steering Committee of Ethnic Statistics Project 
which consisted of one representative each from COLPI, ERRC, INDOK, LGI
63Halmai was a board member o f  the ERRC, and in addition, IN D O K  was funded primarily by OSI- 
Budapest, and used to be part o f  the Central European University (established by George Soros) prior to 
1999.
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and OSI decided to start a program aiming at improving information on the 
Roma community at the level of local authorities, research institutions and 
NGOs in order to facilitate the planning of social policies in relation to the Romani 
population (Center for Policy Studies 2002, emphasis mine).
Nonetheless, Romani activists from Hungary (and other countries) were noticeably
missing from the audience. Indeed, the few Romani activists present cynically remarked
afterwards that “it’s traditional” (a^ s^ okdsds), meaning that their exclusion from these
circles was customary or ‘habitual’ (Anon. 2000: INT). The majority of the participants
were human rights lawyers/practitioners or legal experts. However, unlike the previous
meeting organised by the Council of Europe/PER, the Romani perspective was
marginalised such that even representatives from so-called ‘Romani’ NGOs were all non-
Romani persons.64 Some Roma were present in the audience and were able to ask
questions at the end of the sessions. Many times during the course of my field research, I
would ring Romani collaborators to inform them about important events organised by
the OSI and INGOs elite circles in an attempt to increase Romani participation in these
forums. These endeavours made me realize the extent to which this arena was the
preserve of particular elites and its disconnection from Romani communities themselves,
and emphasised to me the endogamous nature of the ‘Roma rights’ network, suggesting
the depth of symbolic violence experienced by Roma within the very same ‘civil society’
working for their betterment.
The Pre-eminence o f the Human R ights W atch/H elsinki M odel
As knowledge of widespread anti-Gypsy racism grew in post-socialist countries - thereby 
fostering a greater solidarity among Roma in Hungary and other European states (despite 
the occasional political friction between groups) - a number of Western NGOs and 
members of multilateral organisations such as the United States government’s CSCE
64 These included Dimitrina Petrova and Claude Calm, representing the ERRC, as well as Florin Moisa o f  
the Resource Center for Romani Communities in Romania.
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(Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) began to take notice and 
commission their own research on the human rights situation of Roma in Hungary and 
the broader region. As mentioned above (and illustrated in Figure 9), in July 1993, 
Human Rights Watch, a New-York based INGO, published its first report on the 
treatment of Roma in Hungary, Struggling for 'Ethnic Identity: the Gypsies of Hungary. The 
report was a part of the Destroying Ethnic Identity’ series of the Helsinki Watch project, 
and it was at this time, in the early 1990s, that HRW/Helsinki Watch became increasingly 
active in covering the post-socialist ‘transition’ states. The first reports on Roma and 
human rights violations were written about the situation in two Balkan countries: The 
"Persecution of Gypsies in Romania (September 1991) and The Gypsies of Bulgaria (June 1991). 
Subsequendy, in 1993 and 1994, HRW published Police violence against Gypsies-Bulgaria 
(April 1993), Increasing violence against Roma in Bulgaria (August 1993), and Lynch law: violence 
against Roma in Romania (November 1994). There was also a report published in this series 
in 1992 on the human rights situation of Roma in Czechoslovakia, right before the 
‘velvet divorce’ in 1993 when the country split into two nation-states without undue 
political violence.
The formats for these series of HRW reports on the human rights situation of Roma are 
similar: they begin with a history of the Romani population in a specific country, a brief 
summary is then provided of the socialist period, followed by a litany of abuses and 
discrimination Roma experience ranging from police brutality, skinhead violence, 
discrimination in the areas of access to education, health and housing, public opinion and 
the press coverage of Roma, and in some cases, community violence or even pogroms. 
The reports conclude with policy recommendations, based on international (and 
European) human rights instruments, urging governments to ensure greater protections 
for their Romani citizens and to strengthen rule-of-law practices within their state bodies 
(cf. HRW 1993-1998). Though the reports are primarily descriptive, the analysis and
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general narrative within them veers towards a subtle neoliberal bias. For example, the
back cover of the 1993 HRW report on Hungary states that:
Since the demise of the Communist regime in Hungary, the country’s Gypsy or 
Roma population has benefited from the suspension of decades of 
assimilationist, and at times overtly racist, government policy and from an 
increased tolerance for the expression of Roma identity. However, Romas [sic] 
continue to suffer serious discrimination, and at times violence, at the hands of 
fellow citizens, and many public officials appear to exhibit the same behaviour 
(HRW 1993).
Typically, even passing mention is not made of how the embrace of neoliberal economic
policies has served to undermine the socio-economic position of Roma in post-socialist
Hungary. The result is that these INGO reports remained de-contextualised from the
economic, political, and social realities of most Roma in the post-socialist scene, although
there may be a section for example, on employment discrimination (cf. ERRC 2006). As
Mutua (2002) correctly observes:
.. .conventional docttinalists65 stress a narrow range of civil and political rights, as 
is reflected by the mandates of leading INGOs like Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch. Throughout the Cold War period, INGOs concentrated 
their attention on the exposure of what they deemed “core” rights in Soviet bloc 
countries...in a reflection of this ideological bias, INGOs mirrored the position 
of the industrial democracies and generally assumed an unsympathetic, and at 
times, hostile posture towards calls for the expansion of their mandates to 
include economic and social rights (155).
Moreover, the readership itself of the HRW/Helsinki Watch reports generally consists of
liberal scholars, journalists, United States government officials, ‘offending’ governments
in question, international multilateral organisations working in Eastern Europe,
European bodies, and UN bodies. Further analysis of the implications of this narrow
human rights framework is undertaken in Chapters 6 and 7.
65 Mutua regards INGOs as ‘conventional doctrinalists’ because o f  their ‘heavy and almost exclusive 
reliance on positive law in treaties and other sources o f  international law’ (2001:151).
H U M A N  R I G H T S  W  A T  C H /  H E L S I N K I
Rights Denied
T h e  Roma of Hungary
Figure 11 - HRW’s second report on Roma in Hungary, “Rights Denied” (1997) 
Photo credit: Judit M. Horvath and Gyorgy Stalter
Published in its Hungarian language version in 1996, the cover photograph above (from 
1992) depicts an unemployed Romani man in front of his home in an isolated village 
(Helyopapi). The image o f his reclining body conveys a sense o f profound resignation, in 
contrast to the image on the HRW’s report from 1993 (Figure 10) which suggested an 
active, dynamic movement.
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5.3 Disillusionment with national electoral politics
The disappointment of progressive Romani leaders with the results of progressive 
Romani representation in national electoral politics, as well as their increasing 
ideological marginalisation by the mid-1990s, also contributed to the rise of the Romani 
NGO sector, and the ‘Roma rights’ movement more broadly (Kovats 1998; Trehan 2001; 
Vermeersch 2001). By contrast, pro-statist Romani politicians whose predecessors had 
been ‘Old Guard’ beneficiaries of State patronage in communist Hungary remained loyal 
to the state after the switch to the new system. Romani political leaders (like Florian 
Farkas of Lungo Drom) became part of a new nomenklatura within the Gypsy Minority Self- 
Government system.
In the mid-1990s, a growing cynicism with national parliamentary politics replaced the 
earlier mood of optimism of 1990, when several Romani members of parliament 
(Antonia Haga and Aladar Horvath of the Free Democrats/SZDSZ) had successfully 
gained seats on prominent party lists during the first post-communist multi-party 
elections, including and the late Tamas Peli, a Romani artist with the Hungarian Socialist 
Party (MSZP). Therefore, by the mid-1990s, Romani candidates were no longer on 
mainstream party lists, and it became increasingly clear that the needs of Romani citizens 
would be ignored by politicians seeking election, despite the fact that Roma comprise 
close to 4% of the Hungarian electorate (Haga 2000: INT; Horvath 1999: INT; Daroczi 
2000, personal communication). During the elections of April 2002, both the right-of- 
centre party FIDESZ and the MSZMP (Socialists) did attempt to woo Romani voters; 
whilst FIDESZ promised a guaranteed number of seats to the pro-govemment Lungo 
Drom political grouping, the Socialists targeted the large number of disaffected Romani 
voters, along with other Hungarian working class citizens. The subsequent Socialist-Free
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Democrats coalition victory predictably resulted in a more liberal, less nationalist-leaning 
regime.
At the same time however, state-engineered political representation at the local level 
became a prominent feature of minority politics in Hungary. The MSG, legislated by the 
comprehensive Law on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities in 1993, became a 
vehicle for increased local level political activity during the 1990s. Some observers have 
suggested that the G-MSG resulted in a modicum of Romani representation at the local 
level on cultural, educational and various social issues. Nonetheless, Kocze (2004) 
contends that it divides Romani identity as it forces local Roma to ‘choose’ between 
being ‘Gypsy’ and ‘Hungarian’. As a result, many Roma who are integrated at the local 
level, end up not taking part in G-MSG elections, which now require a declaration of 
Romani ethnicity before voting. Political scientist Koulish, who has conducted empirical 
research on the MSG system and its impact on Roma, refers to this phenomenon as a 
form of ‘symbolic violence’ as many Hungarians of Romani background who would 
otherwise be able to navigate their identity are forced to undergo a process of self­
stigmatization (2005: 323-324). Following the October 1998 elections, over 850 
settlements officially gained Gypsy Minority Self-Governments in Hungary. In addition, 
in over 320 settlements, Romani representatives obtained seats within local governments, 
elected positions which are ultimately responsible for the disbursement of funds to the 
minority self-governments. Koulish (2001), Kovats (2001c), and Vermeersch (2001; 
2006) have all analysed political developments related to the institutional evolution of the 
G-MSG system and its functioning since 1995. For purposes of this thesis, I focused on 
how it has actually undermined Romani representation at the Parliamentary level.
As Kovats (2001a) emphasises, the development of the MSG system resulted in a stifling 
of independent Romani politics, as nearly all post-communist governments supported 
the Lungo Drom political movement (which consisted of the old Gypsy nomenklatura
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fostered during socialist times). Thus, many independent Romani political parties or 
those that aligned themselves with the Socialist or Liberal factions were excluded from 
parliamentary representation.
The results of a survey by Koulish (2001), based on questionnaires distributed to Romani 
communities in major Hungarian towns and cities in the summer of 2000, suggested that 
although the majority of Roma would not be in favour of abolishing the MSGs, 
fundamental reforms were viewed as necessary by most representatives in the 
countryside. Some of the questions addressed in his survey were: to what extent does the 
Romani MSG structure continue to be a vehicle for Lungo Drom (The Long Road) 
political activity? To what extent do opposition political movements like Phralipe keep 
control of local level political activity? In addition, what are the long-term effects of 
lessons learned by members of minority groups within local Roma self-governments? Do 
members move on to seats within the mainstream local government, after ‘graduating’ 
from minority self-governments (as Szilvia Lakatos of Pecs - a young Romani intellectual 
whom I befriended - had done)?
Indeed, as a result of the disappointments associated with Parliamentary representation 
mentioned above, only one Romani politician managed to be a Hungarian Member of 
Parliament from 1994-1998. As a result, the NGO sector came to be viewed by 
progressive Romani advocates as an avenue through which Roma had a real possibility to 
become active agents in shaping policy affecting their own communities. In addition, 
many stated that they perceived work in civil society (primarily through NGOs) to be an 
opportunity to influence the state, without necessarily being co-opted by it, a problem 
that they perceived within the Gypsy minority self-government system. At this time, a 
handful of former parliamentarians (Romani and non-Romani) representing Romani 
interests began to work in the NGO sector. Indeed, since the ‘transition’ began, there has 
been a ‘revolving door’ phenomenon, whereby the state and the NGO sector serve as
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alternative and/or parallel spaces of activity and employment for non-Romani and 
Romani intellectuals. For example, Ferenc Koszeg, director of the Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee, was also an MP with the liberal SZDSZ party from 1990-1998. Antonia 
Haga, the former MP of Romani origin, is now working for Partners Hungary, an NGO 
that combines private consultancy work with non-profit training in the field of civil 
society development (Koszeg 1999: INT; Haga 2000: INT). Another illustration is the 
career trajectory of Eva Orsos, formerly one of the highest-ranking women of Gypsy 
(Beash) origin in government as head of the NEKH, National and Ethnic Minorities 
Office. She is also a former co-chairperson of the Board of the European Roma Rights 
Center, as well as being the Director of the Mediator Foundation, an NGO which worked 
to attract jobs and internships for Roma within multinational corporations based in 
Hungary (Orsos 2001: INT). Hence, we can see that whilst she did work in the highest 
sectors of government, she quickly transferred her ‘loyalty* to Hungarian civil society. A 
key significance of this development is that the small number of talented, reform- 
oriented politicians and individuals who would otherwise work in the political arena for 
inclusion of Roma and disadvantaged groups, have now taken up full-time employment 
in the NGO sector. This is in part because they have been effectively marginalised from 
mainstream political institutions, and in part because work in the NGO sector offers 
possibilities and means (many times lucrative) for them to continue articulating their 
agendas (be they subversive or complicit with the neoliberal order).
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5.4 The impact of neoliberal politics on human rights organising
Liberalism was never a doctrine of the Left; it was always the quintessential centrist doctrine. Its 
advocates were sure of their moderation, their wisdom, and their humanity. They arrayed 
themselves simultaneously against an archaic past of unjustified privilege (which they considered 
to be represented by conservative ideology) and a reckless leveling that took no account of either 
virtue or merit (which they considered to be represented by socialist! radical ideology). Liberals 
have always sought to define the rest of the political scene as made up of two extremes between 
which they fall. - Wallerstein (1995: 1-2)
The failure to assert economic rights for the Roma stemmed partly from ideology and lack of 
knowledge about methods to combat poverty, but also reflected the (top heaty* structure of Roma 
politics in this period and its lack of significant base amongst the Roma masses.
- Kovats (1998: 96)
The roots of the indigenous civil rights movement for Roma in Hungary can be traced to
the efforts of the early Romani social reformers who displayed consistent opposition to
the Socialist state in the 1980s. As mentioned earlier, one prominent personality, an
organic intellectual in the Gramscian sense, is Aladar Horvath. In the mid-1980s,
Horvath gained notoriety in his native Miskolc (an industrial town with a large Romani
population) for establishing a Romani cultural club. This pitted him against the
Communist Youth Movement as well as fellow students at his college. Then, in late 1988,
as a reaction to the local Socialist Party organisation’s plan to build a low amenity
housing estate for inner city Roma, Horvath and some of his dissident friends organised
an Anti-Ghetto Committee. In his opposition to the segregated housing estate, Horvath
was joined by intellectuals from Budapest and members of the Laoul Wallenberg
Association, one of Hungary’s first human rights organizations. Eventually the plan was
defeated, at the behest of special instructions from the Patriotic People’s Front and the
Party itself. This was one of the first successful actions of an embryonic Roma civil rights
movement in the socialist bloc. Nevertheless, Horvath believes:
People helped us prevent the construction of the ghetto more as an expression of 
their opposition to the Communist system than of their sympathy for the Roma 
(Horvath 2000, INT; Kosztolanyi 2001).
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Indeed, Horvath was speaking in hindsight: by the mid-1990s, even the liberal political 
parties of Hungary, many of whose members consisted of dissidents in the former 
regime, had begun to distance themselves from Romani voters, who were beginning to 
be seen as liabilities. What Horvath suggests above is that the Liberals’ support for the 
Romani residents of Miskolc at the time was an expression of strategic political 
instrumentalisation (Horvath 2000: INT).
Nonetheless, all three Romani political formations - Phralipe (Brotherhood), Roma 
Parlament and Lungo Drom (Long Road) - appropriated the language and philosophy of 
liberal human rights. For example, Phralipe, founded in 1989, had the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights enshrined in its constitution (cf. Kovats 1998). Moreover, 
in the 1990 elections, two out of three Romani MPs aligned themselves with the liberal 
Free Democrats (SZDSZ), a party that attracted a large number of vocal pro-minorities 
advocates such as the late Zsolt Csalog (Pulitzer-Prize winning journalist) and Ottilia Solt 
(philosopher and socialist MP). Another indication of the over-arching liberal tendencies 
of these early pro-Roma reformers was seen in the debates surrounding the proposed 
Law on Ethnic and National Minorities between 1992 and 1993, which emphasised 
individual rights and multi-culturalism in the discourse.
Furthermore, state-sponsored Gypsy organizations from the socialist era such as the 
Democratic Association of Hungarian Gypsies (DAHG), with Gyula Naday as its head, 
as well as various cultural organisations, continued to function at this time, buoyed by 
government financing. These pro-state groups and independent Romani organisations 
such as Phralipe were depicted as always at odds with each other in the Hungarian press, 
and certainly, the progressive Budapest Roma, as part of the ‘democratic opposition’ to 
the socialist regime, distanced themselves deliberately from the DAHG (OMRI 1995; 
Horvath 1999: INI).
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Eventually, the more radical political groupings of Roma became progressively 
marginalised, as the Hungarian state favoured the ‘old guard’, and eventually, their 
political power was weakened as leadership struggles emerged (Horvath 1999: INT; 
Kozma 1999-2000: INT; Kovats 1998; cf. Vermeersch 2006). For example, whilst in the 
early 1990s, Rjoma Parlament members Jeno Zsigo, Aladar Horvath, Agnes Daroczi and 
Phralipe members such as Bela Osztolykan (some individuals being members of both 
groups) were unified in their mission to fight for the rights of Roma - albeit through a 
variety of different strategies - by the middle of the decade, both groups had splintered 
and created new alliances. In fact, the earlier unity gradually faded as internal differences 
became irreconcilable (cf. Kovats 1998; Vermeersch 2006). As noted by Romani 
women’s activist Kozma, the first democratically elected government under the MDF 
(Magyar Demokrata Forum) party supported a pro-statist Romani political faction Lungo 
Drom, while at the same time, the Roma Parlament (originally created by Phralipe) itself 
became a weak organisation as a result of internal divisions amongst activists. 
Furthermore, the late Osztolykan, a key Romani intellectual in the early days of the 
movement, became co-opted by the Hungarian government (Kozma 1999: INT).
Unlike the organisations sponsored by returning emigre Andras Biro, these earlier 
political groupings established by dissident Romani activists did not eventually 
consolidate themselves into the Western-led human rights NGO network, and this 
contributed to the subalterity of Roma within the Romani NGO sector itself. These 
issues are discussed in greater depth below.
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5.5 The human rights entrepreneurs: post-1995 ‘Roma rights* organising
.. .when I  lived outside of Hungary, my career was focused on the topic of the Third 
World, and when I  came back home, what I  saw was the Third World all over again. 
—Andras Biro (cited in Kosztolanyi, 2001)
The trail of the ‘missionaries’ and the foreign human rights and development experts
who came to play a hegemonic role within the construction of discursive practices of
‘Roma Rights’ in Hungary can be traced back to one key figure: Andras. Biro. As noted,
the transition in Hungary actually began in the mid-1980s, somewhat earlier than its
neighbours in CEE. Moreover, unlike Poland, for example, where the workers’
movement Solidarity played a prominent role in bringing forth regime change (cf. Ost
2005), the Hungarian reformist movement developed within the Communist party
nomenklatura itself during the transition, as surviving leaders of the old party quickly
repudiated Marxism-Leninism and contested elections on democratic socialist platforms.
As Higley et al. (1989) have observed, the principal mechanism of change was a:
[negotiated elite setdement that occurred most explicitly during largely secret 
roundtable negotiations between leaders of the key elite camps in 1989...[thus] 
Hungarian negotiations were icing on a cake elites had baked (26).
By 1982, the Hungarian socialist state itself took the decisive step of joining the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank mechanisms by 1983, thereby 
opening the country up to the influence of global market forces, dramatically altering its 
political economy (World Bank 2005). Then, in a historic moment in 1989, it opened its 
border with neighbouring Austria, facilitating the regime collapse in East Germany as 
thousands upon thousands of East German citizens rushed to the West.
It was during this climate of monumental change that in 1986 Andras Biro returned to 
his homeland after a 30-year absence. A career journalist who had served as a 
development consultant with the United Nations, Biro had been the founder and editor
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of the development reviews Ceres and Ma i^ngira for the UNEP (Biro 1996). It is also 
important to note that by 1984, Hungarian-American billionaire George Soros66 had 
opened the first office of his OSI (Open Society Institute) philanthropic empire in the 
region - the Hungarian Soros Foundation in Budapest
Biro quickly became one of the most influential individuals - in fact, a ‘gatekeeper’ - 
within the field of ‘Roma rights’ in the region, founding and/or directing nearly all the 
key organisations related to ‘Roma rights’ in Hungary. First, he established the Hungarian 
Foundation for Self-Reliance in 1990 (also known as the Autonomy Foundation) with 
the purpose of engaging in development work to assist primarily rural Romani 
communities as well as strengthening environmental projects (World Bank 1996). Several 
years after that, under the auspices of the Autonomy Foundation, he established the 
Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities (NEKI), an NGO whose 
clients are primarily from the Romani community. He was also a pivotal force behind the 
establishment in 1995 of the Roma Press Centre, which monitors and promotes news 
and information on Roma in the Hungarian press, as well as an after-school tuition 
programme for Romani students residing within inner-city Budapest (Joszefvarosi 
Tanoda). Today, these NGOs (crucially, with the financial support of the OSI), comprise 
the backbone of the domestic ‘Romani rights’ movement in Hungary, at least as 
represented through urban NGOs. Typically, local Hungarians would comprise the legal 
and administrative staff, while funding came almost entirely from Western (mainly 
American) philanthropic foundations and INGOs (for whom local NGOs were 
implementing ‘partners’).
66 George Soros’ interests in human rights pre-date his interest in Romani issues. By 1982, Soros had 
become a member o f  the Human Rights Watch and Americas Watch executive committees, and in 1988, 
he became a member o f  the Council on Foreign Relations in the United States. For an account o f  how his 
family survived the Holocaust in Nazi-occupied Hungary, see his father Tivadar Soros’ book, Dancing  
around death in Nazi Hungary’ (2000). The original 1965 version was published in esperanto.
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Biro actively facilitated contacts for the NGOs he founded with Euro-Atlantic private 
foundations such as the Ford Foundation (late 1980s), German Marshall Fund (since 
1990), Rockefeller Brothers Fund (since 1990), and most prominently, the George Soros* 
Open Society Institute and affiliated organisations who were themselves to become key, 
if not hegemonic actors with respect to funding of Romani projects in the region. In 
addition, various European countries, as well as the European Union also provided 
financial assistance to these NGOs: examples included the Swiss Development Agency 
and the Cordaid Foundation, a Dutch government sponsored organisation.
It was not a surprise, therefore, that in 1995, Biro became the recipient of two highly 
prestigious awards: the Swedish ‘Right Livelihood* Award (also known as the ‘Alternative 
Nobel Prize*), which he shared with the Autonomy Foundation in 1995, as well as the 
Hungarian National Prize.
One result has been the development of a complex web of elite NGOs and INGOs, the 
majority of which have access to a direct ‘pipeline* of Western funding, meaning that they 
are pledged a generous sum of money for multi-year projects in advance. Though this 
would normally require the approval of the Board of a particular NGO, in practice, 
Boards generally defer to the directors, and once the director herself approves these 
projects, it is regarded as fa it accompli and generally ‘rubber-stamped* by the Board in 
question. This illustrates one of the roots of the power and hegemony of elite human 
rights entrepreneurs in the development of the ‘Roma rights* movement, and also 
suggests complex, hidden aspects of elite control; these issues are analysed further in 
Chapter Six.
As Biro’s growing reputation for success in establishing Romani initiatives grew, the 
Hungarian government also tried to recruit him for his expertise. In 1995 (the same year 
he was awarded the National Prize), the government established its first GONGO 
(government-organised NGO), the Central Foundation for Hungarian Gypsies or the
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Magyarvrs^ dgz Ciganyokert Ko^alapitvdny^  an organisation set up to work on improving 
education and vocational training for Roma. The directorship was offered to Biro, who 
initially accepted, but subsequently declined the post, apparently in order to maintain his 
independence from state influence.
What is intriguing about the late 1980s and early 1990s is that little documentation exists
of contacts between early Romani activists (discussed earlier in Chapter Four) and Biro.
Individuals I interviewed were also puzzled as to what extent Biro consulted with the
various Romani urban intellectuals when devising these NGOs, although it is clear that
Aladar Horvath himself had consultations with him from the late 1980s onwards.
Questions remain about whether he acted independently of these Romani leaders in his
work. There is some speculation that because of his UN expertise and his seniority - he
was already in his late 60s when he returned to Hungary - Biro may have believed that he
knew what would work best for development within Romani communities. Perhaps
Becker’s (1963) insights on moral entrepreneurship are also instructive in this regard:
Moral crusaders typically want to help those beneath them to achieve a better 
status. That those beneath them do not always like the means proposed for their 
salvation is another matter. But this fact — that moral crusades are typically 
dominated by those in the upper levels of the social structure — means that they 
add to the power they derive from the legitimacy of their moral position, the 
power they derive from their superior position in society (149).
What is clear, however, is that by the mid-1990s, some Romani intellectuals working 
within the sector were frustrated with the almost autocratic power that Biro, as well as 
other elite non-Romani ‘Romani’ advocates wielded within Roma NGO circles. Once 
again, Romani leadership became increasingly marginalised within a field that was 
presumably an autonomous space representing their interests. In my interviews with 
Romani activists who were then in their forties, such as Blanka Kozma (1999), Agnes 
Daroczi (2000), and Aladar Horvath (1999), I observed a sense of resignation, bitterness 
and frustration, both towards the Hungarian state, as well as elite human rights
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entrepreneurs, whom - they suggested to me - had monopolised precious resources at the
expense of genuine social solidarity and Romani emancipation. Here, Kozma (1999)
refers to the exclusionary employment structure present within elite NGOs:
...these positions are filled by people who are not Roma, you can see these are 
responsible positions with good pay, a car, an office, you can see everyone wants 
this, even non-Roma, who want good jobs and a relaxed work environment. 
These are a tiny number of positions, they [non-Roma] are willing to work for us, 
after all the pay is good.. .but this is not a good thing, they shouldn’t stand on our 
side because they take the positions away from us.. .today only those people who 
have tremendous contacts can make a living from this ...the non-Roma shouldn’t 
monopolise the Romani cause, these [positions] should be filled by educated Roma 
(INT, italics mine).
Horvath too, has spoken about this eloquently on a number of occasions, and one
particular speech at a public forum comes to mind, where he was asked to give his input
on the Romani movement and its future on ‘Roma tights’ day at the CEU67:
The Romani Movement has a long way to go. This present discussion itself 
illustrates how far we are from a normal situation: we have several non-Roma 
experts discussing the future of the movement, while we Roma get to say 
something in the end. I will offer some conclusions about the background of this 
development by quoting Malcolm X, who after his trip from Mecca once asked, 
“If you drink coffee which is too strong, too black, what do you do with it? Well, 
you put some cream...but if you put too much cream, it no longer tastes like 
coffee”. This is a lesson from the Black civil rights movement, which offers us a 
strong critique of black integration (Horvath 2000).
Amongst several ‘non-Roma experts’ present at the seminar, several included ERRC 
executive level staff (ERRC 2001c). The role of their human rights entrepreneurship in 
the construction of the Romani civil rights movement is the subject of subsequent 
sections of this thesis. In the above speech at the Central European University, Horvath 
emphasised the danger of dependency that the ‘Roma rights’ movement faces today, a 
dependency not only on foreign aid and neoliberal strategies of human rights, but also 
control on the part of non-Romani elites within the movement itself. Indeed, Horvath
67 ‘Roma Rights Day* was observed for the first time in Budapest on December 8th, 2000. It was organised 
by the OSI network, including the ERRC and the Central European University’s Human Rights Student 
Initiative.
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has on numerous occasions emphasised this, dating back to 1996 and 1997 when the 
ERRC began its human rights work. For example, in November o f 1997, at a meeting I 
attended organised joindy by the OSI’s Roma Participation Program (RPP) and the 
ERRC, palpable tension could be observed between Horvath and Biro. It began when 
Horvath raised the issue o f the monopoly o f non-Roma in the work o f ‘Romani rights’ 
(including the ERRC). Biro intervened immediately, and took him to one side, arguing in 
Hungarian that this was not an appropriate forum to raise such issues (Trehan 1997: FN).
: f  i
Figure 12 - “Hey mister, give me some money”, cartoon on OSPs relationship 
with Romani communities by artist F. Ko$i
The cartoon above is by Ferdinand Ko9i, an Albanian Romani artist based in the United 
Kingdom. The cartoon depicts the assymetrical power relationship between the OSI (the 
benefactor), as an astronaut landing on a moon inhabited by Roma, and the Romani
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recipients or beneficiaries whose position is akin to children begging for money. It offers 
a poignant critique of the current state of events .in post-socialist civil societies, wherein 
Romani civil society has become dependent on the OSI (a hegemonic donor) for its 
survival.
Furthermore, within these private foundation and INGO circles, key individuals push 
their personal agendas, and many of the same individuals, along with their spouses or 
partners, re-appear on various NGO and INGO boards, as well as their legal advisory 
committees. Throughout the 1990s, the majority of these individuals were not of Romani 
origin themselves, although this situation has changed somewhat, given that a younger 
generation of educated Roma are successfully filling these NGO posts (though some 
critics suggest this is tokenism).
From the 1990s, to the EU accession of Hungary in 2004, the sheer dominance of the 
American human rights establishment (both the US State Department and US civil 
society) within the ‘Roma rights’ movement in Europe has been noteworthy. By 
comparison, German, French, or British human rights advocacy networks wielded far 
less influence, and only became more active once Hungary became an EU accession 
state.68 The problems of dependency and external control, which Alinsky (1971), Fox- 
Piven and Cloward (1977) and Warren (2001) have covered in their respective work on 
the organization and mobilization of poor, working class communities are discussed in 
greater depth in Chapters Six and Seven.
68 Nonetheless, some private foundations based in northern Europe, such as the Dutch NOVIB and the 
British Know-How-Fund also provided sponsorship for Romani-related projects in the region.
5.6 The human rights entrepreneurs, part II: enter the European Roma Rights 
Center
Beyond the borders of Hungary, foreign human rights entrepreneurs from the New
York-based OSI, such as its current President Aryeh Neier (a founder and former head
of HRW)69 and the recendy retired Deborah Harding (formerly of the German Marshall
Fund), demonstrated their considerable influence in U.S. foreign policy circles,70 regularly
attending both governmental and non-governmental meetings and seminars focusing on
the transition in Europe and its possible dangers. For example, Harding, as the manager
of the Tolitical Development of Central and Eastern Europe’ programme of the GMF,
exchanged numerous personal faxes and letters with William J. Buder, an influential
lawyer and foreign policy expert for the U.S. government who visited the region
extensively between 1988 and 1993 (cf. Sutler Archives 1990).71 In a letter from January
1990 - sent to Buder in preparation for a conference in Budapest - Harding demonstrates
her detailed knowledge of Hungarian politics and politicians, offering pithy summaries of
their ideological leanings:
[...] Peter Schmidt (reform-oriented communist), Professor at Budapest 
University, “good guy; smart; balanced”. . .Istvan Kukuralli — President of the 
Patriotic Front, a party “between communists and the opposition”. He has done 
theoretical work on the legal status of members of Parliament (Butler Archives, 
1990).
69 For a view into Neier’s own perspective on his work with HRW and OSI, read his human rights memoir, 
Taking liberties (2003). Neier details the enormous power he wields globally using George Soros’ money for 
the advancement o f  the ‘rights agenda’ throughout the globe, see pp. 295-300.
70 See for example, “Why Bush finally stepped in to try to stop the slaughter”, 7 April 2002, The Observer, 
which quotes the OSI’s Morton Halperin’s opinion on the conflict in the Middle East. It also notes, with 
respect to US think tanks, that “The three most influential are three formidable institutions.. .one is the 
global Soros Foundation .. .another is the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and a third is the 
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).” The German Marshall Fund (GMF) is itself a “nonpartisan 
American public policy and grantmaking institution”, see further http://www.gm fus.org/about/index.cfin
71Butler served as the Chairman o f  the executive committee o f the International Commission o f  Jurists 
(ICJ) from 1975 to 1990, and was the honorary president o f  the American Association o f  the ICJ. He also 
“convened annual meetings o f  the principal human rights officials o f  Western governments to discuss 
issues o f  common concern” from 1977 to 1999 (Butler Archives, see
http://www.law.uc.edu/morgan/buderOl /butlerbio.html)
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Harding’s in-depth knowledge of the Hungarian power structure, and the nuances of
party politics during the time of transition, informed her subsequent interventions on
behalf of Roma in Hungary. As will become increasingly evident, liberal human rights
missionaries such as Neier and Harding proved to be powerful catalysts for the
establishment of ‘Roma rights’ based on a particular (neoliberal) ideology, and worked
therefore in tandem with other ‘democracy makers’ (cf. Guilhot 2005), working to
strengthen the comprehensive ‘democratisation’ agenda of the United States government.
In the early 1990s, Human Rights Watch sent several lawyers and researchers to investigate
and report on the human rights situation of Roma in the CEE. One of these individuals
was Theodore Zang, Jr.72, an American public interest lawyer who would eventually write
the first HRW report on Roma in Bulgaria. It was at this time that he emphasised to Dr.
Dimitrina Petrova (an academic, activist, and former MP for the ECO Glasnost political
movement), that the most pressing human rights problem in the region was that of the
Roma. She elaborates:
.. .1 was busy creating various organi2 ations, promoting various projects, most of 
them in the area of human rights but also social science. ..I started to direct an 
institute which I had created called The Institute for Social and Environmental 
Research, and while being the director of this Institute, this guy [Ted Zang], who 
was a good friend from the late 1980s, and who had visited Bulgaria before, said, 
why don’t you do something? Roma are in the most terrible human rights 
situation I have seen in this country.. .this was the first trigger, then I started to 
look around and to see all these, you know, people in the streets, passing through 
ghettoes [while] driving, with my eyes.. .[until then] Roma were absolutely out of 
my vision because I was occupied with human rights.. .constitution building, 
structural problems, the Turkish minority.. .so I should say I went from this 
combination of dissident, of anti-communist dissident.. .from a left perspective, 
environmentalism and human rights to Roma. Roma were a case in point. 
(Petrova 1999: INT).
Petrova and her then husband, Kassimir Kanev (Chair of the Bulgarian Helsinki 
Committee), were already prominent members of the Helsinki Committee Network,
72Zang, a practicing anti-trust lawyer, also established the Human Rights Advocacy Program (HRAP) o f  
Utica College in 1992 with attorneys at Utica along with Professor Theodore S. Orlin. HRAP's purpose is 
to counsel and train non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in transitional democracies, see 
http://www.utica.edu/academic/catalog/2007-08UndergradCat.pdf (page 42).
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headquartered with the International Helsinki Committee in Vienna. Therefore, by the
mid-1990s, Petrova’s pioneering work in Bulgaria, along with the key contacts she had
cultivated within the American human rights establishment and academia, had her well-
placed for the next stage of her career in human rights — as a ‘Roma rights’ entrepreneur.
Petrova had also developed a close friendship with Dr. Deborah Harding, who at this
time was Senior Programme Officer for the German Marshall Fund. Harding would
eventually join the OSI in 1996, working in senior management positions and then go on
to hold the ‘Roma portfolio’ within the organization until her retirement in late 2006.73
She is referred to by some Romani activists as Devla (‘God’ in the Romani language)
Harding, a witty nod to her position of power within the democratization/human rights
industry in post-socialist European countries. Indeed, it was GMF funding which in 1992
helped to establish the first proto-type ‘Romani rights’ NGO in Sofia, The Human Rights
Project, established and directed by Petrova. Formerly a professor of ethics and
philosophy, and a Member of Parliament from 1990 to 1991 for the Union of
Democratic Forces in Bulgaria, Petrova became the 1992 recipient of the American Bar
Association’s annual human rights award, granted each year by the Litigation Section of
the ABA, its largest division (ABA 1999). During the 1994-95 academic year, she was a
Savage Visiting Scholar at the University of Oregon, where she collaborated with
anthropologist Carol Silverman, a specialist on Balkan Romani culture. It was at this time
that she became aware of the interest of Aryeh Neier in Romani issues:
Now in 1995, I spent the year in Oregon teaching human rights and ethnic 
relations in eastern Europe...and there was a meeting organised by OSI, by 
Aryeh Neier I think, where many Roma leaders were present, Ina Zoon 
[Romanian physicist-tumed-human rights lawyer] was there, I am not sure 
whether Biro was present. As far as I know, at this meeting, the need to start 
working on rights was formulated, now.. .1 have never seen any document of that 
meeting, and I’m not sure to what extent this is an idea of the Roma themselves 
and to what extent it is something Aryeh suggested, and they were supportive —
73See further http://www.errc.org/dkk.php?dkk=1706 about her involvement in Romani issues.
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this I don’t know. What I know is that Aryeh called me in July 1995 and offered 
me the job, offered me the job of actually (laughing).. .it wasn’t a job like a job, 
because the institution did not exist, but offered that he would support if I create 
this thing.. .Only later when I met him, he said that he’s thinking of Andras Biro 
as Chair of the Board.. .(Petrova 1999: INT).
In the summer of 1995, Neier also wrote a seminal piece in the American progressive 
publication, The Nation, warning readers against the growing antipathy towards Roma in 
the CEE region. After several paragraphs about their human rights plight, Neier 
mentions Petrova’s work in the Human Rights Project as one of the most promising 
developments in the region, praising her as a “dynamic lawyer”.74
Subsequently, Neier, on behalf of the OSI, began holding serious discussions with Biro 
and Petrova in order to assess the feasibility of establishing an international legal defence 
organisation for Roma in the region (possibly Budapest). Another objective of these 
discussions was to ascertain if Petrova herself would be interested to take up the 
proposed INGO’s management (Petrova 1997 and 1999: INT). Despite being offered a 
tempting academic post at the University of Oregon75, Petrova accepted the challenge of 
Homa rights’ and established a regional centre in Budapest by early 1996 (INT: 1999). 
The European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) was therefore the brainchild of these human 
rights entrepreneurs, and it was officially launched in March 1996 as the Roma Regal 
Resource Center under the auspices of the OSI-Budapest, receiving initial funding of 
$400,000 (RNN 1996). Vermeersch (2001) has pointed out the importance of ‘advocacy 
networks’ within the ‘Roma rights’ movement, and I apply this insight here, 
demonstrating how internationally powerful individuals within Western civil society such 
as Neier and Harding legitimise and support the work of domestic and regional NGO 
human rights entrepreneurs such as Petrova in post-socialist Europe. Another key
74 Petrova is not a qualified lawyer as such, though her wealth o f  experience with human rights law certainly 
makes her an expert in the field. Her educational background is in philosophy and sociology.
75 Where a friend o f  Petrova’s, Professor Carol Silverman, is a tenured professor specializing in Balkan 
Romani culture.
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institution which has exerted a powerful influence on mobilizing for ‘Roma rights* has 
been the OSCE’s Helsinki Commission (CSCE, part of the US government), whose 
work began by monitoring the human rights situation in 1995, and has continued by way 
of detailed policy analysis and interventions (Sobotka 2003: 210-213; Guglielmo and 
Waters 2005; see also Appendix 5 for CSCE Statement).
During the 1990s, the international human rights entrepreneurs based in Hungary 
exercised overwhelming influence and domination within the ‘Roma rights* field. Private 
foundations, government entities such as the U.S. Information Service, and academic 
institutes sponsored many East European activists (including some Roma) for their 
attendances to study trips, conferences and seminars abroad. For example, it was in 1996 
that the U.S. Information Service sponsored the trips of several prominent Roma and 
non-Romani activists (including Aladar Horvath) to visit various minority communities 
and learn about American civil rights movements (Latham 1996). Moreover, the 
phenomenon of what is now cynically called ‘conference tourism’ by some Romani 
activists expanded even further: by 2000, if one visited Budapest (a cosmopolitan city of 
over 2.5 million) for only a week, there would be at least several Romani-related 
conferences, discussions, or cultural events taking place, making it the de facto centre of 
contemporary Roma rights activity in the region. Meusberger (2001) has documented 
how network-building taking place at these conferences by Western elites and their 
counterparts in Eastern Europe had an immeasurable impact on the production of 
knowledge that eventually affected the development of policies on economic aid, 
education and training in Hungary. After attending conferences abroad and ‘representing’ 
their countries in international fora, Hungarian activists and intellectuals returned to their 
home countries, where they influenced domestic policies.
The empirical data I examined in this chapter suggests that the formation of ‘Roma 
rights’ constituencies was largely fuelled by racist violence directed at Roma and by the
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increasing discrimination Roma experienced in various sectors of post-socialist 
Hungarian society: schools, courtrooms, and public places. Another critical antecedent 
for the rise of the ‘Roma rights’ discursive and policy frameworks was the rapid 
emergence and rise of NGOs and INGOs fuelled by Western capital, both of a social 
and financial nature. These NGOs and the human rights entrepreneurs who established 
them have become key forces for the promotion of the ‘rights agenda’ for Romani 
Hungarians. They continue to act as an alternative power base to state-funded 
institutions and public foundations76, and moreover, the NGO sector has itself become a 
site for entrenched interests — both material and ideological.
76 According to one American who worked for the OSI’s Educational Policy Support Unit (EPSU) during 
the late 1990s, OSI began to work more closely with the Hungarian government on educational policy at 
this time (McDonald 2001: INT). Indeed, there was a noticeable shift from being in ‘opposition’ to 
becoming a ‘partner’ in policy-making with the Hungarian government.
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CHAPTER SIX -  THE INFLUENCE AND IMPACT OF NGOS IN  THE  
‘ROMA RIGHTS’ ARENA
Witness the tragedy that has befallen the proponents of the concept: people struggling against 
authoritarian regimes had demanded civil society; what thty got instead were NGOs!
- Chandhoke (2003: 9).
This chapter connects the rise of human rights entrepreneurship discussed in the 
previous chapter to the rapid growth and consolidation of the Romani NGO sector in 
Hungary from the 1990s onwards. I then discuss the work of key NGOs and INGOs, 
interrogating their role in the construction of ‘Roma rights’ discourses and the 
significance for Romani communities. In addition, the impact of the increasing 
institutionalisation of NGOs (cf. Stubbs 2007a, 2007b), and the implications for the 
emergence of asymmetrical relationships of power and knowledge within the sector are 
also covered.
6.1 NGOs and INGOs in Hungary: an overview
More than 50,000 NGOs are registered with the Hungarian government today, and those 
that engage with Romani communities number well over 300 (NIOK 2004). A typology 
of Romani NGOs devised by two veteran activists Janos Barsony and Agnes Daroczi 
(1999), and commissioned by the Open Society Institute-Budapest in a concept paper, 
observed the following significant formations: local and national cultural organisations 
and clubs; civil rights organisations, political and human tights organisations; nationwide 
umbrella organisations representing Romani political interests; ‘showcase’ Romani 
organisations that were created and financed by the State; groups organised on the basis 
of kinship links, representing various interests (including economic); and religious 
organisations. Although these NGOs have their own constituencies, the central and east 
European region as a whole lacks the kind of organizations popular in established
Western democracies (particularly in North America) which are based on fee-based 
membership and/or individual donations collected during regular fund-raising 
campaigns.77
Whilst many of the NGOs identified by Barsony and Daroczi (1999) are community- 
based local NGOs, within the Romani rights arena itself, key INGOs and domestic 
NGOs play a prominent role within Hungarian civil society. I begin with an exposition 
of the goals, strategies, and resources at the disposal of the key INGOs involved in 
defending the human rights of Roma, and then analyze their work. Curiously, Amnesty 
International (AI) only began to take seriously fights’ abuses against Roma after the mid- 
1990s, playing but a minor part in the global Romani rights movement until the EU 
accession of post-socialist states. Today, however, it is a core member of the European 
Roma Policy Coalition (ERPC), a consortium of human rights NGOs working in the 
field (including the ERRC, ERIO, and ERGO), and this has been viewed as its explicit 
entry into the world of identity politics vis-a-vis Roma (cf. Guy 2009, see also Figure 13). 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, by 1998, the ERRC was already the pre-eminent 
INGO in the area, and hence, has overtaken its ‘competitor’, the far more established 
New York-based Human Rights Watch (whom it was initially modeled after).78
It was the HRW79 that first published two reports on the situation of Roma in Hungary 
from a Western (liberal) human rights perspective: Struggling for Ethnic Identity: the Gypsies of 
Hungary (1993) and Rights Denied: the Roma ofHungay (1996). The reports offer a classic
77 The possible exception to this would be religious N G O s and formations amongst Roma. See Gay y 
Blasco (2002). Further research is needed on the nexus between Romani religious associations and political 
mobilization.
78 As a new human rights researcher for the ERRC back in 1996, my first research trip (to the Czech 
Republic) was actually a joint mission with HRW’s researcher Fred Abrams.
79 Founded in 1978 as ‘Helsinki Watch’ by a group o f  activists, including Aryeh Neier and Robert 
Bernstein, HRW was originally established in order to monitor compliance with the Helsinki Accords 
signed at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It now has a global reach, with 
five cross-continental divisions: Africa (1987), Americas (1981), Asia (1985), Europe and Central Asia 
(1978), and the Middle East and North Africa (1989), monitoring primarily the civil and political rights o f  
citizens in over 70 countries (Brown 2001: 72-73).
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catalogue of violations of civil and political rights suffered by Roma from police brutality 
to access to social services and systemic discrimination in education. The first report 
frames the debate on Roma as one of ethnic persecution, hence emphasising the racial 
nature of anti-Gypsy discrimination.
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, one of the goals of the interventions of the liberal 
human rights entrepreneurs was to transform the terms of the debate from Gypsies as a 
‘problematic group’ to that of Roma as a community (or communities) of people with 
ethnic characteristics who, like other groups, are worthy of rights and protections under 
the law. Indeed, it was precisely in 1993, that the Hungarian government approved its 
landmark haw on National and Ethnic Minorities, and thereby included its largest minority 
for special civic and cultural protections (cf. Koulish 2005).
By 1996, with the publication of the second HRW report on Hungary, we see an 
increasingly sophisticated discourse on rights violations; indeed, the American authors of 
this report, Rachel Guglielmo and Timothy Waters, were once teachers for the first state- 
sponsored secondary school for Gypsies in Hungary, the Gandhi Gimnacqum, located in 
Pecs. This report was eventually revised and translated into Hungarian in 1997 (entided 
“Jogfos^ tattan”) by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee for domestic distribution (see 
Figure 10 above).
In addition, legal organisations advocating the rule-of-law paradigm (respect for legal 
institutions and legal processes) such as the Constitutional and Legislative Policy Institute 
(COLPI-Open Society Institute, Budapest), as well as national advocacy groups such as 
the Hungarian Helsinki Committee became active in the mid-1990s. Another NGO that 
began its ‘Roma rights’ work in the early 1990s was the Otherness Foundation’s NEKI 
(Legal Defence Bureau for Ethnic and National Minorities). Initiated by Andras Biro in 
1993 with Imre Furmann, a writer and legal consultant originally from Miskolc who was
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once the Vice-President of the Magyar Demokrata Forum (MDF) political party,80 NEKI 
quickly differentiated itself from the Romani political formations mentioned earlier by 
carving out a non-governmental, non-political image as it insisted on strict criteria in 
establishing whether a case was one of ‘discrimination’ or not (Furmann 1999: INT).81 
Though NEKI is not a Romani organisation itself, the majority of its client base is of 
Romani origin, and as such it is one of the ‘partners’ in the civil rights movement of 
Roma. Apart from a legal secretary, nearly all members of its Budapest-based staff were 
non-Romani during the time my research was conducted. Their core mission has been to 
strengthen rule-of-law practices in Hungary, and to influence legal and human rights 
norms within wider society. In 2000, NEKI had five branches in various regions in 
Hungary, and was widely credited for increasing awareness of human rights issues within 
the legal profession, as well as advocating for legislative reform with the government In 
addition, NEKI raised troubling questions about the existence of anti-Gypsy 
discrimination within the Hungary judiciary and courts, as well as within state bodies 
such as law enforcement; it then took the further step of initiating concrete programmes 
of reform of these institutions by offering training to the relevant civil servants. It 
periodically conducts seminars and workshops on human rights law and practice 
targeting relevant public officials, as well as elected officials in local and minority self- 
governments. In 1994, it began to publish (in Hungarian and English), an annual review 
of their discrimination cases, entitled the ‘White Booklet’ (NEKI 1995). To the limited 
audience reading this publication, it is an eye-opening account of the contentious 
relations between Romani and non-Romani Hungarian officials and individuals
80The MDF was elected in the first free elections in post-socialist Hungary, and was founded by reformed 
communists. When one prominent member in the far-right o f  MDF — Istvan Csurka — made anti-Gypsy 
(and anti-semitic) statements publicly, Furmann left the party (Furmann 1999: INT).
81 In 1999, for example, out o f  a total o f  113 complaints received, they determined that only 24 cases met 
their criteria o f ‘discrimination’.
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(especially at the local level), and each case entry describes in detail the legal remedies 
NEKI attempted to take on behalf of its clients.
Another organisation with similar goals, but a substantially different approach to ‘Roma 
rights’, is the Roma Foundation for Civil Rights. Founded by a former school teacher- 
tumed-Romani rights advocate from eastern Hungary, Horvath is also a former Member 
of Parliament. In the late 1980s, he became outraged when, in the town of Miskolc, local 
officials decided to destroy a housing estate which was inhabited primarily by Roma, and 
replace it with segregated housing at a distance of two kilometers outside the city’s 
boundaries. He organised the creation of an Anti-Ghetto Council, and this successful 
initiative subsequendy propelled him into national-level politics in the early 1990s when 
he was elected as an MP on the party list of the Free Democrats (SZDSZ). The Roma 
Polgaijogi A.lapltvany (RPA) as it is known in Hungarian, began its work in 1995, and has 
branch offices throughout Hungary. Notably, it emphasizes that it is a civil rights 
organisation (as opposed to a legal defence bureau or ‘rule of law’ organisation) working 
to represent oppressed Romani communities in Hungary.82 From its inception, the RPA 
has had a mixture of Romani and non-Romani staff, working together in a more co­
operative and less hierarchical manner than the INGOs mentioned earlier. The insistence 
with which NGO activists in the Romani-rights field distinguish themselves (both non- 
Romani NGOs as well as Romani civil rights organisations) from each other is 
noteworthy.
For example, Fitsum Alemu, a legal consultant for NEKI (originally from Ethiopia, but 
educated in law in Hungary), suggested to me that NEKI, as a ‘gajo’ (non-Romani) 
organization was akin to the Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights in the US, whilst the
82 In the past, the RPA has held meetings with former members o f  the American Black liberation group the 
Black Panthers, with the assistance o f  the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC-Quakers). There is 
also a photograph o f  Black-American civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. displayed prominently in its 
office.
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RPA is more like the NAACP, a civil rights organization which campaigns and mobilizes 
within the Romani communities. He was also quick to point out that in 1999, the RPA 
received more funding than the NEKI, and this was good as they could then not be 
accused of taking a disproportionate piece of the ‘Romani funding pie’ (Alemu 1999: 
INT). His overall impression was that at the domestic level in Hungary, the relations 
between NEKI and RPA were co-operative rather than competitive. To illustrate, he 
gave the example of the struggle for enacting anti-discrimination legislation in Hungary: 
NEKI could send a letter to the Constitutional Court in an attempt to lobby for the 
introduction of an anti-discrimination law, however, this could be supplemented by a 
petition drive within the Romani communities initiated by the RPA.83 He therefore views 
the two organizations operating in different — though complementary - areas of civil 
rights. For example, the annual floods in eastern Hungary affect a disproportionate 
number of Romani families, and the RPA campaigns for assistance to these families; in 
contrast, NEKI’s role is narrower in scope (Alemu 1999: INT).
In 1996, the Romani Civil Rights Foundation established the Roma Press Centre (RPC), 
initially the media arm of its operations, though it now functions as an autonomous 
media NGO. The RPA’s work has encouraged the development of a cadre of 
independent Romani journalists to cover issues within their communities, and also to 
render accurate information in the mainstream media about Roma (Miklosi 1999: INT). 
The RPC also produces timely publications on human rights issues and even short pithy 
booklets on issues of enduring importance such as the Romani Holocaust and the 
shocking anti-lice ‘Disinfection programmes’ of the communist regime which targeted 
Romani villagers until the 1980s (RPC 2002).
83 Nonetheless, I subsquently found out that RPA had decided not to co-operate with NEKI on this 
initiative.
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Finally, the Romani Civil Rights Foundation also has an autonomous higher education 
mentorship programme called the Romaversitas whose primary goal is to support Romani 
youth succeed in higher education (RPA 2000).
ERRC: The ‘Firm’
One of the things that makes the Roma problem [sic], question, so challenging, fascinating, and 
deeply difficult to work in, is precisely that history of oppression of Roma which is so embedded 
in the societies here.. .thefact that attitudes about Roma are so unconscious that ifs  only 
recently that people have begun to become aware of the extraordinary nature of racism towards 
Roma and the fact that the kinds of discrimination which Roma suffer, though thy are terrible, 
and violations of human rights law, are often not extremely visible to most people. Therefore, one 
of the challenges of our work is.. .how to expose, highlight, forpeople to see, "Hey, that is an 
injustice, the fact that Roma can't go into that restaurant, that is a human rights violation, you 
know?" And that is a very difficult thing. - J. Golds ton, former legal director, ERRC 
(1999: INT)
As mentioned in the previous chapter, during the same period that domestic Hungarian 
NGOs were mushrooming, the Neier-Biro-Petrova trio set about establishing a high- 
profile international NGO on ‘Roma rights’ in Budapest. In January 1996, the ERRC was 
thus launched, becoming the very first INGO focusing exclusively on the human rights 
of Roma in Europe. I view the ERRC is a ‘hybrid’ INGO because though it is registered 
with the Hungarian state and functions within Hungarian law as a non-profit (and thus 
with a base in Eastern Europe), its scope of activities spans the whole of the European 
continent, in particular, where there are large Romani populations and, by extension, 
human rights abuses of Roma. Moreover, it can be considered an elite NGO because of 
the size and relative security of its budget, which stood at about $2 million per annum in 
2001. The majority of this funding came direcdy from the OSI pipeline, and was not 
linked to individual private donations or membership fees (cf. Ross Range 2001).84
MIn addition, it is interesting to examine the annual reports and budgets o f  the ING O s like the ERRC, 
items o f  which are only partially transparent to the public. Several large domestic N G O s in Hungary have 
annual budgets o f  approximately US$ 100,000.
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The ERRC sees itself as a “public interest law organization” and engages in a number of 
activities from human rights research and monitoring to advocacy and legal defence. It 
also has an education component targeting the Romani communities themselves. 
Collectively, its quarterly Roma Rights (see sample cover below, Figure 12), represents a 
substantial corpus of information about rights abuses against Roma all over Europe, as 
well as North America and occasionally, the Middle East.
Figure 13 - Cover of ERRC quarterly ‘Roma Rights’ (No. 2 & 3, 2001)
ROMA RIGHTS
QUARTERLY J OURNAL OF THE E U R O P E A N  ROMA RI GHTS  CENTER
N U M B E R S  2 a n d  3 ,  2 0 0 1
Government programmes on Roma
•  Bulgaria
•  Czech Republic
•  Greece
•  Hungary
•  Romania
•  Slovakia
•  Slovenia
•  Spain
Also inside:
•  Roma in the Macedonia crisis
•  Special section: lesson s for advocates from recent 
European Court decision
•  Romani language translation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights
The sketch depicts a Romani man before several legal magistrates at a hearing.
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In its human rights publications, the ERRC combines classic Western human rights 
research methodologies with an innovative writing style in order to attract a broad 
readership. As the ERRC viewed earlier reports (1994/1996) by the HRW on the 
Romani human rights situation in Hungary as comprehensive, a full-length research 
report on Hungary has to date not been published, as has been the case for other 
countries of the region with significant Romani populations. However, periodic reports 
in Roma Rights and advocacy letters to the government of Hungary are filed, targeting 
both its international, English-speaking constituency and appropriate state officials and 
institutions. In March 2000, a special issue of Roma Rights entided “Focus: Roma in 
Hungary” was released, providing an accessible compendium of human rights news on 
Roma in the country from the time that the ERRC first began its research work in 1996. 
One of the ERRC’s most salient and successful activities — according to human rights 
entrepreneurs — has been its legal intervention on behalf of Roma who have suffered 
human rights abuses. The ERRC is today the premiere legal defense organization for 
Roma at the international level, and has also litigated numerous cases before the 
European Court of Human Rights.85 As mentioned earlier, it works closely at the national 
level with domestic legal NGOs such as NEKI in Hungary or the HRP in Bulgaria. One 
former head of its legal division, Jim Goldston, discusses the challenges the ERRC faced 
in the late 1990s:
 one of the avenues.. .to address discrimination against Roma is surely to use
litigation, legal action in courts. Courts, until very recendy, were infused with 
politics entirely and the notion of an independent court, [of] independent of 
political structures was non-existent essentially in much of the region. Recendy, 
of course, that has been part of the change.. .and the question is how do we use 
the courts, can we use courts in ways that protect rights for everyone, including 
Roma? That’s a huge challenge and that involves a very different kind of work in 
many ways, partly it's alerting people and screaming and putting pressure on 
governments, but part of it as well is hard investigation, hard legal research, good
85 Though there is not a comprehensive database on ERRC cases, much information can be gleaned from 
their website archives, see further http://www.errc.org/Archivum index.php
158
writing, building slowly but steadily a network of investigators and lawyers who , 
can regularly, and are willing regularly and financially able, regularly, to undertake 
cases which arise from investigations (1999: INT).
Goldston has identified how the institutional structures in transitional Hungary were in 
the process of reform; indeed, at that time in Hungary, constitutional lawyers and their 
counterparts from primarily the US and UK (for example, at the OSFs COLPI) were 
busy devising ways of re-drafting legal provisions in the area of rights legislation as well 
as coming up with more transparent and fair judicial procedures.
Furthermore, examining the human rights cases that the ERRC, NEKI and RPA took up 
in the previous decade can be useful in determining shifting patterns of violations or 
rights abuses that Roma in Hungary have experienced. Prior to 1995, the majority of 
cases dealt with violent attacks or discrimination by police; by the end of the 1990s, local 
governments were seen to be the primary agents of institutional discrimination (Petrova 
1999: INT; NEKI 1999: 5).86
Both Jim Goldston (currently the Director of OSFs Justice Initiative and a board 
member of the ERRC) and Claude Cahn (former Reseach and Publications Director of 
ERRC, now working at the Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction in Geneva), have explicitly 
asserted the importance of their work in shifting the debate on Romani issues. As 
Goldston put it, “Before, people only wanted to think of the Roma as a social issue, an 
educational issue, or an economic issue.. .we’ve forced them to see it [sic] as a human 
rights issue” (Ross Range 2001). However, the question to pose is which “people” are 
referred to here by Goldston? The Hungarian public or the government of Hungary? 
Members of CEE civil society? This is a core question to answer and one that human 
rights entrepreneurs rarely address.
86 In addition, the Minority Ombudsman at the time, Jeno Kaltenbach, noted the same trend in his annual 
report to the Hungarian Parliament in 1999.
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In addition, the fact that the majority of the items in Roma Rights are only in English
(apart from short Romani-language summaries which began to be incorporated at a later
stage) means that its audience is limited, and whilst this has resulted in the creation of an
international ‘Roma rights’ constituency amongst members of the global civil society (the
“people” that Goldston perhaps alludes to above), it has simultaneously widened the
knowledge gap between English and non-English speakers, and certainly, the vast
majority of Roma fall into this category. However, if one views the publications as
intending to appeal to a global human rights audience, and not necessarily to serve the
purpose of educative dissemination amongst Romani communities, this can be seen as
understandable. Nonetheless, one critical observer, a Romani activist from the Balkans
who works in INGO circles in Budapest, had this to say about ERRC’s publications:
.. .they are not such a big deal, they are merely publishing ‘public secrets’. . .if one 
looks at the machinery of the ERRC, and what they actually publish, it is simply 
newspaper reports which are then translated into English (sent by local 
monitors).. .the problems of discrimination and human rights violations facing 
Roma throughout the region are more or less the same — just varying in degree. 
However, most Roma never read these reports as they are in English, and they 
primarily ‘benefit’ an international elite audience (Anon. 2002: INT).
As emphasised in previous chapters, this has been part of a broader tendency on the part
of civil society itself to generate discourses on Roma which ultimately become exclusive.
The majority of Roma themselves cannot readily access these discourses nor challenge
them, let alone participate in their construction. One project which attempted to
ameliorate this ‘epistemic gap’, begun in 2000, was to summarise the main stories in the
Roma Rights quarterly and organise them in audio cassette format in Romani language for
distribution to Romani communities. However, the results of this endeavour were never
assessed, and moreover, the Romani intern who spearheaded this project, returned to her
native Macedonia, effectively drawing the project to a close in less than two years.
Despite these clear weaknesses with the ERRC’s dissemination strategy, the body of
human rights literature generated within the pages of Roma Rights is impressive and
significant (particularly for researchers),87 covering contentious issues such as de facto 
segregation within the educational system, regressive housing legislation (in some cases, 
resulting from the privatisation of housing councils) which renders a disproportionate 
negative impact on Roma, and police abuse in particular Romani communities. A 
common thread weaving through this corpus of materials is the prejudicial treatment of 
Roma prevalent in European societies, and the discriminatory practices of public 
institutions and private individuals. In most of these texts, anti-discrimination resolutions 
and legislation from the European and UN systems underpin the arguments of various 
contributors who write on human rights of Roma.
With respect to public advocacy work at the domestic level, ERRC advocacy letters are 
commonly addressed to ministers of state, including the general prosecutor, minister of 
education, prime minister and other relevant officials in an attempt to place pressure on 
their offices to react to particular cases of abuse. At the international level, the ERRC 
enjoys consultative status with the ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council) of the UN 
and participates on various international and EU bodies. The onus is on governments 
and institutions to prove their compliance with the corpus of human rights laws to which 
they are signatory members. The ERRC also publishes the writings of Romani activists 
and scholars who work in the NGO sector within the pages of Roma Rights, offering a 
window into the contemporary Romani Weltanschauung for readers, particularly on human 
rights debates. It is these narratives which are perhaps the most salient and useful for 
generating a convivial awareness within the majority society of the Romani communities’ 
predicament in Europe today.
87 Particularly for Western European non-Roma, many o f whom never come into direct contact with 
Roma, nor would they be exposed to knowledge about fellow Romani citizens o f  their country in their 
school textbooks. Roma Rights also reaches a small circle o f educated Roma who then develop a clearer 
picture o f  the similarities o f  human rights violations across countries. Nonetheless, the mass o f  Roma 
would not be reading it, and if  they did, would not find it particularly useful for their lives, apart from to 
confirm what they already know — that they face hostility throughout Europe (cf. Anon 2002: INT).
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4Partner* N G O s
As mentioned in Chapter 5, another organisation in the Homa rights* movement is the 
Hungarian Helsinki Committee, headed by Ferenc Koszeg, a former samizdat publisher, 
and an MP with the SZDSZ party until 1999. The HHC, established in 1990, and a part 
of the Helsinki network in Europe, collaborated with the HRP on their first reports 
covering the situation of Roma in Hungary, and has good co-operation with the ERRC, 
demonstrating the nexus between Budapest-based Hungarian NGOs and international 
(primarily American) human rights organisations. Apart from the ‘rights of Roma* 
agenda, the HHC covers other areas of human rights such as refugee protection, and 
prison reform, advocating for changes in Hungarian legislation as necessary (Koszeg 
1999: INT).
Though the Hungarian Foundation for Self-Reliance {Autonomia Alapitvany) mentioned in 
the previous chapter is not strictly a human rights organisation, in its capacity as a 
Hungarian intermediary organisation (that is, a grant-giving one) working with Romani 
communities, it has engaged in income-generation work in the countryside for nearly two 
decades. In 1994, it granted seed money to NEKI to begin its operations, and in 1997, it 
worked with five legal defence bureaus from four different countries (NEKI was the 
Hungarian representative) across the CEE region to implement the EUROMA project - 
sponsored by the European Commission’s Phare Democracy Programme A d  Hoc facility - an 
eighteen-month project aimed at “reinforcing self-help projects amongst the Roma 
through providing nonprofit leadership and management training, providing media 
training, establishing legal defence bureaus and supporting existing ones, and setting up a 
regional Romani radio station...” (AA 1997: 13-14).88 Finally, it is important to note the
88 I myself happened to attend the leadership training provided for Slovak Roma in Michalovce, Slovakia. 
At one point in the training, when Professor Hubschmannova discussed the Indie roots o f  the Romani 
language, she asked me to join her in teaching the group. To date, a regional Romani radio has not been
162
role of training programmes in conflict resolution coordinated by the Partners Hungary 
foundation, as well as the research they facilitate on key issues such as the G-MSG (cf. 
Koulish 2001; 2005).
Domestically, the SOROS-Hungary foundation and regionally, the Roma Participation 
Programme (OSI-Budapest), both a part of the Soros philanthropic networks in the 
1990s, intervened in the Romani rights movement through their support for multicultural 
education programmes and Romani advocacy centres respectively. In particular, during 
the tenure of one previous RPP Director, Rudko Kawczynski, the organization took a 
fairly radical approach (for the region) in its organizational work, insisting that Roma know 
what's best for their communities. This ultimately pitted Mr. Kawczynski against those 
(primarily non-Roma) within the national Soros Foundations who did not wish to face up 
to the implicit challenge this posed for their work with Romani communities (cf. 
Kawczynski 1999; Anon. 1999: INT).
6.2 De-constructing (un)civil society in Hungary: the politics of the ‘Roma 
industry’
Listening to supposedly knowledgeable people talking about civil society at conferences and other 
fora, it is easy to fa ll into the trap of thinking that civil society is a level playing field and the 
new salvation for development. ..C ivil society is a messy arena of competing claims and interests 
between groups that do not necessarily like each other - Alan Fowler (1997)
For many Western actors and observers of the transition, in particular, philanthropic
bodies that have become active in the post-socialist region since the early 1990s, the
NGO sector has been virtually synonymous with ‘democracy-building, and ‘civil society’
(Fowler 1997; Pinnock 1999). In critically analysing and deconstructing this notion, I
suggest that this view of the NGO sector is reductive, as it does not take into account its
complexity, nor the inherent tensions within this site of power struggle, particularly in
established, although in August 2001, a Budapest-based radio station, Radio ‘C* was launched and 
continues to be on air to this day.
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reference to the Romani subaltern within European civil societies (cf. Trehan 2009). 
Hence, contextualizing these terms is a pre-requisite to understanding how they have 
been interpreted in the modem Hungarian context.
The term ‘civil society’ generally incorporates NGOs, and broadly encompasses political
parties, labour unions, workers’ cooperatives, business associations, membership based
organisations and religious bodies amongst a variety of other actors in society. Along
with its twin ‘democratisation’, both are vociferously contested terms within the
globalised discourse on development today. While I save the deconstruction of these
terms and their local application for the following chapter, where a discussion of the
problems of liberal theories as applied to human rights takes place, I would like to make
two important points at this stage. First of all, the widespread popularity of both these
terms in post-socialist eastern Europe has been a direct result of the ideological and
material dominance of American human rights networks in Hungary, who have rendered
these concepts virtually synonymous with human rights and NGO work in the region.
Secondly, these terms themselves have been constructed on a relatively narrow
understanding of human rights. In her analysis of how the concept of democracy has come
to be formulated from a polyarchical perspective, Hearn (1998) suggests:
...democracy is limited to the political sphere. It focuses on process and clearly 
differentiates process from substance. There is no contradiction in this model in affirming 
that democracy* coexists with massive material inequality. It is outside the definition of 
polyarchy to address such inequality, and thus by definition this form of democracy 
legitimates an unjust social order. It does not entail an emancipatory project from an 
unjust status quo...Now that polyarchy has been conflated to the staple 
definition of democracy in both democratisation and democracy promotion 
literature, the idea of popular democracy is no longer on the democratic agenda 
(15, italics mine).
Her observations reflect the on-going concerns with the difference between ‘substantive’ 
and ‘procedural’ democracy, where the latter form of democracy is practiced from the 
perspective of ‘polyarchy’, whereby “elite minority rule and socio-economic inequalities
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[exist] alongside formal political freedom and elections involving universal suffrage” 
(Robinson 1996: 356, cited in Hearn 1998: 15).
This cogendy illustrates the situation for the majority of Roma, who as citizens of 
Hungary should, in theory, enjoy a range of human rights and protections since the 
transition to ‘democracy’, and yet, the reality is that they remain unable to acquire the 
privileges of citizenship in Hungarian society as a result of gross structural inequalities 
and violence (cf. Farmer 2003). In addition, Hearn’s description of polyarchical 
democracy almost seemlessly overlaps neoliberal models of governance in post-socialist 
Europe, with its strong emphasis on its procedural aspects (such as elections).
As detailed in the previous chapter, during the past decade, the movements for reforms 
of legal and juridical structures in Hungary were grounded in the adoption of liberalist 
rule-of-law and ‘democratisation’ principles as formulated by influential non-state actors 
such as the OSI in New York City and its affiliates in eastern European countries. Both 
the rule-of-law and democratization are seen as part of the broader package of the 
establishment of human rights regimes in post-socialist Europe, and this continues to 
have practical implications for the trajectory of Romani projects and initiatives 
throughout the region. One outcome has been the creation of a parallel system of 
expertise on Roma and the generation of epistemic communities outside the Romani communities 
themselves. Whereas the work of the African National Congress generated its homegrown 
intellectuals and moral entrepreneurs, the Soros-generated parallel system (cf. Stubbs 
2007b) within post-socialist Europe has placed epistemic capital firmly in the hands of 
non-Roma. In Chapter Seven, I cover the problems associated with the persistent lack of 
alternative ideologies to counter the current hegemony within the NGO sector, and the 
prevailing lack of solidarity with dissident Roma displayed by neoliberal human rights 
entrepreneurs.
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To gain further insight into the dynamics within the Romani-related NGO sector in post­
socialist states, discarding assumptions about the ‘voluntary sector* or the ‘non-profit 
sector*, as it is known in established Western polities, is crucial. This has to do with the 
peculiar nature of contemporary Central and Eastern European civil societies:
While the third sector in developed democracies relies upon the other two 
sectors, the problem for the corresponding third sector in the emerging Eastern 
European democracies is finding another basis for its existence. The easiest 
solution to this problem seems to be that...[it] should rely upon the Western 
third sector (and maybe also on the Western first and second sectors). But if the 
voluntary sector relies only on foreign support, it will forever remain foreign to 
Eastern Europe. The problem then is to find the immanent, the inherent forces 
that can support a voluntary sector in countries with ruined economies and 
political structures in transition (Mois Fayon cited in Petrova 1996).
As alluded to above, in a region continuing to experience swift economic, political and 
social change, elite actors have emerged, overcoming the problem of scarce resources (at 
least in the short-term) by relying on funding from wealthier Western countries and more 
recently, from the European Union. They have asserted their role in the development of 
an independent civil society by laying claim to public interest work, a concept which is 
relatively new to the region. In the case of the ‘Romani rights* sector, this has consisted 
of promoting the application of universal human rights standards (including European 
human rights norms such as the EU Race Directive), conducting original research, 
lobbying officials and the media, and providing direct assistance to victims of human 
rights abuses (cf. ERRC/Interights/MPG 2000).
The ‘N G O isation o f human rights* and elite collusion
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the ‘Roma rights* movement as practised in the countries 
of post-socialist Europe is primarily an NGO-led development, and conforms well to the 
‘NGOization of social movements* thesis (Stubbs 2007a; Roy 2004; Hanafi and Tabar 
2003). It is important to note that well-funded organisations whose work focuses on the 
diverse Romani communities in the region generally lack grassroots constituencies, and in
many cases, do not co-operate with local NGOs. Instead of a grassroots mass movement 
supporting these NGOs, we see the emergence of elite constituencies, that is, comprising 
national and international policy-makers, academics, and coalitions of activists (Trehan 
2001). In this respect, the Romani movement is a site for the emergence of the 
‘NGOization of human rights’.
Therefore, the field of human rights in Hungary, and more specifically, the ‘Romani 
rights’ sector, is characterized by a concentration of resources and access to social capital 
among these human rights entrepreneurs, and could be characterized as an opportunistic 
‘collusion of elite interests’.
Paradoxically, this is the direct antithesis of the so-called ‘power-to-the-people’ principle 
that emphasises mobilization at the community level. The bulk of the resources are 
funneled to the same NGOs (and in the case of Hungary, to elite INGOs such as 
European Roma Rights Center and the Autonomia foundation) from the same constellation of 
sponsors I discussed in Chapter 5. Moreover, a further concentration of resources and 
consolidation of NGO power has resulted from the recently formed consortium of 
private foundations known as the ‘Trust for Civil Society’, as well as the programmes 
associated with the ‘Decade of Roma Inclusion: 2005-2015’ (Amove 1980; Guy 2009). 
Another key determinant contributing to this collusion of interests and power are the 
strong personal linkages that individuals within NGO circles have with one another: the 
director of one organisation is the founder of another or vice-versa; the board member 
of one organization acts as a consultant for another; the spouse of one NGO director is 
hired as a consultant for an implementing NGO, and so on. For instance, both Rurnyan 
Russinov and Savelina Danova (a married couple) garnered top posts in the ‘Roma rights’ 
sector in Hungary, after having worked for Petrova’s Human Rights Project in Sofia. 
Russinov took over Kawcynski’s post as Director of RPP (OSI), whilst Danova became a 
senior researcher within the ERRC itself. Another example is Joseph Schull, a Canadian
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who previously worked for the Ford Foundation, and then became a board member with 
the ERRC. Significandy, the exclusive nature of this circle also impacts the construction 
of priorities for the movement as a whole, as human rights entrepreneurs network 
effectively across countries and consolidate their professional capital in this manner.
Institutionalisation o f  NGOs
International human rights lawyer Chidi Odinkalu (1999) of the Justice Initiative of OSI- 
New York (formerly a staff member of the London-based Interights), in a trenchant 
analysis of the African NGO sector for the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International 
Affairs (CCEIA), notes that unlike community-based NGOs, a number of NGOs 
financed directly by Western donors do not enjoy support at the grassroots level. Thus, 
they are not required to be accountable to any constituency, apart from a limited number 
of select donors, who often subscribe to agendas that may or may not reflect the most 
critical needs of the communities they purport to assist. In a striking parallel to 
intermediary organisations working in the field of Romani issues, Odinkalu (1999: 1-2) 
notes that:
Most human rights organisations are modelled after Northern watchdog 
organisations, located in an urban area, run by a core management without a 
membership base (unlike Amnesty International), and dependent solely on 
overseas funding. The most successful of these organisations only manage to 
achieve the equivalent status of a public policy think-tank, a research institute, or 
a specialised publishing house. With a media-driven visibility and a lifestyle to 
match, the leaders of these initiatives.. .progressively grow distant from a life of 
struggle (cited in Trehan 2001).
The parallels with respect to African NGOs are noteworthy due to the relative 
similarities in the power structures, both in sub-Saharan Africa and amongst the Roma in 
Eastern Europe. In the early days of the ‘transition’, some elite NGO entrepreneurs in 
the region believed that systematic recruitment efforts were necessary to attract talented 
technocrats to the field of development and human rights. The objective was to enhance
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professionalism in the field, and offering generous salaries was seen as an effective way to 
achieve this. Danova, formerly co-director of Human Rights Project (Bulgaria) and 
currendy with the ERRC, agrees that Roma face serious problems of access to resources 
within the NGO sector (Danova 2000: INT).
One result of the professionalisation of human rights work or the NGOization of human 
rights, is that the salaries of young NGO workers in the region - especially within 
organizations who receive direct funding from international philanthropies such as the 
Open Society Institute, Charles Mott Foundation, or Rockefeller Brothers - are likely to 
be higher than those of local Hungarian professionals, and significantly higher if one is a 
Western national. In Budapest, for example, a teacher employed by the state in the year 
2000 earned an average of the equivalent of $ 150/month, while a full-time Hungarian 
NGO worker based in Budapest could earn well over $500/month. The salaries within 
some international NGOs in the region are proportionally higher, taking into account the 
cost of living and purchasing power parity, than those working in New York or London 
in similar positions. In some cases, these posts are tax-free for those not officially 
resident in Hungary (for recent job advertisements in the ‘Roma rights’ sector, see 
Appendix #6).
These monetary incentives have had the effect of attracting large numbers of people into 
the NGO sector, individuals who otherwise would have joined the corporate or state 
sector (including academic work) and perhaps equally crucially, this has had the knock-on 
effect of making the non-profit sector a lucrative field with career potential. This has 
been one result of the impact of the current human rights approach, whereby the ethos 
of classical human rights work has been diluted and transformed from one of solidarity 
with and social justice for the oppressed in favour of technocratic skill and loyalty to an 
emerging neoliberal hierarchy.
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A  pattern o f  hierarchical developm ent
A parallel development to the NGO-isation of human rights phenonmenon is that once 
INGOs and elite domestic NGOs establish their dominant position within the ‘Romani 
rights industry’, they then seek to legitimate this position by reaching out to community- 
based organisations and forming alliances and ‘strategic’ partnerships. These 
‘partnerships’ are generally not on an equal footing, as grassroots NGOs are often 
dependent on the elite NGOs for funding, and many times the project specifications are 
pre-designed according to funder’s priorities (cf. Trehan 2001). This strengthens existing 
asymmetries within the sector leading to further hierarchisation, particularly in relation to 
Romani development or civil rights projects, as the project priorities of elite NGOs take 
precedence over those of local NGO. As Blanka Kozma (1999: INT), director of 
Romani Women’s Assocation told me about the planning of Roma-related NGO 
projects:
...these projects were not designed from our perspective, it’s not about our 
survival’ it’s not about our development...then, main aim is not to help Romani 
society or to develop the situation, but to “prevent them [Roma] from going to 
England or America, so that we are not a danger to the EU”...this was the 
motivation [in the past], and it continues to be to this day [italics mine].
These claims by Ms. Kozma were made in the context of the growing migration of Roma 
to Western Europe during the late 1990s as Romani lifeworlds were rendered even more 
precarious, coinciding with the intensive preparations for EU accession by post-socialist 
governments in central Europe. This type of radical critique is rarely found in 
mainstream academic literature on Roma, nor is it likely to be published in the plethora 
of NGO publications. Nevertheless, in private conversations with numerous Romani 
activists, this is one of their most critical concerns about the contemporary NGO-led 
rights movement.
While one should certainly not lament increasing professionalism within the field of 
human rights, if actors within the movement and the strategies that they adopt begin to
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manifest the imperatives of the neoliberal economic order, and thus lose sight of the 
priorities of the communities and people whom they are meant to serve, serious 
questions need to be raised, and, as suggested by David Kennedy (2004), perhaps 
reflexivity within the human rights community needs to become an imperative.
This development demonstrates how the concept of ‘moral entrepreneurship, has itself 
become transformed rather significandy since the time Becker (1963) originally conceived 
of it:
...a man’s preoccupation may become his occupation. What started as an 
amateur interest in a moral issue may become a full-time job; indeed, for many 
reformers it becomes just this. The success of the crusade, therefore, leaves the 
crusader without a vocation (153).
In this thesis, I suggest that the concept of ‘moral entrepreneur’ must be developed 
further, indeed, re-conceptualised, in light of market exigencies and market penetration 
within the contemporary, post-socialist arena of human rights in Europe. In the 
particular case of the human rights movement for Roma, Becker’s understanding of 
‘moral entrepreneur’ from the 1960s has been flipped on its head as the crusader does indeed 
gain a vocation. The ‘market’ for jobs within the ‘Gypsy industry’ is not in danger of 
waning in the near future since much of the diminished funding (or capital) for the work 
of human rights entrepreneurs which was previously sourced from American 
philanthropies (as prominent foundations shifted their sponsorship further eastwards 
projects in central and western Asia) is now being replaced to a significant extent by the 
European Union and its numerous initiatives in the area of Romani integration (Guy and 
Kovats 2006). This development ensures full-time employment for human rights 
entrepreneurs who are ideologically comfortable with the ‘NGOization’ of human rights, 
and indeed, the marketisation of human rights. Moreover, a cursory look at job openings 
during 2007 suggests that many new technocratic jobs whose purpose is to facilitate 
‘Romani integration’ in Europe are now actively recruiting employees. As one Romani
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intellectual has suggested, the ‘Roma rights* movement has generated several thousand 
jobs (and thus security) across Europe for technocrats who have no direct knowledge of 
Romani communities, and perhaps about five hundred of these positions will go to the 
Romani educated elite, if they are lucky. However, the mass of Roma continue to remain 
impoverished and excluded from the labour market, living lives of terrible insecurity (cf. 
Zoltan 2006). I am in agreement with Zoltan that these realities deserve to be discussed 
openly within the human rights ‘community*, particularly if the broader goals of solidarity 
with the oppressed — not to mention the goal of emancipatory cosmopolitanism - are to 
be achieved.
The ‘Cause* becom es consum ed b y the Career
Within the human rights field, and within the ‘rights for Roma* movement itself, there 
are a number of persons devoting their life to the cause of Romani emancipation, whilst 
there are a number of others for whom it has become a career,; a livelihood (and for some, 
a lucrative one).
When we compare it to, say the Indian movement for independence in the early 20th 
century, or the South African anti-apartheid movement or the Black civil rights 
movement in the US, one particular difference stands out. The economic interests, that 
is, the career-building possibilities, were not so evident within these movements, as the 
role of donors and private foundations was not hegemonic. In other words, moral 
entrepreneurs such as M.K. Gandhi, Dr. King, and Nelson Mandela, though supported 
by wealthy benefactors from both within their own communities and outside their 
communities, did not set about to earn money or live lives of relative prosperity as a 
result of their activist leadership. On the contrary, they demonstrably risked their lives for 
their principles and for the ‘good* of their people, imperfect as individuals though they 
may have been.
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Within the law-centered human rights movement for Roma - spearheaded and 
dominated as it is by lawyers and other professional human rights elites - it is not hard to 
see that one of the motivations for joining the movement is the opportunity to build a 
career within it. During the 1990s, these career opportunities expanded in particular for 
American and Western legal professionals and ‘expert’ consultants in post-socialist 
Eastern Europe. For Romani individuals, a career can be established as a so-called 
‘professional Gypsy’ (someone who gamers a position on the basis of her or his Romani 
ethnicity, while using it as a badge of legitimacy), and if one is non-Romani, then as a 
‘universalist’ human rights entrepreneur, who conversely, uses the badge of ‘universalism’ 
to legitimize their interventions. Furthermore, these categories are imbricated depending 
on the extent to which an individual - regardless of ethnicity - gains familiarity with the 
complexity of Romani lifeworlds, and in so doing, transforms her or his own 
mltanschuung to reflect this cognitive acquisition, which then further influences their 
human rights interventions.
Following from the above, despite the growing opportunities afforded by professional 
work in this sector for some select Romani individuals, these phenomena could have 
lasting negative consequences for the current and future generations of NGO activists if 
cynicism begins to replace idealism, the backbone of human rights work (Trehan 2001). 
The values traditionally associated with voluntary sector work such as altruism, self-help, 
community service, alliance-building and co-operation face the danger of being diluted or 
marginalised by an emerging orthodoxy focused solely on the technocratic acumen of 
mainly non-Romani human rights entrepreneurs and the tokenism of select Roma in 
their midst. Work in the development and human rights sector in Hungary is in danger of 
becoming ‘just another job’ if the technocratic model gains pre-eminence over service 
within a community-centred approach, as these observations suggest:
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As they get larger, NGOs are looking more and more like businesses themselves. 
In the past, such groups sought no profits, paid low wages - or none at all - and 
employed idealists. Now a whole class of them, even if not direcdy backed by 
businesses, have taken on corporate trappings. Known collectively as BINGOs 
[big international NGOs], these groups manage funds and employ staff which a 
medium-sized company would envy. Like corporations, they attend conferences 
endlessly. Fund-raisers and senior staff at such NGOs earn wages comparable to 
the private sector (The Economist 2000: 25-27).
The scenario above could describe the work of the ERRC, whom some people working 
in the region refer to with irony as The Firm’, and to the lawyers working there, as 
human rights businessmen’ (Anon. INT: 2006). This is in marked contrast to the 
relatively low-paid jobs within the voluntary sector in Western democracies, where 
government employees can earn as much, if not considerably more, than those employed 
by the non-profit sector. As a result, the generous influx of money that the post-socialist 
NGO sector enjoys through the auspices of the Western private foundations has led to 
an adjoining, perhaps dysfunctional phenomenon - what many Romani intellectuals refer 
to cynically (and openly) as the ‘ethno-business’ or ‘Gypsy industry’. Indeed, Monika 
Horakova, a psychologist of Romani background, and former MP in the Czech Republic 
has claimed that:
there is too much paternalism.. .with too many Czechs who speak no Romani 
making a living by helping a people they do not understand, while Gypsies 
themselves go jobless (cited in Erlanger 2000).
The ‘Gypsy industry’ is not solely a third sector phenomenon, as it also encompasses a 
growing number of Romani-related offices and programmes from culture to education to 
minority rights in the State sector. Indeed, the EU PHARE programmes in the region 
have funding earmarked for the “development of civil society”, which includes 
substantial sums of money for Romani-related projects (Benyi 2000: INT; Guy and
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Kovats 2006; cf. Guy 2009).89 This has also resulted in social tensions rooted in the pay 
differentials between local Romani NGOs and the intermediary NGOs, between Romani 
and non-Romani employees, and between foreign and native workers. Moreover, these 
phenomena are in step with Fowler’s (1997) paradoxical observation that in the short 
term, strengthening civil society tends to increase social tensions, rather than curb them, 
as more actors begin to stake their claim to resources, inspite of the hierarchies which 
result in differential access to these. This phenomenon may be a partial function of 
increasing institutionalisation or formalisation of well-funded NGOs themselves. 
Furthermore, the linkages between the increasing bureaucratisation of human rights 
activity, economic globalization, and corporatist thinking permeate the civil society of the 
region, all serving to marginalize Romani interlocutors within it.
Some Romani leaders have responded to their general position of marginalisation 
(identified in Chapter Two as a form of subalterity) by forming strategic alliances with 
American philanthropists and affiliated human rights entrepreneurs. The above section 
discussed some of the problems associated with the institutionalisation of human rights 
work in Hungary. However, many supporters of the work of these NGOs argue that 
without their intervention, the problems that Roma face today would not be as heavily 
debated and contested, and moreover, the impetus to ameliorate them would not be as 
vigorous (Haga 2000: INT). Nonetheless, other, more critical Romani activists suggest 
that debate and contestation alone are not adequate tools for overcoming structural 
oppression (Kocze 2004; Zoltan 2006).
89In 2000, the PHARE budget for Romani programmes in Hungary was 9.6 million euros in total, and was 
disbursed through the Ministries o f  Education and Social Welfare (Benyi 2000: INT).
6.3 Relations between elite NGOs and Romani communities
Examining parallel developments in another ‘subaltern’ NGO sector, that of the
Palestinian Territories, reveals striking parallels to the development of Romani NGOs in
Eastern Europe. Two social scientists who have critically assessed the work of
Palestinian NGOs suggest that they are:
.. .spectators in the Intifada, unable to make the necessary linkages and articulate 
the objectives of their organisations that promote democracy and social justice, 
and the overarching national agenda and strategy of the Intifada (Hanafi and 
Tabar 2005: 18).
They suggest further that NGOs are generally isolated and lack an organic base in 
Palestinian society. This observation can be applied to many Romani NGOs who are also 
spectators (or at best, witnesses and archivists) in the NGO-based civil society in Eastern 
Europe. Whilst critical voices do emerge from time to time, action is rarely taken based 
on these insights. As covered earlier in the thesis, human rights entrepreneurship as a 
professional occupation is dominated, to a large extent, by non-Roma ‘Romani rights’ 
NGO workers who then rise up in the ranks of professional NGO work, ultimately 
becoming directors and deputy heads of NGOs. In contrast, Roma at these levels tend to 
be rare, and seldom do they become entrepreneurs who devise and envision policy or 
arrive at project priorities for their own communities. This enterprise is almost the 
exclusive preserve of neoliberal-leaning non-Romani benefactors and NGO 
entrepreneurs.
While some researchers, such as Pinnock (1999; 2005), who studied the development of 
post-socialist Romani NGOs in Bulgaria, interpret the rise of Romani NGO projects as 
an important part of a survival strategy, which offers another avenue for strengthening 
their community’s prospects by creating spaces of resistance to non-Romani notions of 
‘integration’, I nevertheless view these ‘NGO survival strategies’ as emerging from a clear 
lack of volition.
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Although the observation that NGO work constitutes a form of survival is clearly 
relevant to the case of Hungary, where the phenomenon of the ‘professional Gypsy 
representative, became visible from the mid-1990s onwards (primarily as a result of the 
country’s unique Minority Self-Government system which led to the election of over 
3,000 local level Romani officials in the previous round of voting), whether this 
development affords possibilities for genuine resistance is quite another matter. My 
perspective is more critical than Pinnock’s (2005) in this sense, as firstly, there is 
increasing resignation on the part of older Romani activists (in their 40s and above), 
coupled with a tacit acceptance by a younger generation (now in their 20s and 30s) of the 
existing inequalities within the contemporary NGO sector. This younger generation is 
removed from the solidarity-building struggles of the 1980s and seems unable to 
recognise the inherent contradictions of the neoliberal NGO model. Nonetheless, Eva 
Orsos, a prominent liberal member of civil society, believes that the NGO sector has 
enabled skills development in the Romani communities:
...the role of civil organisations must intensify in Hungary...this is especially 
important for the Roma. As these are organisations, formations, in which people 
can be present who cannot normally express their common interests, their 
common problems. And for Hungarian Gypsies, indeed for European Gypsies, 
one of the biggest problems is that they cannot express their problems...if you go 
to the Gypsy settlements and sit down with people there, they see their situation 
and their problems with crystal clarity...But they get no further than expressing it, 
they are not capable of realising their aims. So these civil organizations 
[NGOs]...prepare them for roles in public life. And anyone who takes a role in 
any type of civil organization, this means that, possibly, they could use these skills 
in another such organsation dealing with other issues....I see a new generation 
growing up which is better educated, which takes part in schools, communities, 
and university groups, which expresses what the problems are, and which will 
fight the problems they face in a tough manner (2001: INT).
Nevertheless, other Romani activists and scholars argue that the profound deterioration
of the socio-economic circumstances of Roma during the rapid transition to a market
economy did pressure many to create ‘paper NGOs’ and projects in order to gain a share
of the NGO funding pie (Kovats 2003; Trehan 2001; Zoltan 2006).
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The problem  o f  objectification
It is difficult to know who are our genuine friends, and who are the parasites.
Blanka Kozma (1999: INT)
Another, perhaps unintentional development of the NGOisation of human rights work 
vis-a-vis Roma has been the objectification of Romani representatives by human rights 
entrepreneurs themselves. Romani critics claim that rather than being active participants 
(apart from the tiny urban elite Romani minority) in the human rights movement, they 
have become subjects for the human rights work of others, rather like ‘experiments’ for 
tinkering with by legal professionals and international human rights entrepreneurs (cf. 
Trehan and Kocze 2009; Zoltan 2006). This kind of development harkens back to the 
days of ‘imperial philanthropy’, where the agency of subaltern actors within civil society 
was reduced or rendered invisible.
Or, as Hungarian Romani activist Kozma suggests provocatively, “we are nothing but a 
project to therrT (INT: 1999, emphasis mine). Aside from the all-too-common mirroring 
of anti-Gypsy societal bias amongst non-Romani NGO workers themselves, this 
contentious issue also brings to the surface the great difficulties in transplanting Western 
notions of volunteerism or non-profit work to an increasingly competitive, career- 
oriented NGO sector in a region characterized by the presence of uncontested (and even 
unarticulated) racialised hierarchies.
Despite holding progressive beliefs with respect to justice for minorities, most of the 
INGO entrepreneurs in the 1990s continued to work within a rudimentary framework of 
civil society development, where it was not seen as necessary to conduct preliminary 
research into the daily circumstances of Romani communities before embarking upon their 
projects. The cause being just for these moral entrepreneurs, programmes were devised 
for Roma. Meanwhile, Romani NGOs found themselves adapting their agendas to the
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priorities of high-profile partners, even though many had conceived different priorities 
for themselves. Though clear-cut boundaries cannot be drawn between the work of 
Romani-led NGOs and other NGOs in the field, the hierarchical structure currently in 
place ensures that Romani NGOs receive a relatively modest share of the funding ‘pie* 
compared to those intermediary NGOs usually directed by non-Roma. When there are 
resource constraints (access to capital), decision-making power (and thus autonomy) is 
also constrained for these Romani-led NGOs (cf. Pinnock 2005).
Conducting a simple comparison of the annual budgets of intermediary NGOs with 
those of community-based Romani NGOs reveals that the former have resources 
(budgetary and otherwise) which are multiples of the latter (Kocze 2004: INT). 
Intermediary organisations tend to have projects national or regional in scope, and this is 
cited as one explanation for the differences in funding levels.
The donor dependency factor
As Romani leaders and politicians have been dependent on state structures for financial 
support historically, so too, in post-socialist times, Romani actors within the NGO sector 
have become dependent on major philanthropic donors for continuing their work. A 
pecking order of dependency can be observed in this regard, which has resulted in a 
bifurcated system of accessing grants. While elite NGOs and INGOs have relatively easy 
access to direct donations from large private foundations and multilateral agencies from 
the West (a kind of ‘pipeline funding’) based on long-established professional relations, 
local Romani NGOs are dependent upon these elite NGOs for further re-distribution of 
funding at the local level and cannot generally compete with them for the sources of 
‘pipeline funding’. As explained earlier, since most NGOs working in this arena are not 
financially viable without foreign assistance, and membership-funded organisations are 
almost non-existent, the majority of projects are necessarily donor-driven. One
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explanation for the lack of voluntary membership of these organizations in the early 
socialist era was explained as the “legitimate suspicion against voluntary action, as during 
40 years [under actually existing socialism] there was the practice of compulsory 
‘volunteering’, and membership fees were deducted from salaries” (1990 Annual Report, 
Autonomia Foundation). However, it is also the case that volunteerism, particularly in 
Western capitalist societies, has been associated with a middle-class ethos that requires 
surplus time, and that working class people have not had the ‘luxury’ of volunteering. 
Donor dependency seems to have the effect of undermining the independence of local 
NGOs and initiatives as donors subscribing to neoliberal agendas may have different 
priorities from local economically-depressed communities.
As mentioned earlier in the thesis, some human rights entrepreneurs have drawn parallels 
between Romani Europeans to communities in the so-called ‘Third World’. 
Nevertheless, they may overlook the relative exclusion that their own policies generate 
vis-a-vis Romani communities themselves. Even Romani advocates and intellectuals 
active within European civil society are comparable to those in the Third World in terms 
of their isolated position globally. Their common struggle as double minorities in the 
region (social reformers and Roma) takes place on several fronts simultaneously: not only 
against the state, but now increasingly, against structures which inhibit Romani 
participation in the achievement of their own emancipation, including those within civil 
society.
Agnes Daroczi, Aladar Horvath, Rudko Kawczynski, Angela Kocze and Blanka Kozma 
are a few amongst many Romani activists and public intellectuals in the region who 
believe that the hierarchical structure of the NGO sector today inhibits Romani 
participants from key sites of decision-making. Certainly, the burden that most Romani 
intellectuals carry in their attempt to represent themselves, their families, their
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communities, indeed, their whole people (if this is even conceivable, let alone possible), is 
tremendous.
A case in point is Mr. Kawczynski’s seminal, polemical piece entitled, ‘The Politics of
Romani Politics> (1997), written when he was director of the Roma Participation
Programme (RPP) within OSI-Budapest, as well as being a board member of the ERRC.
His piece raises contentious ethical questions which Romani activists have now begun to
voice openly and more vociferously. For example, he asks just who are Romani and non-
Romani human rights NGOs ultimately responsible to? Their donors, the Romani
communities they seek to assist, and/or the general public? Who decides and who should
decide what the priorities are for the development and emancipation of Roma via NGO
sector work? In trying to address these contentious issues, the issue of strategic alliances
(and the epistemic communities they generate) emerges, along with the fact that these
networks to some extent determine whose interests are ultimately served. Here are
Petrova’s words from her editorial entitled “On Representation”, through which she
attempts to reach some clarity in this area:
Who is in a position to say what is “good” for “the Romani people”? What is 
ERRC’s place in setting the agenda? The ERRC believes that racial discrimination 
in the sense of Article 1 of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) is the daily reality of Roma life in end-of- 
century Europe. Racism degrades not only the disadvantaged minority, but 
members of the majority as well. Those who oppress are not themselves free and 
equal. Racial discrimination is a moral and a legal problem of the majority no less 
than it is a tragedy of the oppressed minority (Petrova 1997: 4).
Though both Roma and non-Roma human rights advocates - including Aladar Horvath
and Dimitrina Petrova — would agree that racism is an ill of the majority society, they
would put forward different remedies. Petrova has emphasized, in the same editorial
above, that though the ERRC does not represent Roma in anyway or speak on their
behalf, nevertheless, as racism is a problem of the majority society as much as it is that of
the minority (Roma), therefore, there is space for an organisation like the ERRC and its
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work, as, it is in serving the ‘broader public interest’ that it fulfills its mission (Petrova 
1999: INT).
Writing five years later on the same, subject, Petrova’s (2003: 22-23) following concerns
about Romani leaders and their alliances with homeless campaigners are symptomatic of
the influence of neoliberalism upon post-socialist political thought:
.. .the Romani movement in Central and Eastern Europe has entered a period of 
consciousness building along identity lines, aimed at mass mobilization and 
political participation. But as with other identity movements in other times and 
places, we have observed the disturbing characteristic trends: an emphasis on 
ideological tenets, a construction of cults of personality, and conversely, creation 
of "enemies of the struggle." The "ideology” emerging within the Romani movement 
contains an emphasis on defending the ethnic line, as well as a preoccupation with poverty as a 
mode of solidarity. Romani leaders in Hungary have sought alliances with, for example, groups 
that defend the homeless. This political cosmology has discovered, in non-Roma defenders of 
Roma rights, a convenient bogey. These and other non-Roma working on various 
aspects of Roma-related issues currently provide a convenient medium through 
which the members of an otherwise fragmented and contentious Romani 
leadership can overcome their differences (italics mine).
If we unpack the critical statement above by Petrova, herself one of the key architects of 
‘Roma rights’ discourse, she appears to be muddling two separate issues. The first is 
about the role of non-Roma within the contemporary Romani movement. While I am in 
agreement with Petrova that a “convenient bogey” is at times generated by Romani 
activists who target non-Romani human rights entrepreneurs, the fact remains that non- 
Roma ‘experts’ continue to exhibit disproportionate power in terms of agenda-setting 
and decision-making at the highest executive levels of INGOs and multilateral 
organizations. The lack of visible Romani moral entrepreneurship in the human rights 
arena may be a factor contributing towards this reality; another may well be the exclusion 
faced by Romani agents in civil society, as described earlier in this thesis.
The second point she raises about the alliance between anti-homelessness activists and 
Roma is likely an offshoot of post-socialist political developments in Hungary. What 
Petrova seemingly fails to apprehend is that an alliance with the homeless is a logical
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consequence of the fact that large numbers of Romani families have been evicted or are 
facing immanent eviction in Europe, and this has resulted in Romani leaders seeking new 
and innovative political alliances (see also COHRE 2004). Furthermore, it appears that 
this is a veiled reference to Horvath’s urban activism, in which he has explicitly made 
connections with homeless and pro-poor agendas. He discusses below his perspective on 
the dilemma of the political passivity of the mass of Roma, in relation to poverty:
One of the major problems is that Roma don’t speak up in politics. They are so 
passive and stay in the countryside. They are not educated or don’t have jobs, and 
the feeling that it is the Roma’s own fault for being marginalised is getting 
stronger. The problem is in the welfare system. Roma are often poor, and poor 
people don’t advance.. .there is abuse of power in the regional [countryside] level. 
We need demonstrations, media campaigns, more people working in the field, 
but for that, a new human sensitivity is needed - a sensitivity for the poor, as well 
as for Roma (Horvath interviewed by Vermaas 2000).
Therefore, given Horvath’s own personal background as a veteran community organizer 
fighting against ghettoization back in the mid-1980s in the industrial town of Miskolc 
(long before Petrova became active in the Romani cause in her native Bulgaria), it would 
seem natural for him to continue to organize around a working class and pro-poor 
agenda in Budapest.
Other issues revolving around the ‘racialisation’ of the rights agenda also emerged in 
Hungary. Already by 1995, three respected social scientists warned against two disturbing 
trends in the NGO sector vis-a-vis Romani issues. They argued against a) ‘rigid ethnic 
coupling’ (eg. ‘Romani-specific’ programmes) as this ultimately results in further 
segregation of Roma from the majority society, and b) the top-down structure of most 
organisations whereby “grants and subsidies are swallowed up at the upper levels, and the 
effect of the organisations’ work remains unnoticeable in the communities living in the 
direst circumstances” (Havas, Kertesi, and Kemeny 1995). The above observations point 
to limitations inherent in the neoliberal pro-voluntas perspective.
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Moreover, though there is at times internal reflection on the work and strategies of the 
ERRC (along with its role in the Romani rights movement), as illustrated by key 
editorials written by Dr. Petrova from the late 1990s in the journal Roma Rights, the 
outcome of these ruminations remain contentious. For example, “On representation” 
makes the explicit assertion that the ERRC is not a Romani organization, but a ‘partner* 
organization in the civil rights movement for Roma. Curiously, this claim was in direct 
contradiction to the views of then board member and Romani activist Rudko 
Kawczynski, who back in 1997, had himself suggested that the ERRC was a ‘model 
Romani rights organization* (Petrova 1997; Kawczynski 1997). Indeed, the Roma rights 
movement continues to be characterised by contentious debates and the production of 
parallel, contradictory views, highlighting the tensions emerging from the neo-colonial 
power relations between elite INGOs (who act as hegemons in the field) and local and 
national Romani NGOs (who represent a ‘subaltern counterpublic* in the Fraserian 
sense).
Furthermore, the ERRC, as an INGO with direct financial sponsorship from OSI-New 
York, is characterised by little oversight or input from Romani communities themselves. 
The presence of several Romani members on the Board of the ERRC does not assuage 
some grassroots Romani activists, who begin to perceive these Roma as elites who are 
beholden to interests outside the community and have become co-opted by the agenda 
of the greater power structure (Anon. 2006: INT).
In contrast, domestic and community-based NGOs, whose work consists of daily 
interaction with the problems and crises faced by ordinary Roma, have far more 
‘informal’ input from the local communities themselves. Both the Romani Foundation 
for Civil Rights and NEKI have branch offices in major cities in the countryside, which 
assist persons in more isolated areas of Hungary. However, there is a clear difference in 
approaches: whereas NEKI’s operations are characterised by a more centralised
operations base (from Budapest), the Romani Civil Rights Foundation’s work is more 
decentralised, with local offices retaining a modicum of autonomy. This has also resulted 
in certain branch offices functioning quite well, with others remaining more or less 
dormant until propelled by the next human rights crisis. As the majority of Roma in 
Hungary (approximately 65%) live in the countryside, in smaller towns and villages 
outside of Budapest, the problem of the communication gap and the resource divide 
between urban and rural areas continues to be a serious challenge.
Another reason for differential access to funding is that donor agencies themselves 
harbour popular (mis) perceptions about Roma. They believe that Roma make difficult 
‘partners’ for projects because of a) internal political imbroglios between different 
factions and leaders, and b) the presumably low level of professionalism and skills 
among Romani-led NGOs (Trehan 2001). This leads to heavier investments in NGOs 
led by non-Roma who are perceived as more ‘politically neutral’ and professional. This 
phenomenon has a tendency to harden prevailing anti-Romani stereotypes in the broader 
society, and reinforce the subordinate access that Romani-led initiatives have to the more 
established philanthropic organisations.90
This same phenomenon is in danger of being replicated within the emerging offices of 
European Union institutions and UN agencies (see, for example, the UNDP’s work on 
poverty reduction), which has during the past five years begun to take an increasing 
interest in economic development and socio-economic rights issues for Roma.
Though they are the exceptions, a tiny group of younger, professionally educated and 
trained Romani advocates in Hungary (several dozen at the most in a population that
90 In contrast, the internal political divisions amongst non-Romani advocates working in the sector, as well 
as allegations o f  their lack o f  professionalism and nepotism within high-profile organizations are many 
times overlooked. Indeed, several directors o f  high-profile organisations working on Romani issues have 
been fired in the past amidst accusations o f  poor management and/or undue personal gain.
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numbers well over 600,000)91 were able to gamer places in Romani-related policy-making 
institutions or within smaller NGOs. In a larger sense, they have been able to leapfrog 
over veterans of Romani emancipation, as donors and intermediary organisations favour 
younger, degree-holding and English-speaking Roma to act as interlocutors in their work 
over the traditional Romani leadership based in both urban and rural areas (Kozma, INT: 
1999; Russinov: INT 1999; Horvath: INT 1999).
6.4 Limitations of the Romani third sector
Though perceived as an unquestionable ‘good’ by early NGO entrepreneurs, it appears 
difficult to suggest that the NGO sector could ever replace the work of a democratically 
functioning state. As a result of the past few decades of US-influenced civil society 
programmes which encouraged the downsizing of the state in favour of managerial 
‘efficiency’, the Hungarian state (like many across the region) employed neoliberal 
arguments in favour of the privatization of the social sector and the expanded role of 
civil society in public services provision (Gowan 1996). Even if we do not subscribe to 
the notion that the post-socialist state has particular social policy obligations towards its 
citizens in key areas (health, education, transport and so on), we can still see the 
limitations of third-sector work in supporting Romani communities in the region. 
Another important factor is that the increasing visibility of NGOs in Hungary, coupled 
with shrinking state power (or the partial abdication of state power to the private sector), 
tends to place pressure on the embryonic civil society for coming up with ‘solutions’, 
including policy design and implementation, solutions for which it does not generally 
have the resources nor the capacity to implement. However, as critical scholarship on 
Roma has demonstrated, and as Romani activists themselves well know, many of these
91 In Hungary, approximately 500 Romani students attend institutions o f  higher education at present. It is 
from this pool o f  people that professional N G O  workers are being recruited.
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problems are structurally determined and cannot be addressed with piecemeal NGO 
projects (cf. Kovats 2003; Kocze 2004: INT; Zoltan 2006).
Both Pinnock (1999) and Wizner (1999) pinpoint several reasons for this: a) many times, 
NGO entrepreneurs and donors subscribe to naive ideological agendas based on popular 
concepts, for example ‘empowerment’, ‘human rights’ or ‘sustainability’, without 
connecting them to the real needs of local communities and b) NGOs ultimately cannot 
be held accountable by citizens as the state can and should be (after all, only the state has 
the power to legislate socio-economic policies whose implementation and realization is 
supported direcdy by tax payer’s contributions). Moreover, NGOs generally do not have 
the large-scale institutional resources which are at the disposal of the state. Essentially, 
NGOs are free agents operating on a voluntary basis, having neither the capacity nor the 
responsibility to ameliorate the structurally embedded socio-economic marginalisation 
that citizens of Romani origin face (cf. Wizner 1999).92 On the other hand, there is also 
the potential danger of the state itself absolving some of its core duties towards its 
citizens.
Finally, as mentioned in earlier chapters on the origins and rise of the movement in 
Hungary, the concept of an ‘empowered mass’ of Roma continues to be missing; the 
contemporary ‘Roma rights’ movement has been maintained as an elite-led movement 
since the mid-1990s , and this points to the structural constraints that poverty itself 
imposes on the vast majority of Roma. The model of an organised, pluralistic, “interest 
group politics” popular in the United States and established EU Member States where 
large numbers of citizens are part of the middle-class and establish lobby groups may not
92He further suggests that a general social programme to integrate economically disadvantaged people 
(interestingly, this is similar to policies attempted by the Kadarist regime before they acknowledged Romani 
ethnicity during late socialism), including the Romani poor, would be far preferable to the current Romani- 
specific trend in N G O  projects and government programmes. Indeed, quite a number o f  Romani leaders 
are wary o f  the long-term effects o f  Romani-specific projects at the societal level, which they believe 
reinforces the implication that they are not part o f  the body politic.
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be the one that serves the Romani communities best. As Cloward and Fox-Piven (1977) 
noted in their seminal work - Poor People’s Movements - marginalized people may prefer to 
engage in a politics of protest because:
It is not possible to compel concessions from elites that can be used as resources 
to sustain oppositional organisations over time (xxi).
In sum, organizing for strategic purposes in opposition to entrenched power structures 
may not be a viable option for subaltern Romani communities, whose precarious 
foothold in mainstream society has to date proscribed the formation of effective lobby 
groups or even popular movements which would mobilize the mass of Roma (cf. 
Nirenberg 2009; Rostas 2009).
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that for many Roma, an important functional 
similarity can be perceived between the state sector and the NGO sectors. Both lead to 
relationships of dependency and patronage that offer sources of income for participants, 
thereby creating loyal constituencies in support of their respective ideological and policy 
agendas. In Hungary, this is illustrated by the MSG system organised by the state on the 
one hand, and the exceptional role of Soros’ OSI on the other, a role which was akin to a 
midwife for Hungarian civil society, as discussed in Chapter 5.
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6.5 Assessing the work of ‘Roma rights* NGOs
In my research into the world of ‘Romani rights’, I found it useful to examine parallels 
between private industry and what I term the ‘human rights industry’ (and specific to 
Roma, the ‘Gypsy industry’). As Welch (2001) notes:
For organisations in the private sector, the metrics of success seem clear: 
profitability, rate of growth, product innovation, market share.. .for organisations 
in the public sector, however, calculations about desired outcomes are both more 
complex -and less clear. Claims of success cannot readily be verified. 
Governments may be unlikely to attribute policy change to NGO pressure...(2- 
3).
Therefore, the question arises: how is ‘success’ or ‘effectiveness’ defined and determined 
by NGO actors themselves, their sponsors, and their critics?
'  Framing ‘effectiveness*
To begin with, as the primary task of human rights NGOs is to hold governments 
accountable for perceived abuses against citizens, scant attention is generally paid by 
NGO entrepreneurs to an assessment and evaluation of their own work. For example, 
with respect to the Autonomy Foundation in Budapest - an elite ‘intermediary’ NGO 
whose annual budget was approximately $1 million in the late 1990s - the income 
generation projects that it sponsored in the rural areas of Hungary were evaluated by 
field monitors (consultants) who oversaw the expenditures and contents of the projects. 
However, their role as a co-ordinating agency for these funds (and a number of other 
projects, for example, the Pakiv World-Bank sponsored programme whose goal is to 
train talented Romani community workers in local development strategies) has not 
undergone a thorough evaluation. Therefore, organisations such as these, whilst fulfilling 
the minimum reporting requirements for their sponsors who are based in New York or 
Bonn, do not face objective scrutiny of their work by donors, and moreover, are 
generally not held accountable by the beneficiary community either (another reason for
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this is the asymmetrical position between the INGO and the subaltern communities they 
purport to assist).
The observations above illuminated some of the structural barriers that Romani actors 
encounter within the work of the NGO sector. Many non-Romani lawyers, advocates, 
and educators from post-socialist Europe were trained in Western Europe or the United 
States, enabling them to gain a command of the English language and the particular 
vernacular of civil society ‘speak’, thus giving them an upper hand in the competition for 
the best jobs within the field. Perhaps most significantly, it is the non-Romani 
participants who have the contacts within the international philanthropic networks. One 
result is that the access to top posts — both technocratic and managerial - are restricted to 
those few Roma who can enter these networks and abide by the (unwritten) rules of the 
game. This is a phenomenon analogous to the ‘glass ceiling’ effect in the United States, 
whereby visible minorities are able to gamer an entry-level position, but then 
progressively encounter stubborn barriers as they aspire for top management posts. 
However, this is not a surprising development: the practice of excluding particular 
minority groups from the civil society arena appears to be the norm globally (see 
Chapters 7 and 8). Ironically, within the third sector, where rhetorical emphasis is placed 
on concepts such as inclusion and transparency, Romani candidates, as outsiders to these 
human rights networks, can be passed over easily (cf. Trehan 2001).
We’re too busy being activists to be scientists!
Another contributing factor to this lack of ‘contestation’, and ideological cross­
fertilisation within the field, is the fact that so many Romani intellectuals are engaged in 
full-time politics and community representation. In other words, those who have 
achieved the highest formal qualifications - the badges of modem society’s cultural 
capital - are precisely the Romani individuals who have the least energy and time to
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engage critically with ‘knowledge generation’ in the field. Having joined the ranks of 
professional bureaucrats and NGO workers employed at the local, national or supra­
national level, they have the least time to comment upon, critically examine or publish 
work that would engage scholars writing about them and their lives or their communities’ 
lives. As Romani sociologist Nicolae Gheorghe, a member of the Romanian Academy of 
Sciences, and one of Europe’s foremost policy-makers on Romani issues (former 
Advisor to the OSCE’s Roma and Sinti Contact Point from 1999-2006) remarked 
candidly, “we’re too busy being activists to be scientists” (Gheorghe 2003: INT). The 
career trajectory of Andor Urmosi, a trained medical doctor of Romani background (he is 
a graduate of a Russian medical college), is a case in point. Though he began his career as 
a practicing doctor, and then as a medical researcher and instructor at the Semmelweiss 
Medical University in Budapest, he also worked for sometime in a Moscow-based 
pharmaceutical company. He then returned to Hungary in the late 1990s to work in the 
Ministry of Education in a top post for Romani integration (Ormos 2000: INT). In 
between, he served as an advisor to the Hungarian National Soros Foundation’s on 
Romani health issues, to which he had contributed considerable expertise, including a 
critical evaluation of health education programmes. Fluent in both Russian and English, 
he impressed upon me how there were very few jobs in Hungary, even for someone with 
his educational and professional qualifications.93
6.6 Advocacy: a forum for common interests?
Despite the number of conflicts that arise internally in the field of ‘Romani rights’, there 
are a number of common interests that almost all human rights actors gather around, and 
which holds the contentious movement together. One is attacking racism within the
93 Indeed, Dr. Urmos is a talented medical researcher who has also conducted epidemiological studies on  
various infectious diseases, including HIV/AIDS.
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government and society at large. When ministers of state make distinctly anti-Gypsy 
public statements or once again, a Romani person becomes a victim of racial violence, 
NGOs and activists take leadership roles and jointly condemn these affronts to dignity. 
Naturally, this is an important function they perform, and it is in these moments, that the 
co-operative impulses amongst NGO actors are best manifested. One example of this 
co-operation was the advocacy work and public demonstration surrounding the 
Szekesfehervar “ghetto affair” led by the Romani Civil Rights Foundation in late 1997 
and early 1998. The actions eventually resulted in the cancellation of a controversial re­
housing programme that would have effectively ghettoised Romani families (Trehan 
2001: 149).
As suggested earlier in the thesis, NGOs and INGOs subscribing to the ‘Roma rights’ 
agenda act as moral entrepreneurs, attempting to expose Europe to its deep and 
pervasive anti-Gypsyism. In the recent past, NGOs active on the international scene such 
as the European Roma Rights Centre and Roma National Congress (based in Hamburg, 
Germany), as well as numerous local and domestic NGOs, have worked to increase 
awareness of issues faced by Romani communities in international forums.94 Problems of 
systemic discrimination in the educational system, access to housing and employment are 
just some of the areas in which national and international Romani rights NGOs have 
made significant interventions. As head of research at ERRC in 2001, Claude Cahn, in 
reference to the lawsuit against the Czech state contesting the placement of Romani 
children in remedial schools, asserted that:
What we’ve done is shift the debate.. .we’ve turned the discourse on the obstacles 
Roma schoolchildren face in the Czech Republic from education to 
discrimination. Nobody thought of it as a discrimination problem (Ross Range 
2001).
94 Both the ERRC and the RNC are openly critical o f  governments in Europe. Many domestic N G O s are 
blocked from doing the same as they obtain funds from the state, concurrent with their official N G O  
status.
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Here, we see a conscious, reflexive attempt on the part of human rights entrepreneurs to 
engage in the discursive battle on ‘the Roma’. However, one contentious outcome has 
been that many east Europeans previously in denial about their own anti-Gypsy 
prejudice, have further solidified their views. This is what J. Kolompar suggests, a 
Romani economist who worked for several years as a civil servant within an autonomous 
public foundation, the Foundation for National Employment (OF A ) (Kolompar 2000: 
INT). He notes that the press coverage given to a group of particularly assertive Roma 
from the village of Zamoly (who eventually received asylum in Strasbourg, on the 
grounds of gross ethnic discrimination by the Hungarian state), has been detrimental to 
Romani-Hungarian relations. He believes that the outcome of the court case stoked the 
fire of anti-Gypsyism even further, solidifying the image of Roma as “ungrateful, 
opportunistic welfare-seekers”, thus resulting in far less sympathy for the Romani cause 
by the Hungarian majority.95 Needless to say, this view is not popular amongst liberal 
‘Roma rights’ activists, who would respond that this is tantamount to ‘blaming the 
victim’. The several (impoverished) Romani families that sought - and successfully 
obtained - asylum in France had been the victims of long-term neglect on the part of 
Zamoly’s officials and long-term racial harassment by other villagers. However, during 
one particular altercation, an ethnic Hungarian’s death was blamed on a Romani man, 
creating enduring tensions in the village (ERRC 2001b).
Another outcome of human rights campaigning by NGOs has been that visible progress, 
if only in legislation, on the ‘integration’ of Roma has become a near pre-requisite for 
European Union accession. As Chirico (2000) has noted, this is despite the fact 
established EU countries themselves (such as Italy and France) engage in patendy
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discriminatory practices against Romani citizens within their own countries (cf. Milne 
2008).
The strong intellectual influences of global human rights advocacy organisations such as 
the International Helsinki Federation, Project on Ethnic Relations, Open Society 
Institute and its affiliates, and press-monitoring organisations such as the Roma Press 
Centre, as well as the commissioning of reports on Roma by governments, multilateral 
agencies (World Bank, International Organisation of Migration, etc.) and NGOs has 
generated a plethora of literature on the human rights situation of Roma.
Interestingly, some high-profile human rights entities (such as Amnesty International) did 
not concern themselves seriously with Romani issues until agents of human rights 
entrepreneurship from Eastern Europe began to raise their voices at the international 
level (United Nations 2000; cf. Klimova 2005).96 Today, however, Amnesty has come full 
circle, and found a place at the heart of the international Romani rights movement, see 
Figure 13 below, which depicts postcards which form part of APs advocacy campaign 
against discriminatory measures by the Italian government.97
96This U N  press release from 2000 gave an overview o f N G O  testimonies before the Committee on the 
Elimination o f  Racial Discrimination (CERD) within the United Nations. The fact that it took Amnesty 
International more than ten years before it became seriously involved in ‘Roma rights’ issues at a global 
level may suggest the subtle bias within Western European human rights circles against engaging in the 
defense o f  Roma (whose human rights were generally invisible within Western Europe itself).
97 On January 19, 2004, Romano Prodi, then President o f the European Commission, gave a talk at the 
LSE entitled “Europe: added value, changing quickly”. In the question and answer session, in response to 
my question about the challenges that the integration o f  Romani citizens posed to the future o f  a unified 
Europe and the role o f  the E U , he agreed that the issue was important within Europe as a whole (although 
he did not offer any specific details on how this could be achieved). Nonetheless, it was the Prodi-led, left- 
of-centre Italian government that would in 2007 begin to clamp down on immigrants, especially Roma 
from Eastern Europe. In 2008, vigilante mobs using molotov cocktails burned down several Romani 
dwellings on the outskirts o f  Napoli and Rome, and AI’s campaign photo depicts this (cf. Milne 2008).
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Figure 14 - Advocacy postcards against Italian government programme of finger­
printing Roma, Amnesty International (2007)
Despite these seemingly positive developments, the majority o f ‘Roma rights’ discourses 
do not directly touch the lives o f most Roma themselves, but rather a narrow group o f 
actors on the national or international human rights stage. In other words, the discourse 
tends to be generated for non-Roma (policy-makers and public officials) by non-Roma 
(human rights entrepreneurs).
These same non-Romani activists as well as Romani leaders reinforce each other’s 
positions and legitimacy within the field: the non-Romani activists, given the imperatives 
o f post-colonial, post-imperial attitudes (or political correctness) assert that their activities 
are ‘in partnership’ with Romani activists and indigenous Romani civil rights initiatives. 
In other words, they suggest publicly that their work is to strengthen the Romani civil 
rights movement. Any dissenting opinions or suggestions that their role is becoming 
hegemonic, and that they are actually suppressing indigenous Romani rights voices is
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discounted or ignored, effectively perpetuating symbolic violence vis-a-vis Roma (Trehan 
and Kocze 2009).
As covered earlier in Chapter 2, the fact that most Roma themselves are marginalised 
from much of this intellectual capital is troubling. This goes back to the question of the 
development of history and of the image/s of historically oppressed peoples. As 
prominent Romani linguist and former member of the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Council Ian Hancock (1998) emphasises, if Romani people themselves are not 
in control of their own representation (history, media, etc.), they will remain trapped 
within outsiders’ definitions and views of their own community, the enlightened 
engagement of liberal non-Roma notwithstanding. Perhaps this development will only be 
reversed once Romani social reformers who are embedded in their local communities 
assert their claims more vociferously at national and international fora, thereby 
influencing policy and pushing political will to reflect their communities’ critical 
priorities, and engaging in their own forms of moral entrepreneurship.
Conclusion: m onitoring the m onitors
At times, activities within the third sector successfully support the Romani movement for 
emancipation, and at other times, they tend to be complicit in ‘neo-colonial’ approaches. 
The empirical evidence indicates that the formation of ‘Roma rights’ constituencies was 
fuelled to a large extent by human rights entrepreneurs and activists who were able to 
generate extensive discourses on the human rights plight of Roma, based on the rising 
racial violence and anti-Gypsyism directed towards them (including systemic 
discrimination which they experienced in access to public life: schools, shops, 
workplaces, discos, restaurants and swimming pools). Moreover, this grievance of racial 
violence was then translated by INGO and NGO movement entrepreneurs as a rationale 
for garnering funds from liberal US and other Western philanthropies, thereby solidifying
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the resource and material bases on which they could promote human rights of Roma and 
push for social change. As some within the movement have suggested, the work of 
‘Roma rights’ runs on its own NGO-centred engine, and moreover, it is not clear to what 
extent the priorities of Romani communities determine its destination. As a World Bank 
employee herself noted in a report on Roma in Central and Eastern Europe, “despite the 
eruption of activity.. .very few initiatives have been evaluated or monitored” (Ringold 
2000). This points to the need for further objective assessment and analysis of the impact 
of ‘Romani rights’ work.
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CHAPTER SEVEN -  POPULAR DISCONTENT: CONSEQUENCES OF 
AND CHALLENGES TO NEOLIBERAL CONCEPTIONS OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS
7.1 Neoliberal transitions: transformation of state-society relations
A  piacga^dasag kemenyebb ellenfelnek bi^ onyiilt, mint agoni^ alo partallam.
The market economy is much more difficult for us to oppose than the oneparty state at death*s 
door — Ferenc Koszeg, Chair of Hungarian Helsinki Committee and founding 
member of SZDSZ (cited in Radai 2004)
The previous chapters in this thesis covered the empirical background of the NGO 
sector in post-socialist Hungary in order to analyze the impact of the neoliberal human 
rights approach vis-a-vis the contemporary Romani rights movement, and to investigate 
its linkages with the rise of human rights entrepreneurship, a development which forms 
part of the broader trajectory of neoliberal democratization in the region. Key questions 
raised in my research were the following: Whose order and whose interests are reflected 
in the neoliberal human rights approach manifested in the Homani rights’ movement? 
Equally importantly, what have its consequences been and are there alternatives to its 
current trajectory?
In discussing ‘neoliberal’ human rights concepts, reference was made to a phenomenon 
wherein human rights concerns and campaigning operate synergistically within a liberal 
capitalist system, becoming an arm of the contemporary global neoliberal economic and 
political order. Neoliberal economic theory became the basis for the dominant socio­
economic development model in post-socialist east and central Europe in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s - and indeed - the basis for a hegemonic socio-political order throughout 
the globe (Bourdieu 1998; Hardt and Negri 2000; Gill 2004; Guilhot 2005). This 
particular model is generally anti-statist in the sense that it believes that the state should
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have a limited role in the regulation of the private sector, and its appeal within post­
socialist Hungary (and other central European countries) unsurprisingly derives from the 
public repudiation of Marxism-Leninism in the 1980s, along with their particular history 
of ‘passive revolutions> which led to the demise of communist one-party systems (Gill
2004). Neoliberal thought — whose founding fathers included prominent intellectuals 
such as Von Hayek, Popper and Nozick — was advocated most vociferously by the 
‘Vienna’ and ‘Chicago’ schools of economic philosophy, and tailored itself well to a 
liberal political theory focusing on the development of modem centralized nation-states 
and the erosion of individual autonomy. In part, this resulted from their negative 
experiences of WWII and the dangers of the totalitarian state as experienced under the 
Third Reich. Contemporary neoliberals, such as George Soros, therefore, have long held 
that the “twin pillars of the so-called open society are expansive individual rights and 
freedoms as well as unrestricted free markets” (Chen and Churchill 2005: 3-4). Specific 
mention of Soros is made here because - more than any other single benefactor - he has 
been responsible for (through the OSI) the support and promotion of Romani and 
Romani-focused NGOs today, organizations which form the backbone of the 
movement.98
As Seckinelgin (2002) has correctly observed, the transformation of relations between 
state and society (including the private sector) along the lines of neoliberal imperatives, 
has been one substantive result of the influence of international (mainly Western) donors 
in developing or transitional societies. In his assessment of World Bank reports written
98 Indeed, in special recognition o f  his contributions to the Romani movement, Soros was presented with a 
t-shirt with the caption ‘Romano chavo’ (Romani lad) by the ERTF head, Rudko Kawczynski, at the EU  
Brussels Summit in September 2008. See the full text o f  Soros’ keynote speech at the Summit at: 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/roma/articles publications/articles/roma 20080916.
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by international donors/policymakers, he emphasizes that neoliberal approaches to civil 
society:
...attempt to realign social relations within developing countries parallel to the 
western liberal model of social arrangements between state, market and the third 
sector (2002: 1).
In the case of post-socialist Hungary today, this liberal ‘realignment’ or restructuring of 
state, market and third sector relations may well be nearing completion; nonetheless, for 
many Romani Hungarians (and other citizens of Hungary) it is questionable whether this 
new “arrangement” has been beneficial.
7.2 Neoliberal trajectories of human rights
Liberals have always claimed, that the liberal state — reformist, legalist, and somewhat 
libertarian — was the only state that could guarantee freedom. Andfor the relatively small group 
whose freedom it scfeguarded this was perhaps true. But unfortunately that group always 
remained a minority perpetually en route to becoming eveyone.
- Wallerstein (1995: 2), dted in Farmer (2003)
To a large extent, the neoliberal approach towards human rights works hand-in-glove 
with the dominant discourse on ‘civil society’ which began to permeate the Hungarian 
NGO sector in the 1990s. Along with its equally protean twin ‘democratisation’, both are 
highly contested terms within the globalised discourse on human rights today. As I 
deconstructed these terms and contextualised their local applications in previous 
chapters, I would like to make two key points here. First of all, their general popularity 
and relative lack of contestation within post-socialist states have been direct results of the 
ideological and material dominance of American human rights networks throughout the 
‘transition’, and secondly, these terms themselves have been grounded on a relatively 
narrow understanding of democracy and human rights to begin with. They were based 
on ‘Washington consensus’ approaches to democratisation which sought to weaken the 
control of the state itself within transitional democracies of the region and, in so doing,
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spur the civil society and private sectors, hence bringing countries such as Hungary 
firmly in the sphere of global capital (cf. Gowan 1996; Chandhoke 2003).
Picking up on the first point above, there were several reasons why former dissidents in 
post-socialist states believed they were compelled to adopt a language and philosophy of 
human tights commensurate with their Euro-adantic donors, and did so with only 
minimal resistance to the prevalent neoliberal framework of human rights, even when 
they had serious doubts about the methods and means of their Western benefactors (cf. 
Pinnock 2005). Petrova, the director of the ERRC until December 2006, explains the 
rationale for this development as she narrates the relative passivity and silence of east 
European human rights activists during the particularly testy time of the controversial 
NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo (then part of Serbia and Montenegro)99:
...three additional factors overwhelmed the judgment of human rights 
organizations in Eastern Europe. First, eastern European states had opted for 
NATO membership. The human rights community in these countries was 
therefore afraid of compromising their respective national chances of being 
admitted to the alliance if they criticized NATO. Second, the very status and jobs 
of most human rights activists were made possible by the generous support of 
Western, particularly American, donors. Without their continued support, the future of 
the human rights movement would be uncertain. Third, the human rights community in 
our region was caught in the sinking ship of cold war logic. Human rights 
activists feared that whatever they said would immediately place them in one of 
two camps — for or against NATO. If one is against NATO, one sides with 
Russia and China and therefore is an enemy to democracy (Petrova 1999, italics 
mine).
Moreover, she notes the “lack of leadership” from the more established NGOs in the 
West, whose response to the violent NATO bombing campaign was mild at best. The 
overwhelming feeling of powerlessness and lack of agency on the part of Eastern
99 One o f  the unintended consequences o f  this neoliberal humanitarian intervention’ was that 
approximately 75% o f K osovo’s pre-war Romani population was ethnic cleansed and/or internal 
displacement within Serbia (an estimated 60,000 people, see the website for the N G O  ‘Chachipe ’ [Truth]  for 
recent information on the plight o f  these communities, http://romarights.wordpress.com/. The wisdom o f  
the NATO  bombing in K osovo was the subject o f  heated public discussions between Neier and Soros 
which I witnessed during the summer o f  1999 at the OSI Jamboree (annual meeting o f  Soros’ N G O  
employees) in Budapest. Moreover, former Czech PM, Vaclav Havel also raised grave doubts about the 
bombing campaign when he presented the keynote address at the Central European University’s 
graduation ceremonies in the summer o f  1999, which I also attended.
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European activists at this time (who felt divided and uneasy about NATO’s military 
intervention in the Balkans), as well as their inability to construct alternative discourses 
and practices of human rights (‘without x, y is uncertain’, as Petrova relayed above) 
demonstrates how this resulted in an implicit embrace of neoliberal approaches to human 
rights intervention. Aware of their financial dependency on primarily American 
foundations whose orientations - implicitly or explicitly - were pro-free market and 
limited to procedural democracy, activists in Eastern Europe had difficulty in 
constructing other viable means for their human rights organizing. Therefore, they were 
neither able to generate the methods, nor the tools, that would liberate them from a 
reliance on a model of human rights which was hostage to neoliberal logic.
This reiterates the crucial point about the narrowly conceived notion of ‘democracy’ and 
‘democratization’ within the neoliberal model. Though there is a vast critical literature on 
the contentiousness of the concept of democracy (especially from ‘Third World’ 
democratic perspectives outside the Euro-Atlantic ‘Washington consensus’ sphere of 
influence), unsurprisingly, these works have not enjoyed significant purchase in a region 
which was hurriedly removing the remnants of another problematic ideology, that is, 
communism. As a result, alternative discourses and practices that were pro-working class 
and questioned exploitative forms of globalization, such as that promoted by Horvath of 
the Roma Foundation for Civil Rights or philosopher Miklos Gaspar Tamas, a former 
leftist MP who became a leading member of Attac (part of the tiny Left-Green 
progressive movement in Hungary)100 - did not have a significant impact on the 
prevailing conceptualizations of ‘Roma rights’ strategies as promoted by human rights 
entrepreneurs throughout the 1990s. Perhaps missing in their efforts was what Spivak
100 A ttac was founded in France and stands for the Association pour la taxation des transactions financierespour 
Faide aux citoyens and it was originally founded as a group fighting against currency speculation. See also 
http://www.attac.hu/cikk.php3Pid article=1123 for a recent piece by Tamas.
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(2009) has referred to in a recent public address as “subaltern educational activism”, 
conceived of as a synergistic relationship between intellectuals (such as the erudite 
Tamas) and subaltern communities and representatives of Roma in Hungary.
The lack of effective resistance to the hegemonic status quo also characterizes the 
Romani leadership (both traditional community leaders and those who represent NGOs) 
who are engaged in the human rights movement for Roma. Acton and Gheorghe (2001), 
long-term scholar-participants in the movement offer one salient explanation:
.. .in seeking legitimacy for their struggle, Roma politicians have no choice but to 
lock onto the same concepts of human rights and anti-racism that operate in 
international organizations and relations between existing states (2001).
Alternatives to the current order have yet to be articulated (or as some suggest, even 
formulated) because of the current grip of the neoliberal approach on the human rights 
arena which poses obstacles to (re)conceptualizations of Romani organizing and, by 
extension, the development of a more emancipatory form of politics. Part of the reason 
for this, as mentioned above, has been the dismissal of Romani agency by elites - both 
Roma and non-Roma - within the movement itself (Trehan 1999, 2001; Oprea 2005; 
Zoltan 2006).
7.3 Consequences of the ‘rule-of-law* approach: legislation and litigation
It is the most wonderful task of lawyers to seek new techniques of democracy. ..The limits of the 
performance of law warn us that one cannot expect law alone to realise democracy. Taw can 
always provide only a frame, patterns, ways and methods, [law can only] carve the bed of the 
river - Bama Horvath (1945), TDemokracia esjog/Democracy and Taw\ Budapest 
University lecture, cited in Halmai (1995).
As mentioned in Chapters 5 and 6, the movements for democratic reforms in post­
socialist Hungary have, to a large extent, been based on the strategic adoption of ‘rule-of- 
law’ and ^ 1x1 0 0 ^ 83110^  principles as promoted by liberal reformers, the OSI, its
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affiliates, and other INGOs.101 Harvey (2005) has suggested that these principles - 
adopted within the polities of transition countries - have been commensurate with the 
neoliberal policy imperatives of global Western institutions such as the World Bank and 
IMF.
Within Hungary, there were two key components to these liberal reforms: legislation and 
litigation. The first one resulted in the introduction of pro-minorities, legislation, data 
protection acts (which prohibit keeping criminal records on the basis of ethnic criteria), 
liberalization of laws on media, education, and financial areas. As mentioned earlier in 
this thesis, laws which have specifically impacted Romani Hungarians include the Law on 
National and Ethnic Minorities (1993), which ultimately laid the groundwork for the 
MSG system, as well as the anti-discrimination legislation from 2003 which focuses on 
equal opportunities, and is meant to act as a bulwark against employment discrimination. 
This second piece of legislation was actively lobbied for by liberals and INGOs affiliated 
with OSI programmes and left-liberal political parties in Hungary, and indicates their 
belief in the law as a progressive force for Roma, hence their view on the law as ‘a tool 
for social change’ (cf. Petrova 1999: INT). Former legal director of the ERRC, Goldston 
explains:
.. .one of the challenges here of the ERRC and I think also some other legal 
organisations in this field is that not only are they fighting.. .for the specific cause 
for Roma to be treated as equal and dignified human beings, they are also 
fighting for another cause.. .a broader cause.. .which is can the rule-of law really 
mean something? Everyone talks about the rule-of-law in Central and Eastern 
Europe at this time of transition, but can the courts actually provide remedy for 
people who are victims of human rights abuse on a regular basis? Can the court 
system work? Can the legal system be made to work for people and that is a 
fascinating challenge, a difficult challenge, that too, is a problem of decades and 
centuries in the making.. .(1999: INT).
101 The writings o f  Popper and Hayek were strong influences upon its founder, Hungarian-American 
billionaire philanthropist George Soros, who was a student o f  Popper’s at LSE. See Guilhot (2005) for 
more details o f  Soros’ ideological development.
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These were indeed the key questions on the minds of domestic human rights 
entrepeneurs at the time. Hungarian lawyers and constitutional experts such as Imre 
Furmann, Gabor Halmai, Bea Bodrogi, and Lflla Farkas - all of whom worked tirelessly 
to instill rule-of-law principles within the Hungarian judicial system - became architects 
and front-line workers who would take on ‘test-case* litigation. As mentioned earlier, 
American-style litigious interventions espoused by human rights entrepreneurs such as 
Aryeh Neier (cf. 2004) permeated the emerging rights sector in Hungary, and though 
‘partnerships* were forged with these domestic human rights entrepreneurs, the overall 
approach to social justice was a narrow legalistic one. Moreover, the implicit policy­
making role of the legal approach became explicit as ‘test-case’ litigation was many times 
used deliberately to set a precedent, and act as an engine for future legislative change. 
This occurred most successfully in the case of the Equal Opportunities legislative 
provision enacted in 2003.
Limitations of legalistic approaches
There are three key limitations to the legalistic approaches highlighted above. Firsdy, the
ideological singularity or conformity resulting from the embrace of legalism results in
conceptual blindspots, as Woodiwiss (2006) relates below:
... [the] pursuit of a purely legalistic and especially of a purely civil and political 
legalistic strategy not only cannot be enough to secure global respect for human 
rights but also is not in fact regarded as sufficient by the majority of the world’s 
population.. .this is because, as the social products of particular times and places, 
rights in general and the present array of human rights in particular are blind to 
certain sources of both abuse and virtue (46).
As mentioned in Chapter 6, various ‘Roma tights* practices and strategies sought to gain 
‘justice* for Roma through primarily legal avenues which focused on civil and political 
tights attainment in the past fifteen years. The development of employment 
opportunities and other socio-economic priorities took a back seat to the attainment of 
civil and political tights from the period of early transition to the time of European
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Union accession. Though in the late 1990s, an emphasis on the ‘extreme poverty’102 
within Romani communities surfaced within the ‘Roma rights’ discourse, this was fully 
ten years after the birth of ‘Roma rights’. Moreover, it has only been in the past several 
years that the core issue of economic integration has been granted more weight, and thus 
the connections between increasing Romani exclusion from the mainstream economy, 
increasing impoverishment of whole communities, and increasing anti-Gypsy hostility have 
begun to be acknowledged in public debates (cf. Sigona and Trehan 2009). Therefore, 
issues of socio-economic justice, when addressed, were generally peripheral to the 
discourse, and this is was in large part the result of the ideological hegemony of 
neoliberal rights discourses.
Building upon the social constructionist theme from earlier in this thesis, Woodiwiss 
(2006) suggests that human rights regimes and practices are themselves socially 
contructed; hence, if we examine who the architects of these ‘regimes of rights’ are today 
in post-socialist Hungary, few subaltern names will appear on the list. Critical Romani 
activists such as Kocze and Kozma (2004: INT; 1999: INT) posit that resources currently 
funnelled into legal interventions could be better utilised by providing Roma with the 
necessary tools (for example, targeted skills’ training and educational enhancement) to 
eradicate the sources of their disadvantage in co-operation with local (Hungarian) 
communities, rather than conducting human rights research and engaging in litigation 
alone. The result is that the socio-economic priorities of Roma are often only 
superficially addressed by the piecemeal interventions of human rights entrepreneurs 
(Trehan 2001; Zoltan 2006). What remains to be more fully addressed in the public 
discourse is the critical observation that the financial and intellectual resources ploughed
102A term used by international multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and Council o f  Europe. 
Recently, international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) have begun to take an active interest in the European Roma.
See, for example, Ringold, Orenstein, and Wilkens (2003) Roma in an Expanding Europe: Breaking the 
Poverty Cycle (Washington D.C.: The World Bank).
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into the development of a human rights movement for Roma were in reality severely
disconnected from the aforementioned socio-economic realities. Dominated by human
rights entrepreneurs from the United States after 1995, the ideological make-up of the
human rights movement for Roma became restricted, and even limiting, as it did not
allow for diverse and creative forms of emancipatory action, whether it was through the
dialogical development of community projects or through the construction of transversal
political linkages with other groups and communities in the broader society.
Another core drawback of narrow legalism is the differential access to legal mechanisms
and the political process that subaltern groups face. Human rights lawyer Goldston
(1999) himself has highlighted the gaps between lawyers and their Romani clients,
particularly when it comes to the use of existing legal provisions. He notes:
...one o f the biggest gaps that has to be overcome and this is the gap between largely non- 
Roma lawyers and largely non-lawyer Roma...and in evaluating the success o f action 
today.. .the Assenov case.. .is a huge, huge success in legal terms in that it has re-written 
Article 3 o f the European Convention...for Roma it's an enormous, potentially 
enormous decision because systematically, Roma have been and still generally...do not 
receive the same treatment when they come into police offices and prosecutors’ offices 
and investigators’ offices and complain that they have been victims o f crime. This 
decision makes it clear that when people come to complain and make credible 
allegations, the authorities cannot just sit back and do nothing. If  they do that, they may 
well be in violation of the European Convention. Now that's a powerful, powerful legal 
tool and it's a powerful expansion of the Convention wrought by one case.. .the extent 
to which it has meaning in process, however, depends on our ability to connect the law to reality 
and that depends to a large extent on what the nature o f the lawyers and the Roma 
community are like...The decision to date has been lauded by lanyers, lauded by advocates.. .but 
most Roma donft know about it, thy don't know about it.. .(Goldston 1999: INT, italics mine).
Here, Goldston is suggesting that legal provisions such as Article 3 would not be 
adequate enough to protect subaltern Roma, particularly as most do not even know of its 
existence. Furthermore, with respect to post-socialist Hungary, though there are now 
legal offices in many of the cities across the country, only those Romani individuals or 
families who obtain the support of organisations like ERRC or NEKI (such as provision 
of pro-bono legal services) would be able to overcome the inherent problem of access 
rooted in a lack of resources. However, what about Roma who do manage to gain pro-
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bono legal aid? Adding to the costs of a legal procedure are numerous ‘hidden* costs 
such as time lost from work, transportation, and so forth, not to mention the 
psychological toll of a time-consuming litigation procedure.
In addition, the invisible power asymmetries embedded in the whole legal process rarely
go mentioned. In a critical reflexive piece on the interventions of legal professionals,
human rights lawyer Barbora Bukovska (2006), who herself has litigated in some
landmark Romani cases, has this to say about legal procedures:
.. .litigation concentrates [the] agenda in the hands of elites — lawyers; victims, 
[who] are often uneducated with little or no understanding of the law assume a 
subordinated position with regard to tactics and strategy after human rights 
advocates decide on litigation. Once victims are confronted with a mysterious 
legal procedure and complicated legal language, their ‘fate is no longer in their 
hands*, as advocates as specialists automatically take over their problems (italics 
in original).
The above insight on the imbalance of power in the relationship between non-Romani 
lawyers and their Romani clients reveals the subaltern position of Romani human rights 
victims103 who, from the outset of a legal process taken up on their behalf - often 
initiated by an INGO lawyer or researcher seeking out a victim for a specific test case for 
‘impact litigation* purposes - exercise little control over both the input and the outcome 
of proceedings. After the court proceedings are over, many Roma continue to live lives 
of poverty and exclusion, their rooted position of disadvantage essentially unchanged. 
Indeed, some Romanies even risk becoming local or national scapegoats if there is a 
backlash stemming from the majority, as happened with the Zamoly Roma mentioned 
earlier in the thesis, for whom asylum was successfully obtained in France after a court 
procedure. This is another area where, as Bukovska (2006) correctly points out, there is 
currently a lack of ethical responsibility on the part of human rights lawyers in the region,
i°3  The term ‘victim’ can be problematised, however, it is used here genetically in reference to a person 
suffering from a human rights abuse. There is a large literature on the subject o f  victims and their agency, 
see for example, Elias (1986) on the politics o f  victimisation.
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since even basic respect for the victims is often missing during the case preparation 
process, and litde follow-up is conducted afterwards (cf. Zoltan 2006; see also Appendix 
#3 on interviewing victims of human rights abuses and trauma and Appendix #7 on the 
Zamoly Roma).
The final point about legalism is that both legal victories and changes in the law can be 
perceived as substitutes for changes at the level of society. This type of thinking was 
epitomized by former Hungarian Ambassador Jeszensky, who, in vociferously denying 
charges of institutional racism in his country, pointed to Hungary’s pro-minorities 
legislation (see Appendix #4). The conventional wisdom in majority Hungarian society 
goes something like this, ‘Roma have all the legal protections they could want, our society 
is free of racism (and therefore the effects of prejudicial treatment)!’.
As a result, engineering respect for the ‘human rights of Roma’ through purely litigious 
means is wholly inadequate as perceptions embedded within social customs can only be 
changed through transforming relations and working assiduously towards a reduction in 
social distance between Romani Hungarian citizens and other citizens of society by 
fostering mutual respect. Moreover, legal reforms and ‘democratisation’ only go so far in 
transforming anti-Gypsy racism in Hungarian society, as one Romani speaker eloquendy 
attested to before the Hungarian Parliament on ‘Roma Day’ in April 2000. He detailed 
how ‘hidden’ discrimination could not be overcome by institutional interventions alone:
.. .historical discrimination is [the] result of all those actions and also the social 
attitudes throughout history which resulted in disadvantages, but they were legal 
in their own era [thus], it was not illegal treatment, as it wasn’t against the law. 
This resulted in an accumulation of disadvantage of certain groups. Despite the equal 
treatment required by law, it still resulted in disadvantages of groups in societies.
.. .The social aid [given] to Roma - the socpol - would not allow them to step up 
from one to two. The only way they could do this would be if they got a loan, 
and most don’t have a job, there is really high unemployment, they couldn’t make 
mortgage payments. Therefore, this would result in disproportionate discrimination. 
Within the primary school system of education, there is another destructive effect 
of hidden discrimination, a psychologically destructive effect, which hurts their 
human dignity.. .1 also believe this is intentional, and only formulated as hidden 
discrimination, as it builds on attitudes of discrimination. We clearly see and feel
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its destructive effects.. .this results in these people losing their chances, their 
hope, and [thereforey the tools of law are not effective in this.. .nor is the system of justice. 
This is a legal gap.. .we have to admit that even thejustice system is a partner in this [even the 
justice system solidifies the discrimination]. The institutions are not effective in combating hidden 
discrimination (Setet 2000) [italics mine].
The speaker above articulates clearly the basic problem of what Woodiwiss (2006) 
identified earlier, that is, how laws are social constructs and how subaltern groups 
themselves (such as Roma) face structural impediments to becoming participants in their 
construction.
7.4 Popular discontent: the limits of ‘Roma rights*
...the metaphor of the “[human rights] box” encompasses a set of historical and structural 
circumstances that allow the human rights framework to gain currency among elites while 
limiting advances, and even creating setbacks, for the awareness and acceptance of human rights 
among the generalpopulation.
— Human Rights Dialogue, Carnegie Council on Ethics and International 
Affairs (2000)
.. from being the insurgent creed of activists during the Cold War, human rights has become 
“mainstreamed” into the policy framework of states, multilateral lending institutions like the 
World Bank, and the United Nations itself.
- Ignatieff (2001: 22)
Whilst Romani masses remain marginalised from accessing even the most basic of 
human goods as a result of their impoverished circumstances, initiatives by the state 
generally result in co-option and division of Romani leadership, for example, the MSG 
system mentioned earlier (Kovats 1998, 2001c; Koulish 2005). Hegemonic voices, such 
as that of the Soros Foundations, argue for a ‘pluralistic approach’, implying that the 
complex problems that confront European Roma can be ameliorated through a plurality 
of actors and approaches within an ‘open’ civil society. Nonetheless, this perspective on 
Romani mobilisation ignores the subaltern position of Roma in society (including civil 
society). Pluralism works, if and only if, there is a somewhat level ‘playing field’, some 
approximation of equal access to the goods within the citizenship bundle, where various
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actors can access and contribute to freely. Roma in post-socialist European countries 
such as Hungary do not enjoy such a ‘privilege’.
With respect to post-1995 developments, it is useful to make a further comparison with 
Kovats’ (1998) doctoral research, in which he demonstrated that rising expectations 
among Roma after the enactment of the 1993 Law and Ethnic and National Minorities 
eventually resulted in disappointment with the implementation of the Gypsy MSG 
system. Parallel to this development, my research has suggested that the human rights 
framework promoted by NGOs since 1995 also raised expectations for Roma, resulting 
in disillusionment and skepticism with NGO projects as a vehicle for achieving their 
goals of integration and equality.
After two decades of neoliberal INGO-supported human rights activities in Hungary, 
community-level tensions, as well as the social distance between Roma and non-Roma, 
rather than having decreased, as some analysts of ‘democratisation’ predicted would 
happen (with the consolidation of human rights norms proceeding in linear fashion in 
the newly accessed EU countries), have actually increased in a number of alarming ways 
(HVG  2006). During the prime ministership of FIDESZ’ Viktor Orban from 1998 to 
2002, the far-right Party for the Hungarian Truth and Life — an openly anti-Semitic and anti- 
Gypsy party - held twelve seats in the Hungarian Parliament. Moreover, since the late 
1990s, the arenas of anti-Gypsyism have expanded to include online chatrooms and 
workers’ unions (such as the police officers’ union, which has made an unofficial pact 
recently with Jobbik, the far-right party).104 Even more alarming were the incidents of 
vigilante gunmen who brutally murdered several Roma in premeditated hate crimes in 
2008 and 2009 (cf. Dowling 2009).
104 Jobbik (‘Movement for a Better Hungary*) garnered 3 seats in the recent EP elections in June 2009, along 
with nearly 15% o f  the country’s vote. See their website, where they are stoking a race war between Roma 
(Gypsies) and Hvulgarians http://www.jobbik.com/?page_id=486.
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The social distance between Roma and the majority population (in Hungary, but also 
elsewhere in Europe) remains entrenched (HVG 2006). Trials in court rooms do not 
always result in “justice” per se, as a primarily litigious approach does not work to 
ameliorate the roots of anti-Gypsyism embedded within society. Indeed, Hungarian 
society has begun reacting against ‘Roma rights' by suggesting that Roma are now 
favoured subjects of government programmes, and that affirmative-action type policies 
are unwarranted (the Roma being an undeserving population for this special attention). 
The human rights shell remains empty for the vast majority of Roma. It is almost as if 
the Romani movement (an assemblage of professional Romani human rights workers 
and non-Romani human rights entrepreneurs), live this parallel existence with the mass 
of Roma before them, in their putative “fight for Roma rights”, but have been unwilling 
to make the necessary connections about the terrible socio-economic deprivation 
experienced through poverty, disease, and lack of opportunities which are structurally 
determined (and hence must be approached comprehensively, with the engagement and 
investment of broader structures of governance).
7.5 The Management of Roma
jT]be substitution of elite interests for universal human rights becomes characteristic of the
neoliberal order and forms the basis of neoliberal rights norms —Churchill & Chen (2005)
As shown in this thesis, the proliferation of US-funded NGOs who embraced neoliberal 
ideological frameworks in their modus operandi (such as litigation based on the ethos of 
law as salvation' and the creation of managerial technocracies within their 
organizations)105 was symptomatic of the broader interests of Euro-atlantic elites
105This is the model that was espoused by ERRC’s former director, Dimitrina Petrova, and has also been 
one o f  the legacies o f  N G O s such as HRW, which is closely affiliated to the OSI as a result o f  the Neier- 
Soros nexus (Petrova 2003).
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attempting to manage (or pacify, as some activists suggest) marginalised Romani 
communities perceived as unstable and potentially dangerous to the ‘democratic’ order o f 
transitional democracies. Nonetheless, this is not so straightforward, as the ‘management 
of Roma’ agenda appears to be concealed within a cosmopolitan, progressive shell in 
which the strengthening of democratic institutions and civil and political rights is 
espoused.
THE GLOBAL 
COMPACT
Employing the Roma
Insights from
UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and  the  CIS
Figure 15 - UNDP partnering with Ernst & Young, guide booklet for Romani 
employment: neoliberal ethos in action? (2005)
The photo cover above is from a UNDP/Ernst & Young guide booklet entitled 
‘Employing the Roma: insights from Business.’ It is an attempt by the corporate sector to 
become involved in job creation by encouraging MNCs in the region to hire Roma, and 
it also supplies concrete examples of several MNCs in the region (in Hungary, Slovakia 
and Czech Republic) who have had both positive and negative experiences with Romani 
employees and their (re)training.
During the past fifteen years in post-socialist, transitional European societies, these types 
of neoliberal trajectories have had profound implications for the design and 
implementation of Romani projects and initiatives, resulting in the consolidation of 
initiatives launched by the World Bank, the OSI, the EU and the UN with an elite 
donor’s conference in Budapest in 2004, and referred to as the ‘Decade of Roma 
Inclusion: 2005-2015’ (Templer 2006; cf. Guy 2009; see also Figure 15 above). Though 
rarely broached, the politics and power asymmetries surrounding the Decade initiative 
are worth considering. Despite the considerable media coverage that the initiative - 
encompassing integration projects for Romani communities worth millions of euros - has 
received over the two years since its inception, and the ‘politically correct’ motto on their 
website “Nothing about us, without us”, few Romani NGOs working at the community 
level were invited to the preliminary design meetings, and participation was based on 
selective criteria, thereby ensuring that the diversity of human rights perspectives would 
remain altogether ‘manageable’ by its elite sponsors (Dzeno Foundation 2005; TOL
2005).106
106 Here is a key extract from the Decade o f  Roma Inclusion’s “Vision and Values statement”, available at 
www.romadecade.org: “Nothing about us without us: Roma participation will make or break the Decade. 
Roma representatives and civil society organizations are involved in every stage o f  the Decade. Roma 
shaped and defined the vision from the very outset. Roma dvil society groups and experts identified policy 
priorities and played a key role in defining Decade goals and targets. Roma participation will be central to 
regular oversight and monitoring o f  the process over the next ten years.”
214
Revolving around the core ideologies underlying the actions and policies of INGO actors 
in the field of human rights for Roma, one of my key findings (covered at length in 
Chapters 5 and 6) has been that the ideological stakes that NGO entrepreneurs built in 
the past decade are now closely enmeshed with material stakes such as the perpetuation 
of institutions and the promotion of careers. These developments within the arena of ‘Roma 
rights * may well reinforce the widening gap between the actual material needs of Roma and their 
aspirations for achieving equality as the liberal human rights framework in which Roma rights’ is 
enmeshed is itself embedded within a global neoliberal order. This reflects the paradoxical nature 
of human rights, or what Young has referred to as “a persistent negotiation between 
claim and practice within specific historical moments’* as the alleged neoliberal “promise 
of open society and small government is thus deferred in favor of security and continuity 
of rule” (Young 2000: 5, cited in Chen and Churchill 2005).
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CHAPTER EIGHT -  CONCLUSION: THE MORAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
OF THE ROMANI SUBALTERN
Our system is one of detachment: to keep silenced people from asking questions, to keep the 
judged from judging, to keep solitary people from joining together, and the soul from putting 
together its pieces.
- Eduardo Galeano, “Divorces” (cited in Farmer 2003)
The centralpoint.. .is that human history is made by human beings and since the struggle for 
control over territory is part of that history, so too is  the struggle over historical and 
social m eaning. The task of the critical scholar is not to separate one struggle from the 
other, but to connect them (bold mine)... - Edward Said, “Orientalism” (2003: 331- 
332)
In quoting Said (2003) above, I wish to emphasize that the struggle for “territory” is not 
merely a struggle over a physical entity, but over symbolic and ideological terrain as well, 
including the images of particular subaltern groups and their struggles (cf. Hancock
1997). This insight also applies to another contentious arena: that of human rights 
mobilization on behalf of Roma in post-socialist Hungary, and I have identified one 
aspect of this as ‘human rights entrepreneurship’. As this thesis demonstrates, the field of 
human rights is not an unproblematic arena: it is a complex site of multiple power 
struggles (ideological, material, and political), which are many times waged amongst 
‘unequals’ (cf. Kennedy 2004).
In his magisterial essay on Romani contributions to the Hungarian labour market, 
journalist and Pulitzer Prize-winning writer, the late Zsolt Csalog (1994) exposed the 
history of Romani political economy in an eerily similar fashion to W.E.B. Dubois’ own 
insightful sociological narratives of African-American economic contributions at the turn 
of the 19th century during the post-civil war Reconstruction era (Dubois 1935, 1962, 
1992). This rich history of Romani Europeans is far more compelling than standard 
reductive accounts, suggestive of the conviviality developed through the shared 
lifeworlds of the Rom and the Magyar, in spite of the enormous odds from the Romani 
side. Furthermore, he exhorted his Hungarian readers:
216
...to keep in mind that our generation’s image of Gypsies does not reflect an 
‘ancient’ condition, but is a profound and general side effect of downward 
mobility: ‘decent’ poverty has been exchanged for a slum — the lamentable result 
of a people’s historic catastrophe (Csalog 1994: 75-76).
Based on this essay, as well as extracts from other scholars, I generated a chronology of 
Romani economic contributions in Hungary which provides an overview of the role of 
Romani-Magyar relations historically, offering testimony to the forms of Romani 
persecution and mistreatment, but also to centuries of conviviality and contributions of 
Romani Hungarians (see Appendix #1).
Synopsis of key findings
In this thesis, I followed the development of a specific type of Orientalism to have 
emerged in Europe vis-a-vis Roma - Gypsylorism - and suggested that its legacy 
continues to have a profound impact today in the area of Romani studies. I also 
contextualised critical theories on civil society and the public sphere, and their 
applicability to the lifeworld of human rights entrepreneurs operating in post-socialist 
Hungary in the ‘Roma rights’ movement, demonstrating how within post-socialist civil 
society, Roma occupy the position of subalterns.
In conducting a historical overview on the discursive constructions surrounding Roma 
communities in Hungary from the 1960s to the 1980s, and focusing on the primary ideas 
and ideologies of the socialist era, I uncovered the pivotal role of social scientists and 
Romani dissidents in the construction and (de)construction of the ‘Gypsy problem’ or 
(or ‘Gypsy question’) discourse. Within the socialist press, an analysis of the voices of 
prominent Hungarian intellectuals (some of whom were key dissidents and Roma) and 
state officials (within the communist party) who constructed public narratives on the 
integration of Roma, revealed a surprisingly open discussion on Romani poverty and
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social deprivation during the socialist era in the 1970s and 1980s, highlighting various 
discursive continuities up to the present day.
Post-1989 Hungary witnessed a dramatic rise in the number of domestic NGOs and 
INGOs which embraced the tools of neoliberal human rights advocacy. The thesis 
described how domestic Romani activists began to contest violence and hostility towards 
their communities, whilst liberal NGO and INGO human rights interventions tended to 
focus on ‘rule-of-law, reforms at the constitutional and legislative level. During the mid- 
1990s, Hungary had one of the largest numbers of NGOs per capita in post-socialist 
Europe, indicative of the dynamism within civil society. Nonetheless, my thesis revealed 
the embedded subaltern position of Roma within Hungarian civil society and exposed its 
limitations and paradoxes.
Furthermore, focus was placed on the emergence of ‘Roma Rights’, as I interrogated its 
origins, frameworks, and attendant practices. I discussed the key sources of the rise of 
‘Roma rights’ discursive practices which were primarily reactions to diverse (but 
connected) problems confronting Roma in ‘transition’ Hungary. These were a) the 
collapse of socialist ideologies and structures which created an ideological vacuum for the 
absorption of aspects of neoliberal human rights discourses and practice, as well as a 
space for growing nationalism, b) the general disillusionment of Romani representatives 
with mainstream political parties and electoral politics (especially after 1995), c) 
increasing racist violence and scapegoating of Roma, which rights’ entrepreneurs 
successfully raised in the public domain and d) the expansion into Hungary of Western 
philanthropic groups, human rights entrepreneurs, and capital from primarily - though 
not exclusively - American sources. The origins of the current ‘Roma rights’ discourses 
permeating Europe lie in the interventions of human rights entrepreneurs who promoted 
these discourses in post-socialist countries. With the rise of human rights
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entrepreneurship by the late 1990s, the influence and impact of the institutionalisation of 
NGOs and INGOs became more noticeable in Hungarian civil society.
In analyzing the NGO and INGO research reports covering human rights violations of 
Roma from the early 1990s onwards, as well as the personal narratives of key individuals 
(both Hungarian and those from abroad, in particular, the US) , who fought against anti- 
Gypsyism, I exposed the neoliberal ideologies — both explicit and implicit - underpinning 
their work. In investigating the sources and forms of human rights discourses and their 
social construction, as well as the practical influence of the NGOisation of human rights 
on Romani communities in Hungary, I examined the dominant role of these human 
rights entrepreneurs, concluding that the shift in the public discourse on Roma from 
‘Gypsy problem’ (\ciganjproblema) to the politically liberal concept of ‘Roma rights’ within 
one decade has to a large extent resulted from their efforts.
Moreover, I examined the question of how the contemporary Romani rights movement 
has become ideologically monopolized by the vision of Western neoliberal entrepreneurs 
and their Eastern European counterparts — the vast majority of whom are disconnected 
from the day-to-day struggle of Romani communities. In part, this stemmed from the 
external influence and resource mobilization by US-based private foundations (the OSI 
in particular), but also results from the active human tights entrepreneurship of liberal 
Eastern European elites and their Romani colleagues. In addition, it was at this time that 
NGO sector work became an attractive career option, given the large cuts to the state 
sector and lack of access to capital in the Hungarian private sector.
In addition, the thesis also uncovered how American-style discourses and advocacy 
strategies on human rights focusing on civil and political rights became ever more 
pronounced in post-socialist Europe. Moreover, it covered paradoxes in the world of 
professional human rights, especially with respect to subaltern communities whose voices 
are muted. This reality also demonstrated what was posited earlier in the thesis in
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reference to Gramsci’s (2001) assertions on civil society: that it is a site for the hegemony 
of the established order, rather than a site for emancipation (as it is commonly thought to 
be).
In my latter chapters, I exposed the limitations of contemporary neoliberal human rights 
ideologies and practices within the NGO sector in Hungary, interrogating critical debates 
within the human rights sector itself, for example, the question of the conflict between 
the ‘self-help’ and social justice model versus the ‘professional’, top-down, technocratic 
human rights model in achieving rights for Roma.
A critical challenge facing Romani activists and others engaged in the field is posed by 
the unforeseen dangers of a diffusion of ‘Roma rights’ discourses themselves: there is 
rising concern that the discourse itself may increase anti-Gypsyism and social exclusion 
by emphasising ‘Romani difference’ or ‘exceptionality’, thereby increasing social distance 
between Roma and non-Roma citizens (cf. Kovats 2001a).
Finally, the thesis exposed the disconnection between neoliberal approaches to human 
rights and social integration of Roma (with its narrow emphasis on civic and political 
participation) and the actual material needs of Roma which are not being met (resulting 
from their declining incomes since the mid-1980s which induced chronic unemployment 
in the communities). Human rights entrepreneurs rarely discuss these structural 
paradoxes, nor have they confronted the inherent limitations of neoliberal policy 
approaches towards achieving social justice/emancipation for Roma (Trehan 2009). 
Additionally, I demonstrated how within Hungarian civil society, the minority voices of 
critical and progressive activists gradually became marginalized or pacified (cf. for 
example, those of Kozma, Horvath, Kocze, etc.) as effective alternatives to the status 
quo were not articulated, despite embryonic attempts at forging alternative coalitions 
with the poor and working class. Indeed, Romani participants within human rights
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INGOs themselves occupy the position of the subaltern and struggle to have their voices 
heard.
Nonetheless, a younger generation of Roma who have followed the managerial and 
technocratic Tiiiman rights entrepreneuriaT model, have obtained jobs as a result of the 
patronage of the OSI and other neoliberal sponsors (indeed, they are recruited by them) 
who wield tremendous power in determining policy on Roma.
The spectrum of violence vis-a-vis Roma
What, then, happens to human rights when they are the rights of homo saced07, of those 
excluded from the political community; that is, when thy are of no use, since thy are the rights 
of those who, precisely, have no rights and are treated as inhuman? - Zizek (2005)
In the quote above, Zizek (2005) problematizes a straightforward liberal ‘universalist’ 
concept of human rights, suggesting that unless it is connected to the realization of active 
citizenship, it loses its meaning. As my thesis demonstrated, Roma continue to be 
excluded from Europe’s body politic, not necessarily because there is a dearth of 
legislation on rights protections or particular gaps in legislation, but because they do not 
have the means or tools to effectively realize these rights in the face of contemporary 
structural exclusion and hence overcome an embedded subaltern status. By contrast, as I 
raised earlier in the thesis, ‘soft’ Socialist states of the 1970s and 1980s (such as Hungary, 
but particularly Yugoslavia, which was part of the non-aligned movement and never part 
of the Warsaw Pact) recognized Romani people as citizens who could make 
contributions to their societies. This is not to suggest that anti-Gypsyism was no longer 
salient in these societies, but in contrasting the devastated position of most post-WWII 
Romani communities — survivors of the Holocaust in Europe — the socio-economic gains
107 Giorgio Agamben’s (1998: 115) use o f  “hom o sacer’ refers to a term in Roman law for one who can be 
“killed but not sacrificed” (translated from the Latin as ‘sacred man’ or ‘accursed man*), and this implies a 
kind o f  abandonment or exclusion from the law. Agamben also delineates the biological from political life, 
and home sacer epitomizes ‘bare life’ through his or her exclusion from the political community.
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for Roma (poverty reduction, access to subsidized housing and free healthcare, and yes, 
even education, substandard though it was) were remarkable by the time of late socialism. 
On the other hand, Romani communities have been experiencing downward social 
mobility at the same time that their political and minority rights are celebrated (cf. Kovats
1998). But can Roma in Hungary, as contemporary homo sacere, realize these political 
rights whilst their own base in post-socialist Hungarian society continues to shrink?
An additional key finding of my thesis was that the framing and organization of 
knowledge on Romani people continues to be in the hands of non-Roma (from the 
progression of Gypsylorism to the contemporary human rights NGO sector), and in this 
sense it is perhaps one of the “misrecognised continuities” of the production of historical 
discourses (and I would add, discursive practices) that Edward Said (1978) identified in 
his classic work, Orientalism (Said cited in Brennan 2004; cf. Hancock 1997).
The concept of epistemic violence (Spivak 1988; Trehan and Kocze 2009) vis-a-vis Romani 
Europeans is also accompanied by forms of symbolic violence (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992; Koulish 2005) and structural violence (cf. Farmer 2003). My research has revealed how 
knowledge generated on Romani populations by academics, human rights entrepreneurs, 
and policy-makers can themselves constitute forms of violence generated these architects 
of discursive practice. This is particularly so when the discourses constructed and the 
knowledge generated obscure the centrality and depth of structural exclusion and socio­
economic deprivation lying at the root of contemporary Romani oppression in Europe. 
Finally, I uncovered particular ‘narrative threads’ of epistemic violence present within 
discursive productions on Roma. One begins with Gypsylorism, which exoticized Roma 
and solidified their ‘Otherness’, ensuring its impact on contemporary scholarship today. 
A second one connects neoliberal discourses on ‘Roma rights’ generated by Euro- 
Atlantic NGO human rights entrepreneurs to an EU policy-making elite. This latter 
discourse has recently become hegemonic, and has served to obscure contentious
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relations o f power, particularly in post-socialist Europe. Will these threads be re-fashioned and 
re-woven one day by Romani subalterns themselves? If the overwhelming majority o f human 
rights entrepreneurs today are non-Roma, the implications o f this would be critical to 
examine, and certainly Stanley Cohen’s question to me (in 2007) “who are the Romani 
moral entrepreneurs?” was instrumental in prompting me to examine the reality of 
invisible or missing Romani interlocutors. One response to the challenge of the lack of 
moral entrepreneurship o f the subaltern can perhaps be addressed by the engagement of 
practices o f ‘epistemic disobedience’ (Mignolo 2007) by subaltern groups such as Roma, 
which Mignolo suggests are needed to counter epistemic violence.
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Figure 16 -  Epistemic disobedience in action? Aladar Adam, Romani activist 
from Ukraine, UN World Conference against Racism, Durban (South Africa) 
October 2001. Photo credit: S. Jasarova
In Ocotober 2001, Mr. Adam was sponsored by the neoliberal ERRC to attend the UN’s 
World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) in Durban, South Africa, along with a dozen 
other Romani N G O  activists, primarily from Eastern Europe (cf. ERRC 2001). In the 
photo above, he is shown seated next to a poster from the stall o f the Dalit social justice 
movement in India (a poster critical o f neoliberalism). Although he is actively showing
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his solidarity with Dalits, a type of visual dissonance is produced here, as it is not clear if 
this is a deliberate act of ‘epistemic disobedience’.
At this stage therefore, it would be prudent to ask if the distinctions between ‘Roma 
rights’ as emancipation or exploitation have become blurred? The lifeworld of Roma in 
Hungary today reveals increasing deprivation whose roots can be traced to a spectrum of 
structural violence. What I argue in this thesis is that the ‘Roma rights movement’ as it 
stands - its ideologies, its methods and its diffuse and multiple trajectories — actually 
obfuscates this violence, thereby providing a dense smokescreen, so that both Romani 
activists and policy-makers cannot see clearly (or if they can, they engage in a kind of 
collective denial), and may fall into a vicious cycle whereby they become instruments of 
their own oppression. Caught up in a web of career-building within the ‘Roma industry’, 
many Romani NGO entrepreneurs suggest that they have litde choice but to use the 
frameworks generated and institutionalized by INGOs such as HRW and OSI. Though a 
myriad number of NGOs and offices in Europe now sponsor Romani projects (some 
short-term, others longer in duration), their interventions are only meaningful for 
themselves and their narrow interests, rather than for the mass of Roma, many of whom 
are not yet attuned to the ‘human rights entrepreneurship’ conducted in their name.
This thesis has also shown how structural violence perpetrated against Roma remains in 
place, whilst at the same time human rights projects and integration programmes are 
marketed and advertised as achieving ‘progress’ on their behalf. A spectrum of violence 
against Roma pervades European societies: whether it is in the field of culture, where 
non-Romani cultural impresarios dominate representations of Roma through films 
screened in film festivals, or in the realm of economics, where contemporary neoliberal 
economic regimes ensure that Roma do not have access to capital, to the social and 
political life of Europe, where they remain marginal, despite the recent selection of token
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Romani representatives by some political parties (most recently at the European 
Parliamentary level).
The thesis demonstrates that emerging human rights movements (such as that for the 
‘rights of Roma5) have become circumscribed in an age of neoliberal policy hegemony, 
reflecting the interests of a broader global governance structure dominated by human 
rights entrepreneurs, policy-makers and other elites who manage Roma without 
necessarily generating the means for their inclusion (for which they claim to be creating 
the conditions for in their programmes and interventions). Furthermore, colonial and 
neo-colonial relations are embedded in postsocialist Europe’s relations with Western 
Europe, and within Hungary, and these multiple dynamics of subordination proscribe 
Romani Europeans and their autonomy within the NGO sector (cf. Trehan and Kocze 
2009). Inherent to the neoliberal, technocratic policy approach towards NGO 
development, the ‘NGO-isation’ of human rights has curtailed, if not stunted, the 
development of an autonomous, democratic voice which would effectively intervene or 
mediate on behalf of European Romani communities and their most critical needs.
My preliminary analysis in this area suggests that the advocacy culture and methods of 
neoliberal human rights entrepreneurship continues to have a profound impact on 
younger generations of Romani activists, who have been exposed to a ‘technocratic, 
professional’ model (cf. Rostas 2009) rather than the self-help, bottom-up model of 
community development. Activists (generally older) critical of such approaches tend to 
become sidelined or co-opted to a large degree.
Further research would be needed to examine the development of nascent oppositional 
ideologies to the prevalent neoliberal trajectory of the INGO-led ‘Roma rights’ 
movement. Another area to be explored is the impact of the EU accession and how the 
development of Romani policy at the EU level, for example, the Decade of Roma 
Inclusion (2005-2015) initiative, the EU Roma Brussels Summit (September 2008), Roma
Platform (April 2009) have impacted both the NGO sector and the mass of Romani 
European communities themselves (cf. Guy 2009).
The interdisciplinary scope of this thesis raised many questions concerning the post­
socialist human rights movement for Roma both in Hungary, and more broadly, in the 
CEE region. The NGOs run by human rights entrepreneur’s penetrated and shaped 
Romani ideological forms and advocacy culture in key ways, and a more detailed 
examination of this should constitute the subject of future research.
One way forward is to discuss the intricacies and fallacies surrounding discourse 
generation on Romani human rights issues in public forums. For example, in the summer 
of 2006, with the assistance of the Centre for the Study of Human Rights at the LSE, as 
well as the student Praxis Society and Central London Europe Group (CLEG), an 
evening discussion with speakers entided Citizens or Denizens? The ‘integration' of Roma in 
Europe was organised. It was quite possibly the first time in the history of the London 
School of Economics that Romani activists were invited to share a platform with 
academics and politicians at the Old Lecture Theatre (see attached video of the event, on 
cd-rom). Speakers attempted to break the silence on the contemporary paradoxes within 
the movement: progressive Romani activists Fiorina Zoltan and Angela Kocze, political 
scientist Martin Kovats, and human rights lawyer Barbora Bukovska all participated, 
along with Liberal Democrat MEP Baroness Sarah Ludford who gave the keynote 
address, and is known for her support of the rights of Roma in Europe, along with other 
minorities. Held at the prestigious LSE, it was an occasion to ‘speak truth to power’ in 
the Foucauldian sense, and to air the debate publicly, contesting the conventional 
wisdom on Romani issues before an audience of future European (and global) power 
elites, that is, LSE students, as well as Baroness Ludford.
Can human rights discourses and organisations still be empowering and transformative ?
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My own answer would be a qualified ‘yes’ - human rights continues to be a salient 
principle and can be meaningful in the lives of subaltern communities such as European 
Roma if it can be redefined and liberated from its current neoliberal straitjacket. The 
thesis provides conclusive evidence on the status quo of die hailed neoliberal approaches 
and triumphs in ‘Roma rights’ as being complicit in the reproduction of power 
asymmetries. For the generation of real change, much more has to be done at the 
community level through self-empowerment of Roma, as opposed to a focus on 
changing the attitudes of ‘white Europeans’ which has been the approach thus far of 
many ‘multicultural-type’ European programmes.108
As detailed above, the INGO-led civil rights movement in the region, and in this 
particular case, in Hungary, has in many ways not addressed the core socio-economic 
issues of the Romani communities in part because neoliberal conceptions around which 
contemporary human rights issues are framed in post-socialist Europe have neglected 
(and in some cases, been dismissive of) the importance of economic justice. Keynesian 
theories, which responded to classic Marxist problematisations of inequality, were 
dethroned after the 1970s by neo-classical liberal models which emphasised equality of 
opportunity, but regarded inequality of outcome as ‘natural.’ In contemporary post­
socialist Europe, such models demand that citizens of Romani background play in a 
game whose rules were written for others, and thereby exclude them from empowering 
themselves. Imported discursive practices channeled by Western INGOs to their NGO 
counterparts in Hungary are a case in point, and these could not adequately articulate the 
variety of east European perspectives and interests, and the multiple levels of neo­
colonial relations which imbricate the post-socialist landscape (cf. Trehan and Kocze 
2009).
108See for example the Dosta Programme at www.dosta.org.
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In contrast, progressive activists within the women’s global emancipation movement 
have emphasised that “gender, race and class analysis is.. .essential to both understanding 
the impacts of neoliberal policies and for developing alternative policies that put 
sustainable development and human rights ahead of profits” (AWID 2005). A similar 
intersectional approach towards social justice for Roma is currendy being articulated by 
Romani feminist scholars and activists such as Alexandra Oprea (2004), Angela Kocze 
(2009) and Gregory Kwiek (2008) who see the their communities power, potentialities, 
and pitfalls from the inside. Perhaps their roles as moral entrepreneurs will become more 
visible in the years to come.
As a result, what may be needed is to take forward the holistic analysis begun in this 
thesis, an analysis of the rights movement that both accounts for Romani diversity in 
Europe and privileges local level knowledge, as well as the recognition of socio-economic 
justice as a central pillar within a contemporary human rights framework. This could in 
turn contribute to informing policy decisions with the? input of Romani citizens 
themselves in the areas of education, employment, healthcare, and childcare — all socio­
economic areas where the human rights movement for Roma could yet have an 
emancipatory and transformative impact if material economic realities as well as political 
and cultural rights were to be addressed.
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Foundation; consultant 
with Partners Hungary, a 
US-based INGO 
Former SZDSZ MP, 
Founder and Director of 
Roma Foundation for
Civil Rights (RPA)
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8 Imre Furmann June 26,1999
9 Jim Golds ton September 21,1999
10 Edina Kisonthyi Summer 2005
11 Joszef Kolompar June 2000
12 Angela Kocze June 2004
13 Ferenc Koszeg August 31,1999
14 Blanka Kozma September 22,1999
Director of NEKI, Legal 
Defence Bureau for 
Ethnic Minorities, a 
human rights NGO 
Legal Director, ERRC 
(my former supervisor) 
Hungarian-American 
employee of CEU 
Archives; filmmaker and 
psychologist
Hungarian Romani
economist; worked for 
OFA (National
Employment Foundation) 
Sociologist, former
Executive Director of 
ERIO and educational 
programmes director at 
ERRC
Chairman of Hungarian 
Helsinki Committee and 
official Hungarian
founder of ERRC 
Director, Association of 
Romani Women
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15 Erika Lencses
16 Christina McDonald
17 Gabor Miklosi
18 Agnes Osztolykan
19 Eva 6rsos
20 Dimitrina Petrova
21 Imre Pozsgay
22 Erika Schlager
Summer 2002
December 12,2000
June 25,1999
May 2000
January 2001
September 24,1999
September 7,1999
April 19,1999
Participating in Public 
Life
Hungarian Ministry for 
Social Affairs, Department 
for EU Accession 
Senior Manager, OSI- 
Roma Education
Initiative 
International
Representative, Roma 
Press Center
Romani youth activist;
university student 
Former Head of the
Office of Ethnic and 
National Minorities, 
Director of the ‘Mediator* 
Foundation and co-chair 
of the Board of the ERRC 
Founder and executive
Director of ERRC 
Former Head of the
Patriotic National Front, 
affiliated with MDF 
Lawyer, Commission for
23 Istvan Szikinger January 2001
24 Rumyan Russinov October 27, 2000
25 AkosTarkanyi August 1999
26 Debbie Winterboume February 18,2000
Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (part of OSCE) 
Legal expert and human 
rights activist 
Director, Regional Roma 
Participation Program 
Hungarian social policy 
researcher
Acting Legal Director of 
ERRC; formerly of the 
Refugee Legal Centre 
(UK)
*In addition, I conducted numerous informal interviews and conversations which 
are recorded in my fieldnotes.
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APPENDICES
Appendix #1
A brief chronological overview of Romani contributions to the Hungarian labour 
market (data extracted from Csalog 1994:1-4; Kemeny 2005; Teichmann 2001)
1300s-1600s
Upon their arrival to central Europe, Romani peoples practice traditional crafts which 
remain outside the protection and regulation of the medieval guild system; whereas for 
peasants of the time, cottage industry work is a supplementary source of income, for 
Roma it is the sole source of income. The pressures of market restrictions compel 
Romani families to travel to other markets, thereby maintaining a semi-nomadic way of 
life, which encouraged a diasporic mode of existence. Roma continue to work as 
coppersmiths, tinkers, blacksmiths, as well as in other trades. Bondage and slavery in 
Transylvania is less severe than in Moldavia and Wallachia, and is abolished completely at 
the end of the 17th century. Romani slavery is introduced in Wallachia in the 14th century 
and in Moldavia in the early 16th century, and continues well into the 19th century.
1700s-1800s
Roma continue to work in traditional craft professions, including adobe brick-making; by 
the 18th century, Romani musicians begin to gain a niche in the entertainment market, 
and the most successful amongst them work for aristocrats in the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. Sinti were peddlars and street performers, and there was a variety of other 
professions. Roma are generally excluded from land ownership and use, those that are, 
likely become assimilated. Thus, Roma were always marginal actors in the economic 
system of Austro-Hungary during feudal times. In 1844, Count Kogalniceanu, a humanist 
writer and aristocrat inspired by the ethos of the French Revolution, begins an active 
campaign for abolition of slavery in Romania, with the publication of Desrobirea Tiganilor 
(“The Liberation of the Gypsies”). Romani slaves are emancipated in Moldavia and 
Wallachia after a contentious struggle with the boyars or land-holding aristocrats, in 
1856, leading to a large migration (in waves) of freed Romani slaves to Hungary and 
other parts of Europe and the world. Those who remained were levied with taxes, and 
large numbers — having no other option - continued to be employed by their former 
owners.
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Early 1900s -1940s
The market for traditional Romani craftwork declines precipitously with the rise of 
modem industrial systems of production, which favoured mass produced goods. 
Romanies experience rapid downward social mobility, with many falling  into conditions 
of ‘extreme poverty*. Their historically accumulated ‘capital* evaporates. Roma join the 
lot of Hungary*s ‘three million beggars*, and the drop in their economic situation coupled 
with low social prestige paves the way for their genocide during the Holocaust. Csalog 
emphasises that the “mass deportation of Gypsies to Nazi death camps with the 
indifferent assistance of Hungarian society only happened because the majority of society 
perceived Gypsies as useless parasites incapable of carrying out a day*s work, and as 
potential (if not active) criminals. An estimated 60,000 Hungarian Roma perished or went 
missing at the hands of the Nazis and their allies.
1950s-1960s
Ambitious and extensive industrialisation programme commences under the new 
Communist regime in Hungary, which by this time, has also confiscated peasant lands, 
resulting in radical agragrian reform and a redistribution of land. The creation of jobs in 
the construction sector, factory work, mining, and in public works projects such as the 
sanitation sector, lead Roma to join the modem employment market
1970s-1980s
Romani men are fully integrated — albeit at the lowest levels — of the Hungarian 
economy, with employment rates matching those of others by the mid-1970s. Half of all 
working age Romani women also become employed by the early 1980s.
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Appendix #2
Chronology of NGOs working on Romani issues (1970s-present), expanded and 
updated from Trehan (2001).
1970s and1980s
Possibilities for ‘quasi-civil society’ formations in various state socialist countries, 
including Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia. The International Romani 
Union (IRU) is founded in London in 1971. Roma participate in many cultural and youth 
groups at this time. Some Romani leaders participate in the Charta 77 movement in the 
Czech Republic, and similarly throughout the region in diverse progressive organisations. 
Roma in Yugoslavia organise their own political parties.
1989-1993
Throughout the CEE region, states are in decline, and began to embrace a package of 
economic ‘reforms’ along neoliberal lines monitored by the IMF and World Bank. States 
are characterized by shrinking budgets, periods of increasing unemployment and political 
uncertainty. The first domestic NGOs are created by former dissidents and intellectuals. 
Intellectuals and activists (primarily non-Roma) develop contacts with foreign donors, 
laying the ground for a third sector, a sector whose putative purpose is to enhance the 
empowerment of Roma.
1993-1997
Numerous NGOs and associations founded by Romani activists in the fields of culture, 
education, politics, sport and increasingly, human rights. General optimism in the non­
governmental sector; more philanthropic as well as governmental bodies support human 
rights and ‘democratisation’ programmes in the region. NGOs evolve into credible 
‘partners’ for human rights policy-making on Roma, both domestically and 
internationally.
1997-2004
Increasing institutionalisation of NGOs, professional human rights and development 
‘technocrats’ begin to emerge. Human rights entrepreneurs become increasingly 
powerful. Rising cynicism amongst Romani intellectuals about the third sector, 
emergence of the ‘Gypsy industry’ (state and third sector), phenomenon of 
‘Romanisation’ of programmes, whereby special projects begin to focus on the Romani 
community. ‘Ethno-business’ is in full bloom.
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2004 - presen t
European Union integration fuels further Romani projects and policies on Roma in the 
region. Launch of the Decade of Roma Inclusion’ (2005-2015) spearheaded by Open 
Society Institute, the European Union, the World Bank and European Roma Rights 
Centre, along with other partner organizations. Critical activists begin to point to gap 
between goals of the Decade, and actual programmes on the ground, pointing to lack of 
transparency and participation of grassroots Romani NGOs, and a disconnection 
between rising socio-economic marginalisation of Roma and programmes to ameliorate 
the situation.
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Appendix #3
Interviewing Victims of Traumatic Human Rights Abuses*
(extracted from Media Diversity Training Institute’s website ^Practical Material/Practical 
Tools for Journalists’, see full document at the link
http: / / www.mediadiversity.org/articles publications/ interveiwing%2 0 %2 0 victims.htm ) 
by Jack Saul, Ph.D.
Director, International Trauma Studies Program 
New York University 
www.nvu.edu/trauma.studies
Romani victims are generally objectified within the human rights arena, and there is a 
lack of awareness of the psycho-social needs of Roma who have undergone trauma (cf. 
Bukovska 2005). Little sensitivity training is actually given to human rights campaigners, 
researchers, and lawyers who approach them for information, and very little psycho­
social support is offered to them before or after interviews are conducted about the 
human rights abuses they underwent.
The extract below is from the Media Diversity Institute, and provides suggestions for 
journalists conducting interviews with victims of human rights abuses. Organizations 
such as Human Rights Watch and the European Roma Rights Centre, as well as domestic 
human rights NGOs across Europe should take seriously the implications of the trauma 
their Romani clients have undergone as well as the risks of continuing post-traumatic 
stress disorder, and hence move towards implementing appropriate preparation and 
training measures for human rights researchers who interview Romani victims. Such 
practices working towards placing the needs of the victim of human rights abuses at the centre of 
human rights interventions should become the norm, rather than the exception.
I. Common psychological after-effects of Trauma
A. Post traumatic stress disorder
1. Re-experiencing (intrusive symptoms)
2 . Avoiding (numbing and denial)
3. Increased arousal
B. Other psychological disorders
1 . Anxiety
2. Depressive reactions
3. Somatic complaints
4. Substance abuse
5. Sexual disorders
6 . Organic impairment
C. Other difficulties experienced as a consequence of torture and political violence
1 . Alterations of identity and confusion in relation to reality
2. Survivor guilt and the problem of complicity
3. Disruption of capacity to adequately assess danger
4. Difficulty modulating affect and impulses
5. Social isolation
6 . Interruption of the symbolizing process
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II. Conducting interviews with victims of human rights abuses
A. Preparation
1 . Anticipate and address possible barriers to effective communication
a) environmental - privacy, comfort of setting, adequate amount of time for interview, 
gender of interviewer (particularly in cases of sexual violation)
b) Physical/psychological barriers - physical pain and discomfort, fatigue, sensory 
deficits, psychological disorders, cognitive deficits
c) Sociocultural barriers - cultural differences, language issues, the use of interpreters
d) Make efforts to minimize aspects of the interview situation which may mimic the 
abuse situation
2. Prepare social support for the informant during and after the interview if necessary
B. The interview
1. Explain the process of the interview, give the informant control, and the right to place 
limits, recognition of difficulty speaking about the abuse
2. Establish rapport, respectfulness, connection to the person beyond the violation
3. Good listening skills - allow victim to tell story at first with as few interruptions as 
possible, use of open ended questions, showing acknowledgement, communicating 
empathy and concern, allowing for silences
4. Pacing - adjusting to the informant's readiness to speak about certain aspects of his or 
her experience
5. Mimesis - adjusting to informant's style of expressivity
6 . Giving opportunity for informant to ask questions
7. Confidentiality and security
C. Informant's experience during the interview
1. Recognition of informant's life situation, safety issues, living situation, basic needs, 
is person participating freely?
2. Be aware of the variability of emotional expression of trauma survivor - demeanor may 
not match the person's suffering, cultural variations in emotional expression
3. Re-experiencing of feelings related to the traumatic situation. Common emotional 
responses - terror, shame, despair, rage, confusion, humiliation, powerlessness
4. Psychological reactions that can present obstacles to the interview process - memory 
and concentration difficulties, dissociation, somatic complaints - pains and headaches, 
sleep deprivation, traumatic triggers
III. Interviewing strategies and reactions to interview
A. Interview Strategies
1. Sensitivity to informant's emotional responses during interview, emotional changes 
and cues to stop
2. Knowing when enough detailed information about traumatic experiences is enough, 
looking for details to establish consistency in more neutral areas
3. Use of group interviews to enhance data collecting, shared memory and promote 
bonding with other members of the group
4. Use of non-verbal modalities (drawings and dramatic enactments) to bridge language
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and culture gaps
5. Interviewing children
B. Interviewer reactions - secondary or vicarious traumatization
1. Trauma is contagious - interviewer may experience PTSD reactions
2. Trauma stories may revive personally traumatic experiences in the interviewer
3. Feelings of helplessness and rescue fantasies
4. Shattered world assumptions
5. Having to come to terms with one's own capacity for sadism and evil
6. Witness guilt
C. Coping with vicarious trauma reactions
1. On-going supportive environment
2. Debriefing after hearing trauma stories
3. Anticipation of vicarious trauma reactions
4. Taking care of oneself
5. Use of humour
6 . Avoiding repetition of visual traumatic imagery
7. Relaxation, taking periodic breaks or vacations from work
D. Creating a safe and supportive work environment
1. Working with trauma can cause ruptures in organizations
2. Reactions are anticipated and normalized
3. Risks of vicarious traumatization are discussed - an organizational plan to 
support staff is developed
4. Regular opportunities to meet and talk about how one is affected by the work
5. Debriefing of information as well as emotional experience
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Appendix #4
Letter from Geza Jeszenszky, Ambassador of Hungary to the US to the 
Washington Times editorial pages, July 12,1999
Posted on ROMNET listserve in July 1999 by Erika Schlager, a legal counsel at the US 
Helsinki Commission.
On July 4,1999, the Washington Times (and it appears, the London-based Financial Times 
on or about the same date) ran a story by Financial Times writer Max Easterman under 
the title “Hungary's second-class citizens; Ethnic Magyars make life hard for the 
Gypsies.” The Hungarian Ambassador wrote a rebuttal to the Washington Timesy which 
was printed on July 12. In advance of getting the letter published, it was circulated to 
some Hungarian Americans by the Hungarian Embassy with the note: “An increasing 
number of misinformed reports comes out in the international press about the situation 
of the Gypsies (fashionably named Romas). This is the response the Embassy has 
prepared to a particularly foolish piece which appeared in the Financial Times and in The 
Washington Times. I enclose it for your information.”
Story on Hungary ’s Gypsies ‘ill-informed, malicious’
July 12,1999, The Washington Times, Page A14, Commentary, Editorials, 
Opinions
I realize that the July 4 article on Hungary in your paper (“Hungary’s second-class 
citizens,” World) was not the product of your own journalists. Nevertheless, I wish one 
of your editors had read it before you published such an ill-informed, malicious and 
dilettantish piece.
Before you think that, as the ambassador of Hungary, I feel compelled to whitewash the 
problems in my country, let me state a few facts. Hungary has a large Gypsy minority 
with serious social problems deriving mostly from poverty, poor education and, in many 
cases, an inherited lifestyle that lacks any incentives to break out and do better. It also is a 
fact, however, that the Hungarian government, and society in general, recognizes this 
problem and accepts responsibility for its amelioration.
The reporter blames “institutional racism” for the problems of Hungarian Gypsies. I find 
it reassuring that he cannot provide a shred of evidence to prove this point. What is 
“institutional” in Hungary is that we have a national government agency established 
specifically to deal with the problems and aspirations of national and ethnic minorities. It 
spends most of its budget on programs for the Gypsies, our largest minority. It is 
presently headed by a member of our Bulgarian minority. Earlier, however, its head was a 
highly educated woman from the Gypsy minority. Hungary has one of the most 
enlightened minority laws in the world. This makes it possible for Gypsies to elect their 
own self-governments, even in those places where they are dispersed among the general 
population and, consequently, cannot form a majority.
Since the political changes of 1989-90, several Gypsies were elected to the national 
Parliament, where they vigorously pursued the betterment of their group. Gypsy social 
and cultural organizations, including political parties, number in the hundreds.
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The ignorance and superficiality of this reporter would be humorous, if it were not so sad 
to read this tripe in a respected newspaper. The insinuation that Gypsy musicians "have 
to play Hungarian music and pretend" is inane. Far from being oppressed or intimidated, 
skilled Gypsy musicians are the toast of the entertainment society in Hungary. Gypsy 
orchestras in restaurants rarely play any kind of folk music. They play songs written by 
professional composers of light music, the most popular of whom had been the Gypsy 
bandleader Pista Danko, who lived a century ago.
It also is the height of ignorance to draw a parallel between the urbanized elite of Gypsy 
musicians and the impoverished rural Gypsies. It is like reporting on the impoverished 
black towns of, say, Mississippi in the 1950s, and then add “of course, Duke Ellington 
and Miles Davis are the lucky ones. They have jobs.” Finally, I don't know what to make 
of the Gypsy girl whose IQ was tested at 6 8  but proved to be more competent than that. 
The charge is that "The tests are language-based and heavily slanted toward home life." 
Horrors. But exacdy on what would you test schoolgirls - nuclear physics?
Let me point out that schoolchildren's IQs are not routinely tested in Hungary, and they 
are certainly not carrying a low rating through life as some kind of scarlet letter.
Let me also reveal that my government regularly supports Gypsy cultural, folklore and 
literature programs, but Gypsy - which includes two distinct dialects - is not a modem 
written language. To assign Gypsy children to a life in that language would do precisely 
what my government tries hard to avoid - to perpetuate their disadvantaged status. The 
educational debate in this country on the benefits of ebonies or black English was a very 
short one, wasn't it? No disadvantaged underclass ever emerged from its status due to the 
efforts of social workers assigned to it by the government.
Education, jobs, opportunity and incentives are my government's guiding principles in its 
treatment of our fellow Hungarians of Gypsy background. I would welcome your 
reporting on what really goes on in this field in Hungary. The ignorant article that you 
published just misleads your readers without benefiting anyone.
GEZA JESZENSZKY, Ambassador 
Embassy of the Republic of Hungary 
Washington DC
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Appendix #5
United States Mission to the OSCE Statement on Tolerance and Non­
discrimination: Roma/Sinti
As prepared for delivery by Erika Schlager, U.S. Helsinki Commission, to the OSCE 
Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, Warsaw, September 28, 2005, see online at 
http://osce.usmission.gov/archive/2005/09/HDIM On Tolerance and Non­
discrimination 09 28 05.pdf
Mr. Moderator, let me begin by thank [sic] the Romani non-govemmental organizations 
here and the Office of the Contact Point for Roma and Sinti for the Romani-related side 
events that have been organised throughout the Human Dimension Implementation 
Meeting.
They have effectively mainstreamed Romani issues and enriched our work. Pd also like 
to encourage my colleagues here to see the exhibits on the 2 nd floor related to the 
Romani side events if they have not already done so.
Mr. Moderator, 2005 marks the 30th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, an event 
which has prompted a mix of celebration and introspection. This year is also the 15th 
anniversary of the adoption of Copenhagen Document. Presaging truly historic changes, 
that groundbreaking document was the first international human rights agreement to 
recognize the human rights problems faced by Roma.
“The participating States clearly and unequivocally condemn totalitarianism, racial and 
ethnic hatred, anti-semitism, xenophobia and discrimination against anyone as well as 
persecution on religious and ideological grounds. In this context, they also recognize the 
particular problems of Roma (gypsies)” - Excerptfrom the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting 
of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (1990)
Since then, there have been many other “firsts.” The OSCE held its first seminar on 
Romani human rights issues in 1994. Among those present at that meeting were a Sinto 
survivor of the Holocaust and a young woman who had been widowed by the violence in 
Hadareni, Romania. In 1999, the OSCE appointed the first Romani advisor to the OSCE 
and in 2000 the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities published his seminal 
report on Roma. At the 2003 Maastricht Ministerial, the OSCE participating States 
adopted the Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE 
area.
“We deplore violence and other manifestations of racism and discrimination 
against minorities, including the Roma and Sinti. We commit ourselves to ensure 
that laws and policies fully respect the rights of Roma and Sinti and, where 
necessary, to promote anti-discrimination legislation to this effect. We underline 
the importance of careful attention to the problems of the social exclusion of 
Roma and Sinti. These issues are primarily a responsibility of the participating 
States concerned. We emphasize the important role that the ODIHR Contact 
Point for Roma and Sinti issues can play in providing support. A further helpful 
step might be the elaboration by the Contact Point of an action plan of targeted 
activities, drawn up in co-operation with the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities and others active in this field, notably the Council of Europe.”
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- Excerpt from the Istanbul Summit Declaration (1999)
Elsewhere in the OSCE region, other international organizations have also advanced the 
cause of human rights for Roma during the past 15 years. The first case in which a 
Romani plaintiff successfully brought suit before the European Court on Human Rights 
was decided in 1998. The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights issued 
in 2003 an important report on sterilization without informed consent of Romani women 
in Slovakia and another report on the general situation of Roma this year. Progress for 
Roma has been marked in many other ways. The U.S. Delegation is particularly 
heartened by the development of Romani news organizations, by the growth of grass 
roots Romani non-governmental organizations, and by the increasing political 
empowerment of Roma. Indeed, thanks to the participation of the first Romani Members 
of the European Parliament, that body adopted a resolution on Roma in April of this 
year that righdy identifies key areas where much work remains to be done.
The High Commissioner on National Minorities, in his 2000 report on the situation of 
the Roma and Sinti, observed that “. . .  the rich diversity among Roma within the OSCE 
makes all but a few general conclusions inappropriate. One, however, is plainly 
warranted: discrimination and exclusion are fundamental features of the Roma 
experience. Ten years after the iron curtain fell, Europe is at risk of being divided by new 
walls.”
As if to underscore that point, this year began with a pogrom against Roma in the 
Siberian village of Iskitim, where an estimated 400 Roma were driven from their homes 
while the local authorities reportedly looked on. In a number of OSCE countries, such as 
Greece, continued evictions threaten to turn a new generation of Roma into unwilling 
nomads, and in Belgrade, community protests against municipal efforts to provide 
housing for Roma who currently live under a bridge illustrates the depth of prejudice 
Roma continue to face. In Bulgaria, Sofia municipal authorities demolished many 
unlawfully constructed houses in Roma neighborhoods on August 31, 2005. This action 
left hundreds of Roma homeless, and direcdy contradicted the government’s 1999 
Framework Program for Equal Integration of Roma in Bulgarian Society, which requires 
the legalization of the Roma neighborhoods and of the property in them. Six years after 
Bulgaria adopted the “Framework Program,” little has been done to implement it, and 
Roma and other minorities are still addressed under the demeaning rubric of 
“demographic issues.”
Mr. Moderator, several governments around this table are participating in the “Decade of 
Roma Inclusion.” It seems what we are really embarking on, 15 years after the 
Copenhagen Document, is a decade of rising Romani expectations. When governments 
adopt anti-discrimination legislation, Roma are right to expect it to be meaningfully 
implemented. And when the OSCE participating States adopt an Action Plan on Roma 
and Sinti, Roma are right to expect action. Mr. Moderator, I am reminded of what a 
Romani activist said at an OSCE meeting a few years ago: “We won’t be satisfied with a 
few state subsidies for folk festivals any more.”
At this juncture, there are a few areas where my delegation believes more concerted 
action would be constructive. First, national political leaders should speak out on 
Romani human tights issues. While we note the response of a relevant government 
agency to the anti-Roma manifestations at soccer matches in Bucharest in April, we 
regret that no senior political leaders in Romanian publicly condemned these acts.
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Moreover, the U.S. remains concerned by the phenomenon of political anti-Romism — 
the practice of appealing to anti-Roma prejudice as part of a political campaign. With 
local and national elections scheduled in the next year for several OSCE participating 
States with significant Romani communities, including Slovakia, we urge these States to 
take an active approach to combating this problem. We appreciate the comments from 
the delegate from Slovakia recognizing the desirability of increased Romani political 
participation.
Finally, governments should re-double their efforts to examine and revise outdated 
textbooks that either do not reflect Romani history at all or that include bigoted or 
prejudicial reflections of Roma. In this regard, it is particularly important that the 
experiences of Roma during the Holocaust are taught and remembered. The U.S. 
commends the Hungarian parliament for adopting a resolution on the Holocaust that 
acknowledges the crimes committed against Roma and Jews. We also commend the 
Czech parliament for hosting a photography exhibit about the Lety concentration camp 
this year.
Thank you.
266
Appendix #  6
Extracts from Advertisements for Jobs in the ‘Roma rights industry*
1. Administrative post, European Roma Rights Center (ERRC 2007)
ERRC 
Job Description
Post T itle: Legal Administrator
Reports to : the Legal Director
Annual gross salary: 3.400.000 - 3.700.000 HUF (approximately 19 .000 -20 .500  US 
Dollar) plus benefits
Areas o f Responsibility:
Responsibilities related to legal work:
•  Administering the legal defence grant programme including:
■ Maintaining case files
■ M aintaining and updating the legal database and indexes
■ Administering applications for legal support
■ Administering consultancy and other contracts
• Supporting the organisation o f workshops and training programmes with legal 
components
• Supporting the development o f submissions to intergovernmental structures
•  Legal or other research as requested by the Legal Director
Responsibilities related to administrative support o f the Legal Department:
•  Providing administrative support for the legal intern programme and occasional 
recruitment and selection exercises
•  Supporting the preparation o f  financial reports to donors
•  Reviewing local partners’ financial reports
• Initiating money transfers for project partners and consultants
•  Supporting the preparation o f narrative activity reports for the legal department
•  Arranging travel for the legal department’s staff
•  Other administrative assistance as required by the legal department
•  Other tasks as assigned by the Legal Director
Essential and desirable requirements for the post are outlined in the person 
specification and need to be read in conjunction with the tasks listed above.
Last modified: 03.07.2007
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2. Executive level post, ERRC, 2007
ERRC 
Job Description
Post Title: Programme Director
Reports to: Executive Director
Member of: the senior management team
Supervises: programme department staff members, external consultants, researchers, trainees,
assistant(s) and project coordinators (approximately up to 12 persons on full or part time basis)
Annual gross salary: 12.400.000 -  12.900.000 HUF (approximately 68.000 -  72.000 US
Dollar*) plus benefits, depending on experience
Areas of Responsibility:
General tasks:
• Developing in cooperation with the Executive Director and senior staff team a policy and 
advocacy strategy for the organisation
•  Supervising the implementation of these strategies in cooperation with programme 
department staff
•  Ensuring high quality and timely delivery o f work in programme department in 
accordance with the strategic plan and annual work programme
• Constructively contributing to the work of the senior staff team
• Contributing to ERRC budget plan preparations
• Staying abreast of developments in human rights and Roma rights developments 
internationally
Research, policy analysis and HR training:
•  Analysing the situation concerning Roma in the wider European region and advising the 
Executive Director in taking appropriate advocacy measures
• Supervising the research and capacity building/HR training activities o f the organisation
• Supervising the production of ERRC research reports and contributing to research where 
appropriate
• Coordinating field missions where appropriate
Advocacy:
• Undertaking advocacy work towards the UN, CoE, OSCE and other relevant non-EU 
structures and communicating with these structures as appropriate
•  Coordinating the submission of policy statements to intergovernmental structures and 
instruments concerning Roma
• Proposing and ensuring delivery of advocacy work directed to state authorities
• Representing the organisation towards state authorities and intergovernmental institutions 
as appropriate
* Figures stated in US Dollar are only an indication and do not constitute a legal obligation for ERRC,
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3. Advertisement for Educational training consultancy job, Roma Education 
Fund/OSI (source: Roma Virtual Network 2009)
Roma Education Fund/Scholarship Programs (REF/SPs)
Terms of Reference Roma Health Scholarship Program Training O rganization
Duration: Up to 14 months
Daily Rate: TBD
Time Period: 14 months
The Scholarship Programs as a part of Roma Education Fund (REF) promotes equal 
access of Roma to appropriate and quality higher Education in the Program Countries of 
South Eastern, Eastern and Central Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine), by providing scholarships to 
Roma University students.
In order to address the needs of developing a professional medical staff among Roma 
minority REF and the Open Society Institute (OSI) run scholarship schemes for Roma 
Students pursuing degrees for Medical Nurses and/ or Medical Doctors at state 
accredited/recognized Medical and Medical-Vocational schools in Bulgaria.
Given the complexity of entry examinations in Bulgarian Medical Universities, the REF 
Scholarship Programs wishes to arrange Preparatory Courses for the Roma youth 
interested to take these examinations and enrol in Medical Universities in Bulgaria. The 
course would be for pupils in their final year/s (11th - 12th grades) of high school.
Roma Education Fund Scholarship Programs therefore is seeking applications from 
Training Organizations or Higher Education establishments that have capacity and 
previous experience in organizing Preparatory Courses for entry examinations in 
Universities and/or similar academic preparation courses.
Objective:
The Training Organization would be responsible for:
• preparing and implementing an out-reach plan in order to identify the youth 
interested and eligible to pursue such preparatory courses in close cooperation 
with Roma NGOs, municipalities and schools.
• selecting candidates for the courses; the Program’s goal is to have 30 participants 
in preparatory courses. The selection will be based on the results of the 
candidates’ high school diploma and the grades for the relevant subjects 
(chemistry and biology).
• defining and implementing a curriculum for the preparatory courses in subjects 
like Chemistry, and Biology.
• assessing the progress of each individual student on a regular basis and providing 
an individualised programme of study. Regular 4-month reporting to the REF 
Scholarship Programs Officer on the progress of the students.
• organizing preparatory courses in several or all of the following towns in Bulgaria 
where there are selected students:
Shoumen/Razgrad/Provadia
Sofia/Kyustendil/Blagoevgrad
Sliven/Bourgas
Vidin/Montana/Vraca/Lom
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Plovdiv/Stara Zagora 
• Prepare an intermediary and final evaluation scheme for participants at the 
preparatory courses.
Requirements:
The Training Organization should have at least 3 years experience in the 
organization and provision of preparatory courses for entry examinations in 
Universities in Bulgaria or similar academic courses
Be familiar with the curricula of Medical Universities in Bulgaria as well as 
with the requirements for the entry examinations of the latter
The Training Organization should have the capacity to compile a Preparatory 
Course for candidates who wish to pass entry examinations in Medical 
Universities in Bulgaria
The Preparatory Courses should be delivered by qualified teachers 
Demonstrated ability to outreach to the Roma communities. Knowledge of 
Roma Education issues represents an advantage
The Training Organization should have the capacity to hold the Preparatory 
Courses for 10 consecutive academic months
The Training Organization should be able to organize preparatory courses in 
all or several of the above listed towns.
Output:
A project concept for the Roma Health Scholarship Program Preparatory Course. 
The document should be of about 5 pages. Separate documents to be sent: Executive 
summary, Presentation of the portfolio of the organization and the CV of the 
Manager/Director as well as the CVs of the trainers/teachers. The project concept 
should focus on the following:
Preparation of the curricula/teaching plan and the process of selection of 
teachers/trainers (with teaching experience of at least 3 years);
Specific activities, including the roles and responsibilities of all key players, 
a time bound action plan, and a staffing plan;
Estimated costs of the proposed action plan. Proposals should include a 
description of ’incentive payments’ whereby the fees paid are based on the 
performance of the students in the examination. Proposals should indicate 
the fee for students who: (a) registered; (b) attend all courses; (b) take all the 
examinations; and (c) are admitted to the medical universities. The proposals 
should also include an estimate of the number of students in each category.
Identification of key challenges that would need to be overcome
Geographical mapping
The Project Concept should be prepared in English.
Task management:
The REF Scholarship Programs Officer will be responsible for managing this task.
The eligible Organizations should send the project concept along with the requested 
documents to Rodica Moroi at rmoroi@romaeducationfund.org by May 30, 2009.
HUNGARY -1066 BUDAPEST TEREZ KRT. 46 
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Appendix #7 - Snapshots from around Europe 
Leading Hungarian politicians deny Romani problems
Social and Family Affairs Minister Peter Harrach said on August 5, 2000, regarding Roma 
from the central Hungarian village of Zamoly seeking refugee status in France, that “some 
were going abroad to discredit Hungary, not only demanding compensation but making 
groundless allegations against the state and government.” On August 9, Hungarian Prime 
Minsiter Viktor Orban backed Mr Harrach’s statement in an interview on Hungarian Radio, 
suggesting that Hungarian Roma should “try to study and work more.”
These comments followed the flight of several families of Hungarian Roma, totalling 
approximately 50 people, to France in mid-July. The families have been without a secure 
place to live and have repeatedly been forced to move since the local government destroyed 
their homes in Zamoly in 1997. While still in Zamoly, they received numerous oral and 
written death threats. From late 1999, they were housed in Budapest, where they lived until 
April 2000 in one very small flat, not capable of adequately housing the group. Following 
their move to Budapest, the mayor of Zamoly attempted unsuccessfully to have their official 
address removed from the Zamoly town records.
In April 2000, the Zamoly Roma were again forced to move, this time to the village of Csor 
where, with the assistance only of a relative, they were sheltered in a basement garage, a coal 
cellar and a furnace room with no heat, lighting or warm water. Mr Dezso Csete, the mayor of 
Cs6r, was widely quoted in the Hungarian press after, in direct reference to the Zamoly Roma, 
he stated on national television on April 27, 2000, “At the present time, I believe that the 
Roma of Zdmoly have no place among human beings. Just as in the animal world, parasites 
must be expelled.” Mr Csete has to date suffered no negative consequences as a result of his 
statement. The village of Zamoly sanctioned the construction of substandard housing at the 
edge of town, in a low area plagued by flooding. On February 21, 2000, authorities issued an 
occupancy permit for the houses in Zamoly, despite the fact that the houses did not meet the 
habitability requirements established by law. As of August 31, 2000, the habitability 
requirements still had not been fulfilled. The ERRC has awarded a grant to an attorney to 
represent six Romani families from Zamoly in their complaint against the Mayor of Zamoly.
A complaint was filed on June 15, 2000, with the Szekesfehervar Municipal Court, and was 
later removed to the Fejer Country Court. The first hearing in the case has been scheduled for 
October 31, 2000.
The ERRC held a press conference in Zamoly on August 
31, 2000, (i) to clarify the facts and underlying legal bases 
for the complaint lodged by the Zamoly Roma, in 
response to the lack of accurate and objective information 
made available to the public on the case; and (ii) to 
express concern at the quality and tenor of public 
statements made by Hungarian officials, including high- 
ranking members of the government, about the Zamoly 
case, which may have exacerbated an already tense 
situation vis-a-vis Roma in Hungary.
(Agence France Press, ERRC, Radio Free Europe, Roma 
Press Centre)
Housing on the outskirts o f Zamoly, central Hungary, August 
2000, for Roma from the town. The black marks are mould 
caused by flooding. The local government has authorised the 
houses as ready, despite their evidently uninhabitable state.
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